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I. INTRODUCTION
California Penal Code section 1538.5 governs how a motion to suppress
evidence [hereinafter MTS] is made at a preliminary hearing.' A defendant has the
right to file a MTS if the search was done without a warrant and was unreasonable.2
A defendant may also make a MTS if there was a seizure with a warrant under
specific instances For example, if a warrant is insufficient on its face or the
property seized was not the same property as that described in the warrant, then the
defendant may file a MTS.4 These instances and others are enumerated in Penal
Code section 1538.5.' Courts have interpreted this section differently with regard
to when and how a MTS may be made before trial.6 This has led to the enactment
of local rules that differ on how to govern a MTS at the preliminary hearing.7 For
instance, in Riverside County, a defendant may make an oral MTS at the pre-
liminary hearing, however while in San Francisco, a defendant may not.
8
Local courts also differ on what must be pled in a MTS.9 For example,
Riverside County court rules provide that a MTS does not have to be accompanied
I. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrFEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrTFEE ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 2 (July 1, 1997)
(stating that under Penal Code § 1538.5, a defendant may file a MTS under certain conditions).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a) (West 1997).
3. Id. § 1538.5(b) (West 1997).
4. Id.
5. See id. (explaining that a search or seizure with a warrant would be unreasonable if- (1) warrant is
insufficient on the face, (2) property was not that described in warrant, (3) lack of probable cause for the issued
warrant, (4) execution of the warrant violated federal and state constitutional standards, or (5) any other violation
of federal or state standards).
6. See 4 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTIEN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Procedure in Lower Courts
§ 2253 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining how courts have interpreted Penal Code § 1538.5 differently).
7. See SENATE COMMIrrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrTTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 3 (Mar. 11,
1997) (explaining that local rules may differ depending on the jurisdiction).
8. Compare RIVERSIDE, CAL, R. Cr. 7.5100(B)(2) (allowing a MTS to be made orally during the
preliminary hearing), with SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., R. CT. 10.14(B) (requiring all motions to be made in writing).
9. Id.
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by a memorandum of points and authorities.' ° However, under San Francisco
County court rules, a MTS must be accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities." Chapter 279 expands existing law by making the requirements of a
MTS under Penal Code section 1538.5 uniform and by limiting the discretion of the
local courts.'
2
Three procedural issues are addressed in Chapter 279. First, the Legislature
believes that an oral motion to suppress evidence by a defendant during the pre-
liminary hearing abridges the people's due process rights under the California Con-
stitution.'3 Second, prosecutors were wasting valuable resources trying to prepare
for a surprise MTS by the defendant. 4 Prosecutors also needed to ensure that any
peace officer who seized evidence for the prosecution's case was able to testify at
the preliminary hearing. 5 This was necessary because a number of California state
courts allowed defendants to make an oral MTS during the preliminary hearing.'
6
This procedure worked against the prosecution, giving them no notice as to what
evidence presented would be objected to by the defense. t7 Chapter 279 attempts to
fix both these problems by expanding the procedure required to make a MTS under
Penal Code section 1538.5.18 Finally, Chapter 279 addresses when a misdemeanor
arrest warrant may be served on a defendant at his house by amending Penal Code
section 817, which deals with misdemeanor arrest warrants, so that they comply
with the time limitations set forth in Penal Code section 840.'9
10. RIVERSIDE, CAL., R. Cr. 7.5100(B)(2).
11. SANFRANCISCO, CAL, R. Cr. 10.14(B).
12. See SENATE COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 123, at 3 (May 13,
1997) (stating that under Chapter 279, a memorandum of points and authorities will be required for all MTSs
thereby limiting the discretion of local courts).
13. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30 (vest 1997) (added by Proposition 15, this § of the California Constitution
provides that the people of California have the right to a fair and cost efficient trial which is violated by the
defendants ability to make an oral MTS at the preliminary hearing because of the added cost the prosccution incurs
in preparing for a surprise oral MTS by the defendant); see Ass EMIBLY CONtMMTEEON PUBLICSATETY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OFSB 123, at 3 (July 1, 1997) (stating that requiring the defendant to give a noticed memorandum of
points and authorities when filing a MTS will protect the people's right to due process).
14. See ASSEMBLY COMMI'EEON PUBLIC SAFE-rY, CoMIrrrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 123, at 3 (July 1, 1997)
(explaining that the police officer who had seized the evidence from the defendant would have to be available to
testify in case the defendant made a MTS).
15. See id. (quoting the author as saying, "[SB 123] would relieve [District Attorneys] from having tI
needlessly subpoena victims and peace officers into court in the off chance a defendant decides to bring a motion
to suppress at the preliminary hearing").
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. CAL PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (amended by Chapter 279).
19. See ASSEMBLY COMMI'TTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, Co.iMrrmT- ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 6 (July 1. 1997)
(explaining how lower courts have been confused as to what statute to follow when issuing misdemeanor arrest
warrants at night).
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II. CURRENT LAW: CONFUSION ABOUT WHETHER SECTION 1538.5 PRoVIDES THE
DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO MAKE AN ORAL MTS AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
Penal Code section 1538.5 gives the defendant in felony and misdemeanor
prosecutions the opportunity to make a MTS at various stages in the criminal
procedural process.2" One of the opportunities for the defendant to make a MTS in
felony prosecutions is at the preliminary hearing.21 The MTS filed at the time of the
preliminary hearing is limited to evidence which the prosecution is attempting to
introduce at the preliminary hearing.Y However, courts have had difficulty in deter-
mining what procedure must be followed when making a MTS at the preliminary
hearing' Specifically, courts have differed on whether Penal Code section 1538.5
gives the defendant the right to make an oral MTS at the preliminary hearing, and
whether local court rules may abridge this right.24
In People v. Manning s the court held that in misdemeanor cases a MTS pur-
suant to Penal Code section 1538.5(g)26 did not require written notice and may be
made orally.2' The court stated that in felony prosecutions a MTS made pursuant to
Penal Code section 153 8.5(f) may be made orally at the preliminary hearing without
giving notice to the prosecution.28 The court reasoned that because misdemeanor
prosecutions do not have a preliminary hearing where the defendant has the oppor-
tunity to raise a MTS orally, a MTS made at any pretrial conference may be made
orally without notice to the prosecution.29
Manning clearly states that local rules may govern a MTS. 0 However, the court
did not apply the local rule when it discussed the defendant's right to make an oral
20. See CAL. PENALCODE§ 1538.5 (West 1997) (detailing when a MTS may be filed).
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(0 (West 1997).
22. Id. § 1538.5 (West 1995).
23. SeeASSEMBLYCOMMITEEONPUBLICSAFmTY, CoMMrrYEEANALYSisOFSB 123, at 3-5 (July 1, 1997)
(stating that some courts have ruled that local courts may govern MTS under 1538.5, but noting that other courts
have ruled otherwise).
24. See infra notes 25-50 and accompanying text (explaining how courts have interpreted Penal Code
section 1538.5).
25. 33 Cal. App. 3d 586, 109 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1973).
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(g) (West 1997) (stating that the defendant may make a MTS "at the
preliminary hearing").
27. See Manning, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 597, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (reasoning that making a MTS at a
preliminary hearing would be procedurally difficult if the defense had to give prior written notice to the
prosecution).
28. See id. (stating that, procedurally, a written motion made pursuant to California Penal Code § 1538.5(0
"[did] not lend itself to prior written notice of motion").
29. Id.
30. See id. at 598, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (stating that since California Penal Code § 1538.5 references
established motion practice and does not provide a unique one, local court procedures and rules will govern
suppression motions).
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motion.1 Instead, the court deferred to the legislative intent of Penal Code section
1538.5.32 Therefore, Manning has been interpreted as both prohibiting and allowing
local rules to govern how a MTS is made, creating confusion in the courts as to
whether a defendant is able to make an oral MTS at the preliminary hearing.
33
Following the reasoning of the court in Manning, several other courts have
interpreted Penal Code section 1538.5 as permitting the use of an oral MTS.34 For
example, in People v. Ciraco,5 the court held that the language used in Penal Code
section 1538.5 suggested that the Legislature intended to give the defendant the
right to make an oral MTS during the preliminary hearing.36 The court further
reasoned that a defendant is not in the position to foresee what evidence may be
introduced by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing. Therefore the defendant's
right to make an oral MTS at the preliminary hearing protects a defendant caught
off guard by the introduction of surprise evidence, to which the defendant would
otherwise object.37 Another case decided by following the Manning reasoning is
Cox v. Superior Court38 which held that local courts may not abridge the defen-
dant's right under Penal Code section 1538.5 to make an oral MTS at the
preliminary hearing.3
9
However, there are a number of cases that interpret Manning and Penal Code
section 1538.5 differently.40 In People v. Lewis,4' an appellate court upheld a muni-
cipal court's denial of an oral MTS on the grounds that it did not comply with local
court rules. 2 The appellate court cited Manning for support in deciding that local
31. See id. at 597,109 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (noting that the legislature implicitly allowed oral MTSs to be made
in felony eases during the preliminary hearing therefore, by analogy since misdemeanors have no preliminary
hearing the legislature must have meant to allow oral MTSs during the pretrial stage).
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in eases which have followed the
Manning courts reasoning).
34. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of such cases).
35. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1142,226 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1986).
36. See id. at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (determining that the legislature in using the language "at the
preliminary hearing" intended that a defendant could raise a MTS orally while the preliminary hearing was going
on).
37. See id. (stating that requiring advance notice on a MTS during the preliminary hearing would lead to
three alternatives: (1) the defense council would have to be "clairvoyant;" (2) the preliminary process would have
to be interrupted every time evidence was introduced that the defendant wanted to make a MTS on, so that they
could give notice to the prosecution; and/or (3) the defendant's right to make constitutional objections to an invalid
search and seizure would be lost during the preliminary hearing).
38. 19 Cal. App. 4th 1048, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (1994).
39. See id. at 1051, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 753 (holding that Shasta County local court rules 7.03(E) and 10.03
where invalid because they required a defendant to give notice to the prosecution before making a MTS, and thus
were inconsistent with the legislative intent of California Penal Code § 1538.5).
40. See People v. Hallman, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1330, 1341,264 Cal. Rptr. 215.221 (1989) (stating that local
court rules, which aid the court in promoting judicial economy, govern the pleading requirements of California
Penal Code § 1538.5); see also People v. Coleman, 229 Cal. App. 3d 321, 325, 280 Cal. Rptr. 54, 56 (1991)
(agreeing with the ruling in Hallman).
41. 71 Cal. App. 3d 817, 139 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1977).
42. Id. at 820-21, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
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rules43 governed making a MTS under Penal Code section 1538.5 because the
statute deferred to established motion practice during the preliminary hearing.44
ImI. CURRENT LAw: CONFLICT AS TO HOW MUCH SPECIFICITY A MTS REQUIRES
The requirements for a defendant's pleading in a MTS vary depending on local
court rules which normally determine the requirements for a sufficiently pled MTS
motion.45 Local court rules often require that the MTS pleading be accompanied by
points and authorities, contain a detailed description of the evidence to be sup-
pressed, and contain the specific grounds for suppression.46
However, courts have refused to uphold pleading requirements under local court
rules where the defendant made a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a
search warrant 7 In these cases, the courts have ruled that when a defendant makes
a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a search warrant, the pleading
would be sufficient if it contained a description of the property and pleads that the
evidence was obtained without a search warrant as grounds for suppression.48
In Manning, the court reasoned that the purpose behind Penal Code section
1538.5 was to shift the procedural burden for pleading a MTS to the defendant,
while maintaining the same burden on the prosecution to prove that the evidence
it wishes to introduce was obtained properly.4 9 Therefore, when pleading a MTS the
defendant is required to give clear details of the evidence they wish to suppress, the
specific grounds for suppression, as well as whatever the local court rule requires
to be pled.5
However, the court in Wilder v. County of Tulare 5 reasoned that where the
evidence was obtained without a search warrant, the defendant's initial pleading of
a MTS is sufficient if it contains a specific description of the illegally obtained
evidence and provides grounds for suppression of evidence obtained without a
search warrant. 52 The court also propounded the procedural steps to be taken after
43. BEVERLY HLLS, CA, MUNICIPAL CT. R. 55.11(C).
44. See Lewis, 71 Cal. App. 3d at 820-21, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (stating that the court in Manning had
understood that local rules would apply to a MTS under California Penal Code § 1538.5).
45. See ALAMEDA, CA, R. CT. 19 (listing the requirements which the local court requires for filing a MTS
under California Penal Code § 1538.5).
46. Id.
47. See Wilder v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 90,97, 154 Cal. Rptr. 494,498 (1979) (overruling a local
court rule which required the defendant to file a points and authorities).
48. Id. at 97, 154 Cal. Rptr. 494 at 498.
49. See Manning, 33 Cal. App. 3d. at 596, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 538 (stating that the intention of California
Penal Code § 1538.5 was to outline the procedural burdens of the parties, while leaving the burdens of proof alone).
50. See id. (explaining what must be plead in the defendants MTS).
51. 92 Cal. App. 3d 90, 154 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979).
52. See id. at 96, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98 (noting where the defendant bears the burden of pleading).
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this initial pleading by the defendant.53 The Wilder court came to the conclusion that
when the prosecution introduces evidence obtained without a search warrant, a
defendant need not plead with specificity the grounds on which they are making a
MTS because the prosecution bears the burden of proof in justifying a warrantless
search. 4
In People v. Hallman,55 the court sharply criticizes the decision in Wilder.56 In
arguing that the Wilder procedure required for pleading a MTS is erroneous, the
court brings up two points.57 First, it contended that the Wilder court had failed to
recognize the difference between the burden of proving that the evidence presented
was obtained legally and the burden required in pleading a motion.58 Second, it
parroted the Manning court's deference to local rules regarding the requirements of
pleading a MTS under Penal Code section 1538.5. 59
rv. MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER SECTION 1538.5 AFTER CHAPTER 279
A. Oral Motions
Chapter 279 eliminates a defendant's ability to make an oral motion during the
preliminary hearing when charged with a felony offense.6 Specifically, it now
requires defendants to serve the prosecution with notice of the MTS five days prior
to the preliminary hearing.6' Chapter 279 recognizes that the defendant under this
procedure may be caught by surprise during the preliminary hearing with evidence
it had no knowledge of prior to the hearing, but about which the defendant would
like to file a MTS. 62 Chapter 279 makes allowances for such a contingency.
63
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 279, a magistrate conducting a preliminary
hearing had the discretion to grant the prosecution a continuance when surprised by
an oral MTS during the hearing.64 Under Chapter 279, the magistrate has this same
discretion to allow a continuance in order to permit a defendant who has been
53. See id. at 97, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (establishing that after defendants initial pleading, the burden then
shifts to the prosecution to justify the warrantless search and seizure in its responsive pleading, followed by an
opportunity for the defendant to respond to the prosecution's justifications).
54. Id
55. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1330,264 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1989).
56. Id. at 1333, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
57. Id. at 1337-41, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 218-21.
58. Id
59. Id.
60. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMITEE ANALYSTS OF SB 123, at 2 (Mar. 11,
1997) (explaining that Chapter 279 now requires the defendant to give notice of a MTS prior to the hearing).
61. CAL. PENALCODE § 1538.5 (amended by Chapter 279).
62. See ASsEBMLYCOMijTEEONPUBLiCSAFETY, CoMMITrEs ANAL)Ysis OFSB 123, at 3 (July 1, 1997)
(stating that committee members had concerns that circumstances would arise where the defendant would be
surprised).
63. Id.
64. CAL PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West 1997).
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surprised by evidence introduced by the prosecution to file a written MTS.65 There-
fore, the defendant will not lose his ability to challenge evidence at the preliminary
hearing with a MTS.'
Prior to Chapter 279, a number of courts permitted the defendant to make a
MTS orally at the preliminary hearing without having to show much support for the
motion.67 After the defendant had made this motion, the prosecution would be
required to support fully the validity of its challenged evidence.68 Therefore, the
defendant, without having to plead any specific wrongdoing on the part of the
prosecution, was able to make the prosecution fully prove that all the evidence they
introduced was properly obtained.69
Chapter 279 effectively shifts the burden of making the initial pleading to the
defendant by requiring them to plead specifically why they are making a MTS prior
to the preliminary hearing and by requiring them to include points and authorities
with their written motion.70 Therefore, the defendant can no longer make the pro-
secution prove the validity of challenged evidence without making a specific
showing of the grounds upon which they have challenged the evidence.7 t Further-
more, Chapter 279 sets forth the procedure that the prosecution must follow in filing
a response to a MTS made prior to the preliminary hearing.72 Chapter 279 requires
the prosecution to serve any written response to the defendant within a minimum
of two days prior to the hearing.73
B. Pleading Requirements of a MTS Under 1538.5 After Chapter 279
Chapter 279 sets forth the conditions for adequately pleading a MTS under
Penal Code section 1538.5.74 Specifically, Chapter 279 outlines four requirements
for a sufficient MTS: (1) a MTS must contain a list of the specific items of evidence
which the defendant wishes to suppress;75 (2) a MTS must outline the grounds in
support of suppression; (3) a MTS must be accompanied by a memorandum of
65. See id. § 1538.5(0(2) (amended by Chapter 279) (stating that a continuance may be granted to the
defendant to file a written motion).
66. Id.
67. See SENATE CoMmrrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMMrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 4 (May 13,
1997) (explaining that a defendant may make a MTS in jurisdictions that follow Wilder without having to point to
any specifics in the motion).
68. See id. at 5 (explaining how the prosecution was unaware of the evidence the defendant would try to
suppress, and therefore the prosecution had to take extreme measures to make sure they were prepared for all
contingencies).
69. Id.
70. SENATE RUMys COMMtTrEE, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 123, at I (July, 8 1997).
71. 1d
72. See CAL. PENALCODE §1538.5(0(3) (amended by Chapter 279) (stating that the prosecutor must return
his response to the defendant two days before preliminary hearing).
73. Id. §1538.5(f)(3) (amended by Chapter 279).
74. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
75. CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5(f)(2) (amended by Chapter 279).
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points and authorities; and (4) the defendant must show proof of service by the
prosecution.76 The first two requirements do not change existing law except to
require that this information must always be in writing." Therefore local districts
that followed Wilder must now eliminate all oral MTS's made during the
preliminary hearing because Chapter 279 overrules that case.78 The second two
requirements add to the procedural barriers defendants must contend with if they
wish to make a MTS. 79 Some have argued that the addition of these barriers will
deter overworked public defenders from making a MTS to protect their client. 80
C. Misdemeanor Arrest Warrants and Chapter 279
In People v. Ramey,8t the California Supreme Court held that the federal and
California Constitution prohibits the arrest of a person within his home based on
probable cause without a warrant. 82 The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
protects people from unreasonable searches of their homes.83 This protection
extends to arrests made within the home." Therefore, an arrest based on probable
cause made in a person's home without a warrant is a violation of that person's
Fourth Amendment rights and is per se unreasonable. 5 A recent decision, People
v. Bittaker,8 6 affirmed the Ramey court's decision regarding felony arrests and has
been interpreted as extending to misdemeanor arrests as well. 7
The rulings in Ramey and Bittaker were codified in Penal Code section 813 for
felony arrests and Penal Code section 817 for misdemeanor arrests.88 Under existing
law, felony arrest warrants made pursuant to Penal Code section 813 may not be
served by a police officer after ten at night or before six in the morning.8 9 The
Legislature meant to apply the same time limitations to misdemeanor arrest
76. See ASSEMBLYCOMMI'rEEONPUBLICSAFETY, CoMMIFEEANALYSISOFSB 123, at I (July 1, 1997);
see also CAL PENAL CODE § 1538.5(f(2) (amended by Chapter 279) (requiring a MrS to be accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities).
77. ASSEMBLY COMWITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM= ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 3 (July 1, 1997).
78. See SENATE COMMIM"EE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 5 (Mar. 11,
1997) (stating that it was part of the author's intent to overrule the decision in Wilder).
79. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (describing what is now required to be filed with a MTS).
80. See SENATE COMMTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMm'EE ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 4 (Mar. 11,
1997) (reporting that opposition to the bill believes it will create more of a burden for the courts).
81. 16 Cal. 3d 263,545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).




86. 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 774 P.2d 659, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1989).
87. Id. at 1071, 774 P.2d at 671, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
88. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 563, sec. 4, at 3449 (West) (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 817 and
amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 813, § 826) (stating that Chapter 563 codified the ruling in Bittaker).
89. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 123, at 5 (July 1, 1997)
(explaining how Penal Code §§ 836, 817 and 840 worked together).
496
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warrants issued pursuant to Penal Code section 817.V0 However, because of the lack
of clarity in Penal Code section 817, the time limitations have not been applied to
misdemeanor arrests. 9
The Legislature enacted Chapter 279 to clarify when misdemeanor arrest
warrants issued pursuant to Penal Code section 817 may be served. 92 Chapter 279
makes it clear that misdemeanor arrest warrants issued under Penal Code section
817 must follow the guidelines for service described in Penal Code section 840.93
Penal Code section 840 prohibits the serving of arrest warrants by police at a per-
son's house between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.94 By enacting Chapter 279, the
Legislature has cleared up an anomaly under prior law where misdemeanor arrest
warrants based on probable cause could be served anytime day or night, but service
of felony arrest warrants were restricted to specific hours. 95
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES REGARDING IMPROPERLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
Chapter 279 makes it more difficult for the defendant to make a MTS. The
defendant's ability to challenge evidence in this manner is important because
evidence obtained by a state agency which was obtained by an improper invasion
of privacy without due process may not be used in criminal prosecutions. 96 When
the prosecution introduces evidence, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
that the method that was used in obtaining evidence was justified.9 7 However,
unless the evidence is objected to by the defendant through a MTS, the prosecution
does not have to meet this burden.98 An exception to this rule exists when it is
clearly evident that the evidence was obtained illegally.99 Therefore, the ability to
file a MTS is an important procedural safeguard for the defendant against the intro-
duction of improperly seized evidence.
90. See id. (stating that it was the Legislature's intent when drafting California Penal Code § 817 that the
limitations of California Penal Code § 840 apply).
91. Id.
92. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 6 (July 1, 1997)
(stating that judges in San Diego had voiced concern over how California Penal Code § 817 applied in misdemeanor
situations).
93. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 817 (amended by Chapter 279) (stating clearly that misdemeanor arrest
warrants were governed by California Penal Code § 840 in regards to the timing of service).
94. Id. § 840 (West 1997).
95. See ASSEMBLY COMMI"rEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 123, at 3 (July 1, 1997)
(explaining that originally both California Penal Code § 817 and § 836 were supposed to have time limitations on
when they may be served).
96. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,657 (1961) (expounding the exclusionary rule which requires that the
fruits of an illegal search may not be used as evidence).
97. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 582-83 (explaining that the burden of proof is on the prosecution).
98. Wilder, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 96-97, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
99. Id.
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One example of evidence that can be suppressed is evidence which is seized
pursuant to a warrantless search of a private home. t°° Evidence seized in this man-
ner is per se unconstitutional, unless there is an applicable exception for entering
the house.' 1 Furthermore, evidence found outside the scope of the police officer's
search to secure the premises may also be a constitutional violation and therefore
may be suppressed." 2
In California, Badillo v. Superior Court'03 outlined who has the burden of
proving that evidence obtained without a search warrant was the result of a justified
search.' °4 The court in Badillo placed the burden on the prosecution to show that
reasonable cause or some other justification existed for the search and seizure.0 5
Chapter 279 creates greater procedural barriers for the defendant in trying to sup-
press illegally obtained evidence.'1 6 However, it specifically states that it does not
change the prosecution's need to prove that evidence which is objected to by the
defendant by means of a MTS was not the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. 7
Under Chapter 279, the defendant still has an opportunity to suppress evidence
before trial by making a written MTS prior to the Preliminary hearing or by
requesting a continuance during the Preliminary hearing in order to file a MTS.05
Therefore the defendant will be protected from tainted evidence being used against
him.1°)
VI. CONCLUSION
Conflicting views in the courts as to the procedural requirements of filing a
MTS under Penal Code section 1538.5 have led to inconsistent local court rules in
California."0 Jurisdictions that allow oral MTSs to be made by the defendant at the
preliminary hearing or allow a defendant to file a MTS without accompanying
points and authorities will have to change their policies. Chapter 279 rejects an oral
MTS made during the preliminary hearing. It also eliminates the procedure of filing
a MTS without accompanying points and authorities."' Chapter 279 states that it
100. Id.
101. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 583 (stating that no arrest in one's home without a warrant is valid unless under
exigent circumstances, such as if the arrest was made in hot pursuit).
102. Id. at 583.
103. 46 Cal. 2d 269, 294 P.2d 23 (1956).
104. Id. at 271,294 P.2d at 26.
105. See id. at 271, 294 P.2d at 25 (supporting the notion that the prosecutor bears the burden of proving a
search without an arrest warrant is invalid).
106. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
107. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5 (amended by Chapter 279) (stating that the statute does nothing to
abridge the ruling of Badillo).
108. Id.
109. 1d.
110. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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does not change the constitutional burden of proof requirements as set forth in
Badillo."2 However, Chapter 279 has been criticized as either requiring the defen-
dant to guess at what evidence will be offered or having the preliminary hearing be
subject to possibly numerous delays 13
Furthermore, Chapter 279 creates more work for defense attorneys who are no
longer able to make a simple oral MTS at the preliminary hearing' 1 4 Since most
criminal defense attorneys are overworked public defenders, the added procedural
burden created by Chapter 279 may discourage some attorneys from making a
MTS, even though it would be in his client's best interest.! 5 In some cases a defen-
dant may be prosecuted with evidence which otherwise would have been suppres-
sed. The ability of the defendant to suppress evidence through a MTS is an
important procedural safeguard." 6 This safeguard may be hindered by the added
procedures imposed by Chapter 279. Nevertheless, because the defendant' s right to
make a MTS has not been changed, due process will not be violated merely because
Chapter 279 creates more work for the defendant's attorney.
112. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (outlining the importance of a MTS to the defendants due
process rights).
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Getting Tough on Homeless Sex Offenders: Is the New




Penal Code § 290 (amended).
SB 882 (Schiff); 1997 STAT. Ch. 821
I. INTRODUCTION
We see it in the headlines all too frequently; another child sexually molested
and often brutally murdered by a repeat sex offender. Names like Polly Klaas t and
Megan Kanka2 are reminders of all the ,other victims, too many to name, who have
met the same fate.3 The public is increasingly frustrated with a system that doesn't
protect its children from the nightmare of sexual abuse.4 New legislation dealing
1. See Ellen Hale, Stolen Children-Repeat Sex Offenders Prey on Children, GANNET NEWS SERV., Nov.
10, 1993 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing the Polly Klaas story, and noting the sympathy
which captured the nation and fueled a campaign for stricter measures with respect to repeat offenders)
2. See Richard Jerome et al., Megan's Legacy: Little Megan Kanka was Brutally Murdered. Now Her
Family Wnts Other Parents to Know When a Sex Offender Moves in Next Door, PEOPLE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 46 (dis-
cussing the tragedy of Megan Kanka, who was kidnaped, sexually assaulted, and murdered by a repeat offender),
Megan's story inspired New Jersey's "Megan's Law," a version of which has been enacted in other states as well.
See, e.g.. N.J. STAT.ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West 1996) (establishing registration and notification requirements
for sex offenders in New Jersey).
3. See Shari . Geller, Zero Tolerance for Child Molesters and Sexual Predators: Why Do We Release
Convicted Pedophiles So They Can Do It Again and Again? Make it a One-Strike Offense. L.A. TiMES, Dec. 16,
1996, at B5 (describing the kidnap and murder of DeAnn Emerald Mu'min and Alicia Sybilla Jones)
4. See Turning Point: The Revolving Door: When Sex Offenders Go Free, (ABC television broadcast, Sept.
21, 1994) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing public opinion and the "Tennis Shoe Brigade"
in Washington-a group dedicated to sex offense issues); see also Brian D. Crecente, Candlelight Vigil to Mark
Year Since Amber Abduction, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 7, 1997, at 4 (describing the one-year anni-
versary of the abduction and murder of 9 year-old Amber Hagerman, and noting that the anniversary has spurred
action by the Arglington group "People Against Sex Offenders"); Eric Harrison, Tougher Sex-Crime Laws Spark
Right-to-Know Flap Legislation: Backers Say Public Should Be Told About Offenders' Presence. Experts Fear
More Harm Than Good, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at Al (noting that a fed-up nation, fueled by fear and
frustration with the rising ti&. of sex crimes committed against children, is lashing out with laws and punitive
measures); Shawn Hubler, "Pillowcase Rapist": Latest Catalyst ForAnti-Crime Drives. L.A. TiMES, Jan. 27, 1996,
at 1 (asserting that the public outrage over highly publicized cases of child abuse, along with the fact that victims
are more willing to report such attacks, has increased public fear that sex offenders, if freed, will attack again);
Louise Slaughter, Rep. Slaughter Calls on Congress to Protect Citizens from Violent Sex Offenders, Government
Press Release by Federal Document Clearing House, June 23, 1997 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(commenting that "people are fed up with a legal system that allows people, like five-time convicted sex offender
Leroy Hendricks, to revolve in and out of prison repeating gruesome crimes in state after state").
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with the registration of sex offenders, has been, and continues to be, enacted in
many states in response to public furor.5 However, even with the enactment of new
legislation, according to law makers and law enforcement officials, there are flaws
in the registration system which need to be corrected. 6 Chapter 821' is California's
attempt to correct such a perceived flaw.
II. EXiSTiNG LAW
Existing law requires a convicted sex offender to register for the rest of his8 life
with local law enforcement officials upon release from confinement. 9 The sex
5. See Jan Hoffman, New Law is Urged on Freed Sex Offenders, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at BI (noting
that neighbors of a murdered girl in New Jersey, Megan Kanka, urged state legislators to pass new legislation,
called Megan's Law, requiring community notification of the presence of sex offenders in the neighborhood); see
also Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 14071 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring all states to implement laws concerning the registration of sex offenders or
risk losing federal funds).
6. See Ivan Sciupac, Megan's Law To Get Revisions: Legislators Hope to Fill in Cracks, DAILY NEws
L.A., July 13, 1997, at N4 (noting that the current system is far from ideal and that legislators hope to fill in the
cracks with legislation such as Chapter 821); see also infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (describing the
inaccurate results obtained by the Department of Justice and the Los Angeles Police Department when tracking
registered sex offenders).
7. Chapter 821 amends California Code of Civil Procedure § 1279.5 and California Penal Code CODE §§
243.4, 290, and 290.4 relating to sex offenders. This article will focus on the provision of Chapter 821, which
amends California Penal Code § 290, relating to homeless sex offenders.
8. Use of the word "his" rather than a gender neutral term is due to the nature of the typical sex offender.
According to a study by the National Institute of Health, a typical sex offender is male, begins molesting at the age
of 15, molests an average of 117 children, and often seeks access to a child by legitimate means. ASSEMBLY
COMMrrrEEON PUBLIC SAFEY, COMM EE ANALYSIS OFSB 1254, at 2 (July 11, 1997).
9. See CAI. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West Supp. 1997) (loitering about a toilet open to the public for the
purpose of engaging or soliciting any lewd or lascivious or unlawful act); id. § 647.6 (West Supp. 1997) (molesting
a child under the age of 18); id. § 314 (West 1988) (indecent exposure); id. § 311.2 (West Supp. 1997) (printing,
exhibiting, distributing, exchanging, or possessing matter depicting sexual conduct by a minor); id. § 311.3 (West
Supp. 1997) (sexual exploitation of a child); id. § 311.4 (West Supp. 1997) (employment of a minor to perform
prohibited acts as described in § 311.2); id. § 290(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring specific sex offenders to
register with respective peace officers in the offender's area of domicile); id. § 290(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997) (listing
the specific criminal violations that trigger the registration requirement); id. § 288 (West Supp. 1997) (lewd or
lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14); id. § 288(a) (West Supp. 1997) (oral copulation); id. § 288.5 (West
Supp. 1997) (continuous sexual abuse of a child); id. § 286 (West Supp. 1997) (sodomy); id. § 285 (West 1988)
(incest); id. § 267 (West 1988) (abduction of a person under the age of 18 for purpose of prostitution); id. § 266
(West 1988) (procuring a female for prostitution); id. § 266G) (West 1988) (procuring a child under the age of 16
for lewd and lascivious acts); id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 1997) (rape or penetration of genital or anal openings); id.
§ 261 (West Supp. 1997) (rape); id. § 243.4 (West Supp. 1997) (sexual battery); id. § 220 (West 1988) (assault to
commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, rape in concert with another, lascivious acts upon a child, or penetration of
genitals or anus with a foreign object); id. § 208(d) (West Supp. 1997) (kidnaping with intent to commit rape, oral
copulation, sodomy, or rape by instrument).
1998 / Criminal Procedure
offender must update the registration information annually, or within five working
days of entering a municipality 0 Failure to register is a crime.'"
However, due to the transient nature of sex offenders,12 law enforcement
officials often find that they are not in possession of current information regarding
sex offenders.13 In 1995, the State Department of Justice sent postcards to the add-
resses it had for all registered sex offenders in order to remind them of the
registration requirements. 4 Twenty percent of all of the postcards sent out statewide
were returned as undeliverable, leading officials to conclude that they had lost track
of one-fifth of the sex-offenders.' 5 This was not an isolated incident. 6 In Los
Angeles, the police department has approximately 3,200 registered sex offenders
on the books,' 7 but according to state prison release information and other public
records, the actual number of sex offenders in the Los Angeles area is closer to
8,100.18
Homeless sex offenders pose a special problem under the current registration
system because they have no residence address to change when they move. The
current registration system requires sex offenders to register if they plan to be in a
municipality for five days or more.' 9 Therefore, although homeless sex offenders
10. Id. § 290(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring that a person required to register shall register within five
working days of coming into any city or county in which he or she resides for that length of time).
I1. See id. § 290(g)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that failure to register is a felony if the underlying
crime was a felony).
12. See Nicholas Riccardi & Jeff Leeds, Many Sex Offenders Not at RegisteredAddresses, L.A. TIMES, July
12, 1997, at Al (noting the vast discrepancy between the number of listed sex offenders and the number of sex
offende-s law enforcement officials are able to find, and characterizing sex offenders as "notoriously mobile and
elusive").
13. See id. (identifying an enormous error rate of approximately 70% in the registration system in the Los
Angeles County sheriff's department; an estimated two-thirds of the county's high-risk sex offenders were not at
their registered addresses).
14. See Jeff Leeds & Nicholas Riccardi, Many Molesters' Addresses are Unknown Officials Say, L.A.
TMs, jan. 30, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Molesters'Addresses Unknown] (quoting an official in charge of the Los
Angeles Police Department's data base as saying that the system is a complete nightmare, and that sex offenders
can pretty much go wherever they want); see also Thao Hua, In Orange County, A Third of Book's Pedophiles Live
in Anaheim, L.A. TIMts, Feb. 22, 1996, at B1 (stating that when sex offenders are released from jail, they're
allowed to use the parole or probation address as their address until they get settled, and some sex offenders never
change the address).
15. Molesters'Addresses Unknown, supra note 14, at Al.
16. See Kenneth Reich, Many Simply Ignore Law: Sex OffenderRegistration Not Working, Experts Say, L.A.
TIES, Aug. 8, 1986, at I (describing how thousands of people required to register are not doing so and many more
thousands who have registered at least once are not notifying the authorities when they move). The Los Angeles
Police Department stopped even trying to contact by mail those released sex offenders for whom it had received
notices from state institutions of requirements to register and who did not appear voluntarily. Id.
17. Molesters' Addresses Unknown, supra note 14, at Al.
18. Id.
19. See Steve Ryfle & Efrain Hernandez Jr., Sex Offender Suspected in Burbank Rape, Hangs Himself in
Jail, L.A. TtMs, Jan. 16, 1997, at B4 (describing the suicide of a 28-year old transient who was arrested for raping
an 1 1-year old girl in California while on parole in Oregon for sexually abusing a 5-year old girl, and asserting that
sex offender registration may need to be made stricter for transients); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text (discussing the requirements of California Penal Code § 290 that sex offenders register annually, or within five
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may move more than 100 times in a year, if they don't plan to stay in a municipality
for at least five days, they are only required to register once a year.20 Law enforce-
ment officials acknowledge that sex offenders in the data base are "here today and
gone tomorrow," and note that keeping track of the homeless sex offenders is very
difficult.2 ' Chapter 821 attempts to make the tracking of homeless sex offenders
easier by requiring more frequent registration.
III. NEW LAW
Chapter 821 requires registrants with no residence address to update their
registration no less than once every ninety days on a Department of Justice form. 2
This requirement is in addition to the requirement to register within five working
days of coming into any city or county in which the person temporarily resides.2
A registrant with no residence address must register within five working days from
the date of his birthday.24 A registrant who falls to register is guilty of a mis-
demeanor, punishable by up to six months in a county jail. 2
Does Chapter 821 help law enforcement by keeping track of hard to find people
who may have committed another crime, or is it an unnecessary restriction which
imposes an additional burden on a class of individuals based solely on their lack of
a residence?
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES CONCERNING CHAPTER 821
Additional registration requirements pose potential constitutional problems.26
Opponents of Chapter 821 contend that it tramples the civil liberties of individuals
who have already paid their debt to society and imposes an additional burden on a
class of individuals based solely on their lack of a residence.27
Additionally, studies determining the recidivism rates for sex offenders are
inconsistent.28 Some statistics show that sex offenders have a lower recidivism rate
days of moving to a new address).
20. See Ryfle & Hernandez, supra note 19 (quoting the author of Chapter 821 as stating there is "a hole that
needs to be plugged" to prevent transients from moving over 100 times in a year and only registering once).
21. See Riccardi & Leeds, supra note 12, at AI (quoting a Los Angeles County Sheriff Lieutenant who also
described the sex offenders in the database as living in their cars).
22. CAL PENAL CoDE § 290(g)(5) (amended by Chapter 821).
23. Id. (a)(1) (West Supp.1997).
24. Id. (a)(1)(C) (amended by Chapter 821).
25. Id. (a)(1)(B) (amended by Chapter 821).
26. See infra notes 31-101 and accompanying text (noting potential problems concerning cruel and unusual
punishment, equal protection, and ex post facto issues).
27. See Hubler, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting Mary Broderick of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
as saying that when somebody has served their time, that should be it).
28. See Diane Brady, Radical Treatment: A Special Program in Manitoba Seeks to Put Sex Offenders Back
in Society, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 26,1993, at 38 (showing recidivism rates as low as 20%); see also Robert E. Freeman-
Longo & Ronald V. Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime: Can Sex Offenders EverAlter Their Ways? Special
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than do persons convicted of crimes against property.29 There are also many types
of sex offenders, some more likely than others to repeat sex crimes, which com-
plicates any study of recidivism rates among sex offenders.3° Imposing additional
registration requirements when there is little danger to society may amount to cruel
and unusual punishment.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The California Supreme Court has held that the sex offender registration
compelled by California Penal Code section 290 is a form of punishment. 31 The
court also has held that a punishment may be excessive and therefore uncon-
stitutional, not only if it is inflicted by a cruel or unusual method, but also if it is
grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.32 In determining
whether the punishment is disproportionate to the offense, an analysis using the
Lynch test is necessary.33 The Lynch test involves three factors: (1) a consideration
of the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree
of danger both present to society;34 (2) a comparison of the challenged penalty with
penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for more serious crimes;35 and (3) a
comparison of the challenged penalty with penalties imposed for the same offense
in other jurisdictions.36
Treatment Programs Provide Some Hope, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1986, at 58 (estimating a recidivism rate of up
to 80%); Andrew Vaches, Sex Predators They Can't Be Saved, So What Should We Do?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Jan. 10, 1993, at J5 (citing a Minnesota study which found that rapists and child molesters who completed
psychiatric treatment were arrested more often for new sex crimes than those who had not been treated at all).
29. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Truth About Repeat Sex Offenders, L.A. TIMiES, May 5, 1997, at B5
(comparing recidivism rates for those convicted of lewd conduct with those convicted of burglary and robbery).
30. See Treatment For Sex Offenders, SACRAMENTOBEE, Dec. 9, 1991, at B14 (noting the various historics
of sex offenders such as pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism or dirty phone calls, and sexual assault); see also
Hoffman, supra note 5, at BI (explaining the difficulty of casting all sex offenders in the same category).
31. See In Re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914,922, 663 P.2d 216, 220, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662 (1983) (holding that
mandatory registration of sex offenders convicted under misdemeanor disorderly conduct statute is punishment,
that in this instance violated cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Califomia Constitution).
32. See In Re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226 (1972) (concluding
that "in California a punishment may violate article I, section 6, of the Constitution if, although not cruel or unusual
in its mehod, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity").
33. See id. at 425-27, 503 P.2d at 930-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226-28 (1972) (finding that the life sentence
prescribed for a second offense of indecent exposure was so disproportionate to the crime as to violate the cruel or
unusual punishment clause of the California Constitution).
34. Id. at 425,503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
35. Id at 426,503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal Rptr. at227.
36. Id. at 427,503 P.2d at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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1. Nature Of Offense and Degree of Danger To Society
In looking at the nature of the offense, a determination must be made con-
cerning the severity of the offense for which a person can be convicted.37 The
California Supreme Court has considered the lifetime registration penalty as it
applies to various offenses. The court has held that requiring registration under
California Penal Code section 290 for persons convicted of California Penal Code
section 647(a)38 misdemeanors (lewd or dissolute conduct) constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.3 9 The court has held likewise for persons convicted under
Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1 misdemeanors (indecent exposure).' In both
instances, the court found the offenses to be relatively minor in nature.4
Because victims of sexual abuse are often children, because sex offenders tend
to be former victims of molestation themselves, and because the average sex
offender molests multiple times, a sex offense poses a high degree of danger to
society.42 Therefore, under the first factor of the Lynch test, the degree of danger to
society, the ninety day registration update requirement is likely not cruel and
unusual punishment.
2. Comparison of the Challenged Penalty with Penalties Imposed in
the Same Jurisdiction for More Serious Crimes
The basis for the second factor in the Lynch test is the assumption that the
Legislature, while occasionally responding to public emotion, will, for the most
part, act with proper consideration of constitutional limits in establishing penalties
for various offenses. 3 The penalties established by the Legislature will illustrate the
constitutionally permissible degrees of severity.' If, in reviewing the penalties,
more serious crimes are punished less severely than the offense in question, the
challenged penalty is suspect.'
37. See In Re King, 157 Cal. App. 3d 556,557,204 Cal. Rptr. 39,40 (1984) (holding that California Penal
Code § 290, a sex offender registration statute for indecent exposure, is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual
punishment).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West 1996) (prohibiting lewd or dissolute conduct).
39. In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 926, 663 P.2d at 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
40. In re King, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 558,204 Cal. Rptr. at 41; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 314.1 (West 1996)
(prohibiting indecent exposure).
41. See King, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 558, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (noting that the commission of the offense
invariably entails no physical aggression or even contact); see also In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 923, 663 P.2d at 220,
191 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (noting that the sexual overture in the case was by no means violent or dangerous and no one
need be victimized in the traditional criminal sense).
42. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing a study by the National Institute of Health which
found that the typical sex offender molests an average of 117 children).
43. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 426, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (detailing the second factor used
in determining whether a challenged penalty is considered cruel and unusual).
44. Il
45. Id.
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Violation of the registration update required by Chapter 821 results in a mis-
demeanor punishable by six months in jail. 6 Currently, failure to register as a sex
offender is considered a felony if the underlying crime is a felony.47 Because the
resulting penalty is less severe under Chapter 821 (misdemeanor as opposed to
felony), it is unlikely that the ninety day registration update requirement will be
suspect under the second factor in the Lynch test.
3. Comparison of the Challenged Penalty with Penalties Imposed for the
Same Offense in Other Jurisdictions
The basis for the third factor in the Lynch test is similar to the reasoning for the
second factor. The assumption is that the vast majority of jurisdictions will have
enacted statutes that are within the constitutional limit of severity.48 If the chal-
lenged penalty exceeds the penalty imposed by a significant number of other juris-
dictions, the disparity is an indicator of excessiveness, and the challenged penalty
is suspect.4 9
Currently, although all states have enacted lifetime registration for sex
offenders, no other state requires a ninety day registration update for transient sex
offenders.50 However, there are five states that require a ninety day registration
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(I) (amended by Chapter 821).
47. See id. § 290(g)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that any person required to register based on a felony
conviction who willfully violates the registration provision, upon each subsequent conviction, shall be guilty of a
felony punishable in the state prison for 16 months or two or three years).
48. See Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d. at427,503 P.2d. at 932,105 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (explaining the third technique used
to determine whether a challenged penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
49. Id.
50. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-1 1-200 to 13A-I 1-203 (1994) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but
lacking an additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010 to
12.63.020 (Michie 1995) (requiring an annual registration update, but lacking additional registration update require.
ment for homeless sex offenders); ARtZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to 13-3825 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring
an initial registration and requiring that an identification card be obtained from the motor vehicles division after
every 3 years, but lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-12-901 to 12-12-909 (Michie 1995) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but lacking additional
registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (1997) (lacking an
additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders, but requiring registration each time a sex
offender changes a temporary or permanent address, regardless of whether the address is within the same
jurisdicticn); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement,
but lacking additional registration update requirement forhomeless sex offenders); DEL CODEANti. tit. 11, § 4120
(1995 & Supp. 1996) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West Supp. 1997) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12
(1997) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707 to 743 (Supp. 1995) (same); IDAHO CODE § 18-8301 to 18-8311 (1997)
(same); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3 to 150110 (West 1992) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-1 to 5-2-12-13
(West Supp. 1996) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.1 to 629.A.15 (Vest Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial
registration requirement, requiring a verification of address every three months for sexually violent predators, but
lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to
22-4910 (1995) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but lacking additional registration update requirement
for homeltss sex offenders); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500 to 17.540 (Baldwin 1996) (same); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15:542 to 15:549 (Vest Supp. 1997) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 11101 to 11144 (Vest
Supp.1996) (same); MD. CODEANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENT § 792 (1996) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6,
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update for sexually violent predators.5 ' The key question is whether the danger
involved in not being able to track sexually violent predators is similar to the danger
involved in not being able to track homeless sex offenders. To date, there have not
been any studies indicating what percentage of sex offenders are homeless, although
§§ 178C to 1780 (West Supp. 1997) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 28-721 to 28-730 (West Supp.1997)
(same); MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (West Supp.1997) (same); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to 45-33-19 (Supp. 1996)
(same); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.600 to 566.625 (West Supp. 1997) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-502 to
46-23-508 (1995) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4001 to 29-4013 (Supp. 1996) (requiring an initial registration
requirement, annual verification, verification every three months for a sexually violent offender, but lacking
additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151 to
207.157 (Michie 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but lacking additional registration update
requirement for homeless sex offenders); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1 Ito 632-A:21 (1996) (same); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement, annual verification, but
lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-1 lA-I to
29-I IA-8 (Michie Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but lacking additional registration
update requirement for homeless sex offenders); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168a to 168s (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(requiring an initial registration requirement, annual update, but lacking additional registration update requirement
for homeless sex offenders); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5 to 14-208.11 (Supp. 1996) (requiring an initial
registration requirement, but lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1995) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01 to 2950.08 (Anderson 1996)
(same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581 to 587 (West Supp. 1997) (same); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.515 to 181.519
(1989) (same); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791 to 9798 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration
requirement, annual verification, verification of sexually violent predators every ninety days, but lacking additional
registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 11-37.1-I to 11-37.1-19 (Supp.
1996) (requiring an initial registration requirement, annual registration, quarterly verification for sexually violent
predators, quarterly verification for first 2 years, but lacking additional registration update requirement forhomeless
sex offenders); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 23-3-400 to 23-3-490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (requiring an initial registration
requirement, annual registration, but lacking additional registration update requirement forhomeless sex offenders);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-31 to 22-22-42 (Michie Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement,
annual registration, but lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to 40-39-108 (Supp. 1996) (requiring an initial registration requirement, ninety day verification
by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, but lacking additional registration update for homeless sex offenders);
TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement, and
requiring a person who does not have a residence address within 7 days to provide the address of the temporary
residence and to report to a supervising officer not less than twice a week for as long as the person is not at their
intended address); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but
lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401 to
5413 (Supp. 1996) (requiring an initial registration requirement, annual registration, update every ninety days for
sexually violent predators, but lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to 19.2-298.4 (Michie Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement, annual
registration, but lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9A.44.130 to 9A.44.140 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but lacking
additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to 61-8F-9 (Supp.
1996) (requiring an initial registration requirement, but lacking additional registration update requirement for
homeless sex offenders); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.45 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring an initial registration
requirement, annual registration, but lacking additional registration update requirement for homeless sex offenders);
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 7-19-306 (Michie 1997) (same).
51. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1-.15 (West Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4001-13 (Supp. 1996);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791 to 9798 (Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1 to 11-37.1-19 (Supp. 1996);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401 to 5413 (Supp. 1996).
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law enforcement officials indicate that a large percentage of sex offenders on the
data base are transient and difficult to track.52
In addition to the statutes requiring more frequent registration updates for
sexually violent predators, Tennessee requires verification every ninety days,53 and
Texas requires registrants with no permanent address to report to a law enforcement
official at least twice a week.' These statutory requirements indicate that Tennessee
and Texas realize frequent verification of certain sex offenders is necessary.
Because no other state currently requires a ninety day registration update for
homeless sex offenders, and only a significant minority55 recognize the frequent
verification necessity for any type of sex offender, an analysis of otherjurisdictions
would therefore indicate that under the third factor of the Lynch test, the ninety day
registration update requirement of Chapter 821 may be suspect.
Although the ninety day registration update may be suspect under the third
factor of the Lynch test because the large majority of states do not impose a similar
registration update requirement on homeless sex offenders, the balancing of the
Lynch factors indicates that Chapter 821 is likely to withstand a constitutional
challenge based on cruel and unusual punishment. The danger sex offenders present
to society has been recognized, both at the federal and state levels, by the passage
of legislation requiring registration.5 6 Because transient sex offenders pose a unique
problem,57 it is likely that this danger to society will be considered significant
enough to justify a ninety day registration update requirement with a misdemeanor
penalty for failure to do so.
4. Legislative Domain
In addition to the Lynch test, opponents face a considerable burden in chal-
lenging a penalty as cruel and unusual. 8 The doctrine of separation of powers
cautions courts to tread lightly when approaching matters within the province of the
52. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the transient nature of se). offenders).
53. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to 40-39-108 (Supp. 1996).
54. TE)X. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1997).
55. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (illustrating the various requirements for sex offenders
in the different states).
56. See CAL. PENALCODE § 290(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (providing for lifetime registration for certain sex-
offenders); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Megan's Law and federal legislation requiring
registration for sexually violent offenders); supra note 50 (listing state statutes requiring registration of sex-
offenders).
57. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (describing the problems experienced bylaw enforcement
agencies in trying to keep track of homeless/transient sex offenders).
58. See People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 174,534 P.2d 1001, 1006,121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1975) (holding
that when a defendant convicted under a section encompassing a wide range of conduct challenges a statute as
imposing cruel or unusual punishment, judicial review must await an initial determination by the Adult Authority
of the proper term in the individual case, or conduct will be measured against the statutory maximum, and also
emphasizing that a considerable burden rests on a defendant who challenges a penalty as cruel and unusual).
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Legislature. 9 The province of the legislature includes such matters as the definition
of crime and the determination of punishment.60 The legislature is therefore given
broad discretion when enacting penal statutes and specifying appropriate punish-
ments.6t Statutes must be upheld unless they are clearly unconstitutional.6
Because the legislature is entrusted with enacting penal statutes and specifying
penalties, and the courts will not void such statutes unless they are clearly uncon-
stitutional, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court will invalidate Chapter
821 as a form of cruel and unusual punishment.
B. Equal Protection
Both the Federal Constitution and the California Constitution require equal pro-
tection of the laws for all persons.63 These constitutional provisions guarantee that
people who are similarly situated will be treated similarly under the law.6
4
Typically, only race, gender and legitimacy classifications are afforded heightened
scrutiny.65 By default, other social classifications are afforded a "rational basis"
scrutiny.66
The classification at issue here is homeless sex offenders. Since homeless sex
offenders are a group not afforded heightened scrutiny, rational basis scrutiny
applies. The rational basis test allows a statute to single out a class for distinctive
treatment only if that classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose.
67
Protecting society from sex offenders falls within the police powers of the
government and can hardly be argued as anything other than a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. The author of Chapter 821 estimates that there are approximately
59. See id. (noting that the doctrine of separation of powers is firmly entrenched in the law of California);
see also People v. Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 176-77, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411,414 (same).
60. See Mills, 8 Cal. App. 3d. at 177,146 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (commenting that the choice of fitting and proper
penalties is not an exact science, but a legislative skill involving an appraisal of the evils to be corrected, the
weighing of practical alternatives, consideration of relevant policy factors, and responsiveness to the public will).
61. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 414,503 P.2d at 922, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (adding that the determination
of whether a legislatively prescribed punishment is constitutionally excessive is not a duty which the courts eagerly
assume or lightly discharge).
62. Id. at415, 503 P.2d at 922, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
63. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (providing that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws); see also CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7 (same).
64. See Britt v. City of Pomona, 223 Cal. App. 3d 265,274,272 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (1990) (setting out the
equal protection provisions in an examination of the constitutionality of a transient occupancy tax).
65. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (declaring that race-based affirmative action
plans are subject to strict scrutiny); see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 451 (1988)
(noting that heightened scrutiny standard of review "has generally been applied only in cases that involved
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy").
66. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997) (stating that a rational basis test is used if a




900 individuals identified as homeless sex offenders. 68 Law enforcement officials
claim that annual registration does not work for transients, because they may move
more than 100 times in a year, making it difficult for police to find them.69 Chapter
821 addresses this problem by requiring transient sex offenders to update their
registration every ninety days.70 This would seem to indicate the existence of a
rational relationship between the distinctive treatment of sex offenders without a
residence and the legitimate governmental purpose of protecting society from repeat
sex offenders by keeping track of prior sex offenders. Therefore, Chapter 821 will
likely withstand a constitutional challenge based on equal protection.
C. Ex Post Facto Issues
An ex post facto law is prohibited under both the Federal Constitution71 and the
California Constitution.72 A law violates the ex post facto clause only if it is a law
that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when committed.'
In order to determine whether Chapter 821 changes the punishment and inflicts
a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed, a
determination must be made as to whether Chapter 821 is applied retrospectively.7'
A law is retrospective if it "changes the legal consequences of acts completed
before its effective date.' 7' The legislature provided that the registration update
requirements of Chapter 821 apply to homeless sex offenders who would otherwise
be required to register, regardless of the date of the offense.76 Since Chapter 821
imposes new registration update requirements that were not required when the
homeless sex offender committed the sex offense, a retrospective application of
Chapter 821 is possible.
The United States Supreme Court established the framework for ex post facto
analysis, which is known as the "Calder categories., 77 Applying the Calder cate-
68. See ASSEMBLY COMMITME ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CoMMI-EE ANALYSIS OF SB 882, July 1, 1997, at 2
(noting the author's claim that Chapter 821 is a modest effort to track approximately 900 individuals who relocate
numerous times between their annual registrations).
69. See Ryfle & Hernandez, supra note 19 (describing the difficulty in tracking transient sex offenders).
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (a)(1)(B) (amended by Chapter 821).
71. See U.S. CONsT., art. 1, § 9 (providing that no ex post facto law be passed).
72. See CAL CONST., art. 1, §10 (specifying that an ex post facto law may not be passed).
73. Id.
74. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 40-41.
75. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) (holding that amended sentencing guidelines, applied
to crimes which occurred before the effective date of the guidelines, were in violation of the ex post facto clause).
76. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(1)(B) (enacted by Chapter 821) (providing that if a person who is
registering has no residence eddress, he or she must update his or her registration no less than once every ninety
days in addition to the annual registration requirement).
77. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 386, 390 (1798) (listing ex post facto laws within the meaning of
the U.S. Constitution prohibition).
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gories, the United States Supreme Court in Collins v. Youngblood78 summarized that
a law violates the ex post facto clause if it "punishes as a crime an act previously
committed which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the
punishment for a crime after its commission, or which deprives one charged with
a crime of any defense available according to the law at the time the act was
committed .... 7'
The second Calder factor which pertains to making the punishment for a crime
more burdensome after the completion of the crime is the only factor relevant to this
analysis. Chapter 821 increases the burden of registration by requiring a homeless
sex offender to register every ninety days.80 The critical issue then, is whether the
ninety day registration requirement of Chapter 821 constitutes an increased punish-
ment prohibited by the State and federal Constitutions.
To determine whether a law constitutes an increased punishment prohibited by
the State and federal Constitutions, an analysis must be made to determine if the
law is intended to punish an offender for a past act, or whether the restriction on the
individual is "a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation." Absent con-
clusive evidence of legislative intent as to the penal nature of a statute, an analysis
based on the Mendoza-Martinez factors" is necessary.8"
The Mendoza-Martinez factors include: (1) whether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as
punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4)
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6)
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
to it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.83 These factors may often point in different directions," and must be
78. 497 U.S. 37 (1990); see id. at 52 (holding that a Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts
was not prohibited by the ex post facto clause).
79. Id. at 42-43.
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(g) (amended by Chapter 821).
81. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (finding that statutes divesting an
American of his citizenship for leaving or remaining outside the U.S. for purposes of evading military service are
unconstitutional without affording procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution).
82. See In re Reed, 33 Cal.3d at 920-23,663 P.2d at 218-20, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660-62 (applying Mendoza-
Martinez factors).
83. See Kennedy 372 U.S. at 168-69 (listing the factors traditionally used to determine whether an Act of
Congress is penal or regulatory in character).
84. Id.
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considered in relation to the statute on its face. 5 The task is not simply to count the
factors on each side, but to weigh them.
8 6
1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint
Chapter 821 requires a registration update every ninety days for transient sex
offenders, which is not currently required for sex offender registration. 7 Because
the update imposes an additional requirement, it can be considered an affirmative
disability or restraint.
2. Historically Regarded as Punishment
GoVernments often use varying methods of registration as a way for law
enforcement agencies to have easy access to necessary information. 8 However, the
California Supreme Court held that lifetime registration is a form of punishment in
In re Reed.89 Because the lifetime registration requirement has been considered
punishment, and the ninety day registration update requirement is an additional
method of lifetime registration, it is likely that the update requirement of Chapter
821 would also be considered punishment.
3. Finding of Scienter
Because the registration requirement is dependent upon the conviction of under-
lying crimes, 90 there will necessarily be a finding of scienter.
85. Id.; see also In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d at 920-22, 663 P.2d at 218-20, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 660-62 (using
Mendoza-Martinez factors in determining whether misdemeanor lewd or dissolute conduct constituted cruel and
unusual punishment).
86. See State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1217 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that Arizona's sex offender registration
statute, ARt REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-8321, is regulatory in nature and not an unconstitutional ex post facto law
when applied to defendants convicted after the enactment of the statute for offenses predating the enactment of the
statute).
87. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(1)(B) (enacted by Chapter 821) (providing that if a person who is
registering has no residence address, he or she must update his or her registration no less than once every ninety
days in addition to the annual registration requirement).
88. Manning, 532 N.W. 2d at 248.
89. 33 Cal. 3d 914, 663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983); see supra note 31 and accompanying text
(noting that the California Supreme Court held that lifetime registration for sex offenders constitutes a form of
punishment in determining whether lifetime registration constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
90. See supra note 9 (listing the various offenses which trigger the requirement to register under California
Penal Code § 290).
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4. Promote Traditional Aims of Punishment
This factor examines whether the law promotes the traditional function of
punishment-either retribution or deterrence." Although requiring a homeless sex
offender to update his registration information can be viewed as an additional
burden on the sex offender, it does not seem to qualify as retribution. The purpose
of the requirement is more likely to be considered a means of aiding law enforce-
ment in tracking homeless sex offenders than it is to be considered as punishing the
sex offender.
However, an argument can be made that a more frequent registration require-
ment is a form of deterrence, because a registered sex offender is less likely to
commit a crime if police can ascertain his whereabouts. On the other hand, an
offender may be deterred by the conviction and punishment he has already received,
whether he is required to register or not.92 Therefore, although deterrence may be
possible, such deterrence can be considered de minimus,93 and is secondary to the
main goal of aiding law enforcement.
5. Behavior Already a Crime
Because the registration requirement is dependent upon the conviction of an
underlying crime, there will necessarily be a finding that the behavior is already a
crime.
6. Alternative Purpose
The courts of other states have consistently found that registration of sex
offenders serves a regulatory purpose.94 Similarly, California has held that the
fundamental legislative purpose of Penal Code section 290 is to assure that persons
convicted of sex crimes shall be readily available for police surveillance at all
times.95 This purpose of aiding law enforcement can be considered an alternative
purpose to punishing a registrant for past crimes.
91. Manning, 532 N.W. 2d at 248.
92. See State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1994) (holding that Washington's statute requiring
convicted felony sex offenders to register was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law, as applied to defendants
convicted of felony sex offenses prior to the statute's effective date).
93. See State v. Costello. 643 A.2d. 531,533 (N.H. 1994) (noting that any punitive effect of the sex offender
registration statute was de minimus).
94. See Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 244 (upholding Minnesota's sex offender registration statute); see also
Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1217 (Ariz. 1992) (upholding Arizona's sex offender registration statute); Costello, 643 A.2d
at 531 (validating New Hampshire's sex offender registration statute); People v. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d 4 (111. 1995)
(affirming Illinois' sex offender registration statute); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1062 (upholding Washington's sex offender
registration statute).
95. Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 45,324 P.2d 990,994 (1958).
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Z Is Chapter 821 Excessive in Relation to the Alternative Purpose?
The Legislature may prescribe laws to promote the health, safety, and general
welfare of the people of California.96 Broad discretion is thus vested in the Legis-
lature to determine what the public interest demands under particular circumstances.
Will requiring homeless sex offenders to update their registration every ninety
days result in individuals being life-long suspects? Even though registered sex
offenders maybe suspects if another sex offense occurs in the same community, the
attention received is due to the prior conviction, and not due to the result of regis-
tration as a sex offender.97 Additionally, even if a sex offender is subject to
suspicion, he is still entitled to the constitutional protections, and cannot be arrested
solely because of his prior convictions."s
Law enforcement officials feel that the annual registration requirement is not
workable for homeless sex offenders, who move many times throughout a year."
Therefore, in order for registration to be effective, law enforcement must find a way
to receive more current information on homeless sex offenders. The critical ques-
tion regarding registration is how often is "enough," and how often is "excessive"?
As originally proposed, Chapter 821 would have required homeless sex offenders
to update their registration every thirty days, rather than the current ninety day
requirement. too The ninety day requirement is certainly less excessive than the thirty
day requirement. Since there is no easy answer, and since the Legislature is given
broad discretion to determine what the public interest demands under particular
circumstances, it is unlikely that the ninety day registration update requirement will
be considered excessive.
While some of the Mendoza-Martinez factors may point in different directions
with regard to the regulatory or punitive purposes of Chapter 821, it is the balancing
of the factors against the stated alternative purpose of protecting the public by
locating sex offenders that determines whether Chapter 821 violates the ex post
facto clause.'t t Since Chapter 821 necessarily applies to those who have been con-
victed of crimes deemed dangerous by society, the regulatory purpose of aiding law
enforcement in locating such offenders seems to weigh heavier than the burden of
having to update registration information every ninety days. Therefore, the ninety
96. See In re Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 649-50,226 P. 914,921 (1924) (commenting that the police power is
the "power inherent in the government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to protect the order, safety, health,
morals and general welfare of society").
97. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the special problems posed by homeless sex
offenders who move many times in a year).
100. See ASSEMBLY COMMIrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMNITEE AALYSIS OF SB 882, at 2 (July 1, 1997)
(noting the California Public Defenders Association believes the ninety day time requirement is more practical for
transients to meet than the previously proposed 30 day time requirement).
101. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing process used when analyzing
the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
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day registration update requirement of Chapter 821 is likely to withstand a con-
stitutional challenge.
V. CONCLUSION
While California is unique among the states in enacting an additional
registration update for homeless sex offenders as part of its lifetime registration
process,10 2 it seems unlikely that a constitutional challenge will be upheld. The
separation of powers doctrine allows the Legislature to determine the appropriate
penalties for crimes unless such statutes are plainly and clearly unconstitutional.
It will be difficult to show that the requirements of Chapter 821 are plainly and
clearly unconstitutional, particularly since the burden is on the party asserting the
challenge."°3 Although the registration requirements of Chapter 821 are additional
impositions on an individual who has served his sentence, they appear to be more
regulatory in nature than punitive. '4 The burden appears small compared to the
compelling state interest in protecting society from sex offenders.105 Given the
climate of public opinion,' °6 recent legislative enactments that have been upheld as
constitutional,0 7 and consistency in other states in holding registration statutes as
non-violative of the ex post facto clause,'0 8 it seems unlikely that a constitutional
challenge will prevail.
Although Chapter 821 is likely to survive a constitutional challenge, the
question of whether Chapter 821 is a good law still remains: Is Chapter 821 neces-
sary, or is it a hysterical response? The analysis used to determine whether Chapter
821 violates the Federal and California Constitutions also answers the question of
whether Chapter 821 is a good law. The benefits to society outweigh the burden to
the homeless sex offender. Therefore, Chapter 821 is a good law. To conclude
otherwise results in the failure to verify the whereabouts of homeless sex offenders
and thereby undermine the very purpose for which the sex offender registration
statute is designed-keeping track of convicted sex offenders.
102. See supra note 50 (listing the various state statutes requiring sex offender registration).
103. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of the party challenging the con-
stitutionality of a penalty).
104. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (analyzing whether Chapter 821 promotes the traditional
aims of punishment)
105. See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text (listing the Mendoza-Martinez factors and discussing
their application to Chapter 821).
106. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing public outrage over repeat sex-offenders).
107. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing legislation enacted in response to public furor over
repeat sex-offenders).
108. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (listing states whose courts have upheld sex-offender
registration statutes against ex post facto challenges).
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Grand Jury Reform: Making Justice Just
Jay A. Christofferson
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code § 939.71 (new); §§ 939; 939.2; 939.7 (amended).
AB 163 (Baugh); 1997 STAT. Ch. 21
Legislative change is frequently engineered by one who experiences the
inadequacies of a particular law. Last year, Assemblyman Scott Baugh endured the
inequities of the grand jury system' which inspired him to advocate for changing
the grand jury procedure.' Without the district attorney producing vindicating
evidence within his possession, the grand jury indicted Mr. Baugh on election-
wrongdoing charges The trial judge dismissed seventeen of the twenty-two
charges because the district attorney failed to produce evidence that would
potentially exonerate Mr. Baugh. However, shortly thereafter, the district attorney
refiled the majority of original charges, including many of those previously dis-
missed, and these charges will receive determination shortly.5
Although the grand jury is not a necessary aspect of every criminal trial, the
grand jury system does serve an important role as the initial step in federal and most
state criminal proceedings notwithstanding its lack of many basic procedural trial
1. See CAL PENAL CODE § 888 (West Supp. 1997) (defining a "grand jury" as a "body of the required
number of persons returned from the citizens of the county before the court sworn to inquire of public offenses
commitred or triable within the county"); see also id. § 904 (West Supp. 1997) (detailing the grand jury as having
nineteen members in areas smaller than five million and twenty-three for areas larger than five million sitting to
determine if sufficient evidence exists to indict the suspect); John Kagel, California Grand Jury-71k'o Current
Problems, 52 CAL. L. REv. 116, 116 (1964) (explaining the selection process for grand jury members).
2. See Eric Bailey, Baugh Bill on D.A. Evidence Rule Signed, L.A. TIMEs, June 12, 1997, at B4
(experiencing the inequities of the grand jury from the accused's perspective inspired Baugh to eliminate the unfair
procedures of the grand jury).
3. See Key Players In Plan To Split Democratic Vote, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 28, 1997, at A17
[hereinafter Key Players in Plan to Split Democratic Vote] (observing that the charges were quickly dismissed by
the trial judge).
4. See Bailey, supra note 2, at B4 (explaining that the reasoning behind the trial judge's dismissal was that
the district attorney had knowledge of significant evidence favoring the accused).
5. See id. (reporting that although Baugh was indicted for election wrongdoing, his attorneys presented
letters iCentifying witnesses who could prove his innocence, but they were not called before the grand jury); see
also Key Players in Plan To Split Democratic Vote, supra note 3. at A17 (recounting that many of the original
charges have been refiled by the district attomey).
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court rules.6 Indeed, the grand jury serves two judicial purposes: (1) To protect the
innocent from unwarranted criminal prosecution; and (2) to act as an accusatory
body that determines if sufficient cause7 exists to prosecute the suspect.' However,
despite its salient functions and a California Supreme Court case purportedly to the
contrary, the California grand jury remains procedurally inequitable because
prosecutors need not produce exculpatory evidence at the grand jury proceeding.9
I. INTRODUCTION
Recognition of existing procedural inequities and belated adherence to judicial
precedent have spearheaded the push to revamp the grand jury system.10 Not sur-
prisingly, due to its unfair procedural characteristics, the grand jury has received
strident criticism." In particular, one aspect of grand jury procedure has borne the
brunt of this criticism: The lack of well-defined guidelines forprosecutors regarding
the presentation of exonerating evidence within their knowledge. 2 To improve the
6. See Patrick F. Mastrian IT[, Note, Indianhead Poker In the Grand Jury Room: Prosecutorial Suppression
of Exculpatory Evidence, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (1994) (explaining that the grand jury process is devoid
of numerous procedural mechanisms afforded the accused in criminal trials such as allowing defense attorneys in
the grand jury room); see also Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door ofAn American Grand Jury: Its History, Its
Secrecy and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1996) (describing that historically the grand jury has been
an obscure and biased yet constant figure in the criminal procedure process); Robert Johnston, Grand
Jury--Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 157, 161 (1974) (berating the
prejudicial actions of prosecutors in the grand jury room when they badger witnesses to constructively bias the
grand jury).
7. See Cumminskey v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1025, 893 P.2d 1059, 1063-64, 13 Cal. Rptr.
551, 555 (1984) (defining sufficient cause as when all evidence taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted,
would, in the jury's judgment, provide cause to believe that a public offense was committed by the individual
accused).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 923 (West 1976) (determining that the grand jury is to convene at the bequest
of the prosecutor or upon their own accord for the investigation and consideration of matters of a criminal nature);
see also John Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 119, 123-24 (1964)
(concluding that the jury functions to accuse individuals and to act as evaluators of evidence).
9. See generally Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975)
(defining "exculpatory evidence" as "evidence tending to negate guilt").
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.71 (added by Chapter 21) (mandating that exculpatory evidence known
to the prosecuting attorney must be produced and noting that by modifying the law the legislature intends to codify
the holding in Johnson v. Superior Court).
11. See e.g., Michael J. Lightfoot, Symposium: Responsibilities of the Criminal Defense Attorney, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 69, 72-73 (1996) (noting that where fellow citizens stand between the accused and a criminal charge,
the defendant is devoid of the benefits of a lawyer to present her side); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 261-63 (1995) (decrying the fact that grand juries
act as the prosecutor's rubber stamp and are willing to "indict a ham sandwich" if asked to do so by the
government); Laurie Buchan, The Constitutional Rights of Federal and California Grand Jury Witnesses, 10 SW.
U. L. REV. 895, 912-13 (1978) (pointing to procedural inadequacies-including the prosecutor's non-imperative
to present exculpatory evidence-as an anachronism making grand juries ineffective guardians of innocent people).
12. See Jonathan R. Bass, Criminal Procedure: District Attorney's Duty To Inform Grand Jury of
Exculpatory Evidence, 65 CAL. L. REV. 382,391-92 (1977) (criticizing the narrow interpretation that subsequent
California courts have discerned from Johnson thereby making it unnecessary to present all exonerating evidence);
see also Ajit V. Pal, Should A Grand Jury Subpoena Override A District Court's Protective Order, 64 U. CHI. L.
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effectiveness of the grand jury, the California Legislature has promulgated law that
requires prosecutors to inform the grand jury of the nature and existence of
exculpatory evidence within their knowledge.' 3
Ostensibly, Chapter 21 removes the most inequitable aspect of the grand jury
process by requiring the prosecuting attorney to divulge evidence that exonerates
the accused.14 Opponents of Chapter 21 question the effectiveness of changing the
grand jury system for three reasons: (1) The exculpatory evidence requirement is
ill-defined and the grand jury retains ultimate discretion in considering exculpatory
evidence; 5 (2) the introduction of exculpatory evidence for grand jury consideration
will promote mini-trials that the grand jury is ill-equipped to handle;16 and (3) the
district attorney can proceed by information17 thereby circumventing the grand jury
procedure modifications created by Chapter 21.8 Currently, problems with the
California grand jury system create real concerns over procedural shortcomings and
inequities. Thus, new laws that afford the accused enhanced protection to diminish
the unfairness of a one-sided indictment process are welcomed. 9
REV. 317, 317-19 (1997) (averring that frequently grand juries are not exposed to exculpatory evidence in the
prosecutor's possession).
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.71 (added by Chapter 21) (requiring the prosecutor to inform the grand
jury of such exculpatory evidence of which she is aware); see also Bass, supra note 12, at 391 (questioning what
type of evidence needs to be disclosed post-Johnson: evidence tending to negate guilt or evidence that certainly
negztes guilt).
14. See Mastrian, supra note 6, at 1378-79 (positing that the screening function of the grand jury requires
an increasing openness and fairness on the part of the prosecutor in presenting evidence which guarantees a more
complete assessment of all evidence to determine probable cause).
15. See Bass, supra note 12, at 392-93 (concluding that the Johnson holding does not lessen the power of
the grand jury to call for the production of exculpatory evidence, nor change the grand jury's ability to disavow
such evidence).
16. See Richard E. Gerstein & Laurie 0. Robinson, Remedy for the Grand Jury: Retain But Reform, 64
A.B.A.J. 337, 337-39 (1978) (noting that revelation of all exculpatory evidence known to the district attorney will
make the grandjury a de facto trialjury that weighs all evidence and determines guilt rather than solely determining
if sufficient evidence exists to indict).
17. See BLACK'sLAwDIcnroNARY701 (5th ed. 1988) (defining a "criminal information" as an "accusation
exhibited against a person for some criminal offense, without an indictment which is presented by a competent
public officer on his oath of office, instead of a grand jury on their oath").
18. See CAL. CONST. art. , § 14 (West 1976) (explaining that a criminal information or an indictment is
necessary for convicting an accused); CAL. PENAL CODE § 682 (West 1976) (providing that criminal prosecutions
may be initiated by either an indictment by grand jury or by information and preliminary hearing); see also Karl
Kinoga & Robert F. Jordan, Some Limitations and Controls of the California Grand Jury System, 2 S.C. L. Rev.
78, 79 (1962) (reasoning that the district attorney, for strategical reasons, usually bypasses the grand jury in the
great majority of criminal prosecutions).
19. See infra notes 11-12 (decrying the inequitable procedures endured by the accused in a grand jury trial).
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II. GRAND JURY PROCEDURE
Several states require the prosecutor to produce exculpatory evidence in a grand
jury proceeding.20 Because the interests of the accused otherwise go unrepresented
at the grand jury stage, the prosecutor's responsibility to seek justice may suffice
as the basis for a duty to bring exculpatory evidence to the grand jury's attention.2,
A. The Prosecutor's Duty to Reveal Exculpatory Evidence Before Enactment
of Chapter 21
Prior to Chapter 21, California law required the prosecutor to inform the grand
jury of any evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt.22 Nonetheless, the guide-
lines for determining what evidence reasonably tends to negate guilt remained
unclear.2' California law also allowed the grand jury to weigh all evidence sub-
mitted to it and to retain the discretion to order the presentation of additional
evidence not submitted by the prosecutor.24
20. See, e.g., COLO. R. PROF. COND. 3.8(d) (West 1994) (requiring the prosecutor to make a timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the accused's
guilt or mitigates the offense); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-47 f(f) (West 1997) (mandating that an attorney conducting
the investigation shall disclose to the investigatory grand jury any exculpatory information or material in his
possession, custody or control concerning any person who is a target of the investigation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-
11(b) (Michie 1996) (stating that the prosecuting attorney assisting the grand jury shall present evidence that
directly negates guilt of the target where he is aware of such evidence); UTAH CODEANN. § 77-10a-13 (West 1985)
(detailing that when the State's attorney or the special prosecutor is personally aware of substantial and competent
evidence negating the guilt of a subject or target that might reasonably be expected to lead the grand jury not to
indict, he shall present or otherwise disclose the evidence to the grand jury).
21. See SARA SUN BEALE Er AL, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRAcFicE § 6.2 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the
responsibilities of a prosecutor to seek justice, not merely to serve as an advocate); see also STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3-3.6 (b) (1980) (declaring that no prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand
jury evidence which will tend substantially to negate guilt); see also Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and
Stare Decisis: 7e Present Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and An End To Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 1135, 1140, (1996) (warning that the absolute immunity afforded prosecutors in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 416-19 (1976), promotes obfuscation, not disclosure of evidence because the prosecutor need not fear
prosecution for her non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence).
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.71 (added by Chapter 21) (stating that exculpatory evidence tending to
negate guilt within the prosecutor's ken must be produced, but not dictating if this included all evidence or only
that which would exonerate the particular parties).
23. See People v. Laney, 115 Cal. App. 3d 508. 514. 171 Cal. Rptr. 493,495 (1981) (finding no violation
of the tending to negate guilt standard since the suppressed evidence would not have affected the grand jury's
decision to indict); see also BEAI, supra note 21, at § 6.03 (noting that numerous situations have arisen where
unproduced evidence did not foreclose a later indictment).




Chapter 21 expands and amends existing law by codifying precedent requiring
the prosecutor to present, not merely disclose, exculpatory evidence.' Nevertheless,
Chapter 21 does not explicitly detail what type of evidence the prosecuting attorney
must reveal.26 Various possible standards exist ranging from evidence that would
certainly exonerate the accused, to evidence which might assist the accused's case.
27
Without a clear standard, the prosecutor retains discretion in what material to
present to the grand jury.2 Moreover, inasmuch as the grand jury retains discretion
in assessing and allocating relevance to the information it receives, the change
effectuated by Chapter 21 fails to alleviate the concern that the witness receive a
fair criminal trial. This reality occurs because the jury can ignore or allocate limited
relevance to any evidence it receives.
Im. THE PROSECUTOR PRESENTING EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
A. Federal Grand Jury Procedure
Grand jury proceedings do not explicitly implicate the Sixth Amendment.29 The
Supreme Court has held that the "grand jury is a vital procedural and investigative
mechanism."3 The Supreme Court explained, "[the grand jury] has been regarded
as the primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive per-
secution."" In an apparent contradiction, the Supreme Court held in United States
v. Williams,32 that a prosecutor need not produce exculpatory evidence for grand
jury assessment.33 In Williams, the prosecutor did not divulge evidence that helped
to disprove the prosecutor's case despite the evidence being depicted as substantial
exculpatory evidence.' The Supreme Court reasoned that requiring the prosecutor
25. Id. § 939.71 (added by Chapter 21) (requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence within the
prosecutor's knowledge and inform the grand jury of its duty as pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7).
26. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSTS of AB 163, at I (Apr. 3, 1997) (discussing that the scope
of evidence which the prosecutor must disclose, but not defining the exact level required); see also BEALE, supra
note 21, at § 6.03 (concluding that sundry interpretations concerning the scope of exculpatory evidence allows
prosecutors the latitude to comply with the law while not disclosing all evidence known to them).
27. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COailTTEE ANALYSIS of AB 163, at 2 (Apr. 3. 1997) (discussing the lack of
an exact standard for presenting evidence beneficial to the accused).
28. id.
29. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,581 (1976) (holding that the right to counsel prescribed
by the Sixth Amendment is inapplicable when the subject is summoned to appear before a grand jury).
30. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 (1972).
31. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
32. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
33. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 51 (describing that the grand jury sits not to determine if the accused is guilty
or innocent, but merely to determine if sufficient evidence exists to find probable cause to indict),
34. Id at 39.
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to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury's
historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body. 35
Since the Supreme Court has determined that the Fifth Amendment requirement
for grand jury procedure does not supervene state law, the individual states can
determine their own criminal procedure mechanisms. 36 Therefore, the standard for
producing evidence in grand jury trials remains within the state's purview.37 Con-
sequently, Chapter 21 does not infringe on Fifth Amendment rights.
B. Chapter 21 and the Presentation of Exculpatory Evidence
Traditionally the grand jury, unlike the trial jury, heard only the prosecutor's
side of the case.38 Many jurisdictions have changed these traditional roles to adapt
the grand jury to the realities of the modem criminal justice system.39 Chapter 21
specifically requires the production of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor.4°
However, in mandating these changes, Chapter 21 does not address or clarify the4t
type of evidence that should be produced. Chapter 21 also fails to define the grand
jury's responsibility in evaluating this evidence.42
To identify the scope of evidence the prosecutor must produce, understanding
the legislative intent of Chapter 21 is instrumental. The legislative intent behind
Chapter 21 is explicit: To codify the holding of Johnson v. Superior Court.4 3 In
Johnson, the prosecutor rejected the decision of the magistrate who refused to
holdover the defendant after he testified that one of his alleged associates in a
narcotics transaction had grossly exaggerated the accused's role in the transaction."
Also, the defendant proclaimed that his limited participation had been part of a plan
35. Id. at 51. But see United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (1979) (categorizing the reasons to compel
the prosecutor to produce exculpatory evidence as an indictment can produce devastating personal and professional
impact that a dismissal or an acquittal can never undo); Maryland v. Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (making the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request at the trial stage as violative of
due process).
36. See generally Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (explicating that states retain the right to
determine criminal procedure mechanisms).
37. Id.
38. See David Stevenson, Note, The Prosecutor's Duty To Present Exculpatory Evidence To An Indicting
Grand Jury, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1514, 1516 (1977) (comparing the screening values of indictment and information
proceedings and determining that the grand jury indictment is a one-sided process because the prosecutor is the sole
source of evidence).
39. See BEALE, supra note 21, at § 6.03 (observing that the modern trend toward opening the grand jury
system and necessitating the production of evidence to exonerate the accused comports with protecting the
accused's reputation and standing in the community better than previous methods).
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.71 (added by Chapter 21) (mandating that the prosecutor produce
exculpatory evidence within her knowledge).
41. See Bass, supra note 12, at 391-93 (opining that the scope of necessary evidence is not broadly defined
by decisions subsequent to Johnson).
42. Id.
43. 15 Cal. 3d 248,539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975).
44. Id. at 253,539 P.2d at 794, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 34,35.
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to furnish information to a local prosecutor in connection with a plea bargain on
another charge.45 Only the arresting officers gave grand jury testimony and the
grand jury did not receive information concerning the defendant's preliminary
hearing testimony.46 The California Supreme Court reasoned that section 939.7 of
the Penal Code required the grand jury to "consider evidence within its reach that
will explain away the charge."47 The court reasoned that this requirement imposed
a corresponding duty on the prosecutor to inform the grand jury of known
exculpatory evidence.48
However, the initial question of the scope of evidence implicated by Johnson,
and by extension Chapter 21, remains confused because court decisions in the sub-
sequent twenty-two years have created a split of opinion concerning the type of
evidence the prosecutor must produce.49 One camp speaks of the obligation to
present evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt, a standard analogous to that
applied to the prosecutor's due process obligation of disclosure at trial.50 The other
camp has taken a more conservative position, finding that the prosecutor's obli-
gation encompasses a much narrower range of evidence than the due process
obligation applicable at trial. 51 Thus, courts applying the latter philosophy require
prosecutors to disclose before the grand jury only that exculpatory evidence which
clearly negates guilt.52 Dismissal of an indictment would follow only where the
grand jury would not have indicted had it considered the exculpatory evidence. 53
In an important decision clarifying Johnson, the court in People v. McCalister54
provided a narrow interpretation of Johnson and revealed another glaring defect in
the production of exculpatory evidence requirement. 55 In McCalister, the district
attorney disregarded a preliminary hearing decision to drop certain charges against
the defendant, and instead kept all charges intact.56 Despite a letter from the defense
attorney explaining that evidence within his possession would exculpate his client,
45. Id.
46. Id. at 253, 539 P.2d at 795, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
47. Id. at 254,539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
48. Id. at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
49. See YALE KAMISAR Er AL. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 946
(7th ed. 1990) (analyzing the differing approaches to this issue).
50. Id.; see id. (recapitulating that this standard would require the dismissal of an indictment where the
exculpatory evidence in question would have created a "fair probability" of a grand jury decision not to indict).
51. Id.; see id. at 946-47 (observing that the split in the courts is based on interpreting the scope of the terms
"negating guilt").
52. See WAYNE LAFAVE &JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 733 (2d ed. 1992) (recognizing that the
courts not adhering to the duty to produce all exculpatory evidence rely upon the non-adversarial nature of the grand
jury proceeding to defend their position).
53. Id.
54. 54 Cal. App. 3d918, 126 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1976).
55. See Bass, supra note 12, at 392 (noting that the previous decisions did not establish a concrete test or
standard for determining what evidence must be submitted).
56. McCalister, 54 Cal. App. at 923, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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the defendant suffered an indictment on all charges presented.57 The defense
attorney moved to have the indictment dismissed because several witnesses were
available to testify that the accused did not commit one of the attacks.58 If true, the
testimony would exculpate the accused. However, the grand jury indicted without
calling a single witness.5 The court held that producing this exculpatory evidence
was non-imperative because it would not guarantee the defendant's innocence: °
Furthermore, the court determined that the grand jury should retain apparently
unlimited discretion to hear or not to hear any evidence, thereby calling into
question the efficacy of Johnson.6' The McCalister court's narrow interpretation of
Johnson undercuts the latter decision's importance because evidence that qualifies
as substantially exculpatory can be withheld without prejudicing the grand jury
indictment and future criminal convictions.62 Moreover, the implicit premise of
Johnson, to promote the presentation of evidence that tends to negate guilt, appears
ineffectual because a grand jury can disregard or opt to consider evidence at their
discretion.63 Finally, for practical considerations, determining if the excluded
evidence prejudiced the grand jury at the trial court level leaves the accused
stigmatized as an indicted criminal thereby damaging personal and professional
reputations.64 In sum, the codification of Johnson does not guarantee the pre-
sentation of all evidence nor does it compel the grand jury to assess any evidence
presented to it.65
V. CONCLUSION
Events, frequently trying ones, inspire change. Senator Baugh experienced the
inequities of the grand jury firsthand, and thus spearheaded an overhaul of the grand
jury system in order to guarantee a fair criminal procedure beginning in the grand
57. Id. at 923, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 884 n.2.
58. Id. at 928, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
59. Id. at 922, 126 Cal. Rptr at 883; see also People v. Saam, 106 Cal. App. 3d 789, 799, 165 Cal. Rptr.
256, 261 (1980) (finding that the prosecutor's failure to advise the grand jury of the magistrate's dismissal of the
charges based on Fourth Amendment violations was not prejudicial to the defendant nor did it improperly influence
the grand jury to indict).
60. McCalister, 54 Cal. App. at 925, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
61. See Bass, supra note 12, at 393-95 (commenting that the Johnson holding left unclear the scope of
evidence required to be presented and the grand jury's ability to consider evidence it deems pertinent).
62. See id. (discussing the limited effect of Johnson because of the questionable interpretation of its
evidentiary scope).
63. Id.
64. See Serubo, 604 F.2d at 817 (criticizing a system that exonerates an individual only after the stigma of
an indictment attaches, thus likely sacrificing an individual's career and character to considerable question); see
also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,219 (1979) (arguing that grandjury secrecy protects
those individuals exonerated by the grand jury from public ridicule which is a worthy goal, but seemingly
contradicting the rule of Williams that presentation of exonerating evidence by the district attorney is not required).
65. See Bass, supra note 12, at 393 (concluding that the holding in Johnson does not resolve the problems
of the grand jury system).
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jury room.6 Chapter 21 compels the prosecutor to present all exculpatory evidence
within her knowledge.67 In so doing, California joins a growing number of states
transforming the grand jury procedure to create a more open and equitable system.68
Unquestionably, requiring the prosecutor to produce exculpatory evidence furthers
the premise of the grand jury: To achieve a just result.69 Notwithstanding these
changes, Chapter 21 leaves the courts to determine the scope of evidence the
prosecutor must produce.70 Moreover, the grand jury remains the ultimate arbiter
in determining what constitutes exonerating evidence and thus producing all excul-
patory information does not axiomatically preclude the indictment of innocent
people.7 ' Despite these unanswered questions and possible limitations, Chapter 21
prospectively will foster a more balanced grand jury process that will afford the
accused a greater opportunity to receive a fair grand jury trial.
66. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 21, 23-26 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
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Increasing Penalties for Bridge Trespassers
Christopher S. Hall
Code Section Affected
Streets & Highways Code § 27174.2 (amended).
SB 4 (Kopp); 1997 STAT. Ch. 379
On November 23, 1996, actor Woody Harrelson and eight companions scaled
the Golden Gate Bridge to protest the logging of redwood trees in the Headwaters
Forest. t The nine protestors suspended themselves with rock climbing gear and
hung among the bridge's suspension cables for five and a half hours causing an
enormous traffic jam.2 As a result of the traffic delay, one man missed the birth of
his son, a family missed a funeral, and thousands of drivers sat motionless for
hours.3
I. INTRODUCTION
The Golden Gate Bridge is frequently used as a demonstration site by activists
looking to further their cause.4 The Bridge's sidewalks make it particularly
susceptible to demonstrators as well as vandals and thrill seekers because the side-
walks provide an easy entrance for anyone wishing to use the Bridge.5
1. See Editorial, Throw the Book at Them, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 26, 1996, at A18 [hereinafter Throw the
Book at Them] (describing how Harrelson and eight other individuals climbed the bridge to bring attention to
redwood forests); Vicki Haddock, Kopp Talks Tough on Bridge Protests; Vows Bill to Make Demonstration
Felonies, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 26, 1996, at Al (explaining that the nine people suspended themselves in rock
climbing gear in order to protest a government deal that would save 7,500 acres of ancient redwood trees while
leaving the rest of the forest vulnerable to industrial logging).
2. Haddock, supra note 1, at Al.
3. See id. (describing how the demonstration caused mass frustration, and caused some individuals to miss
important events due to the traffic delay); see also Throw the Book at Them, supra note 1, at AI8 (stating the
demonstration stranded thousands of motorists on the Golden Gate Bridge for hours).
4. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (explaining how a group of demonstrators used the Golden
Gate Bridge to protest certain logging practices in California); see also Aids Protest Closes Golden Gate, L.A.
TIEs, Jan. 31, 1989, at A2 (describing how a group of 80 demonstrators caused the Golden Gate Bridge to be shut
down during rush hour traffic in order to protest the government's response to the Aids epidemic); David
Holley, 3,000 in LA. Protest Threat of Nuclear War, L.A. TWIES, Aug. 7, 1985, at A3 (describing how a group of
protesters threw mattresses and watermelons onto the Golden Gate Bridge in order to protest the threat of nuclear
war); Marc Lifsher, 2,000 Protesters Boo Pope in Rally at San Francisco Mission, ORANGE CoUNTY REG., Sept.
18, 1987, at A18 (describing how a group of protesters were arrested for blocking a lane on the Golden Gate Bridge
to protest the Pope's visit to San Francisco).
5. Gate Bridge Board Wants Trespassing to Be a Felony. S.F. CHRON., June 11, 1994, at A23.
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Consequently, Bridge officials requested the California Legislature to enact severe
penalties for trespassing on the Bridge.6 The California Legislature responded by
enacting Chapter 379 which raises the penalties for trespassing on any district toll
bridge.
7
Proponents of Chapter 379 believe that prior penalties failed to deter would-be
trespassers! Although opponents of Chapter 379 argue that it is designed to restrain
freedom of expression and disempower protestors, supporters claim that Chapter
379 protects the people's right of free expression while it penalizes those that would
subject others to risk of harm.' Moreover, supporters believe that Chapter 379
withstands constitutional scrutiny because it is not an attempt to suppress speech
but is merely a time, place, and manner restriction on the use of toll bridges as
demonstration sites.' °
11. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 379, bridge trespassing was a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for up to six months and/or a fine of
up to $1,000." Given the amount of violations, prior penalties obviously did not
deter the public from trespassing on bridges.12 Consequently, Bridge officials
sought to increase bridge trespassing penalties to deter potential violators.1
3
The California Legislature responded to the request by enacting Chapter 379,
which increases the penalty for bridge trespassing to a jail term of up to one year
6. Id.
7. See CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 27174.2 (amended by Chapter 379) (raising the penalties for
unauthorized climbing on a district toll bridge to include a possible jail term not to exceed one year, and a possible
fine not to exceed $10,000).
3. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 4, at 2 (July 1, 1997) (stating that prior law did not
impose a significant enough penalty to act as a deterrent).
9. See Bobbie Stein, Letters to the Editor, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 1996, at A26 (arguing that free exprcssion
and civil disobedience are vital aspects of the American society and Chapter 379 is designed to limit these
freedoms). But see ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMNMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 4, at 3 (July 1, 1997) (claiming that Chapter
379 does not abridge freedom of expression but pznalizes those that would subject others to risk of harm),
10. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (declaring that a content-neutral time, place or manner
regulation on speech will survive constitutional scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and leave ample alternative channels of communication).
11. See CAL STs.&HIGH. CODE § 27174.2 (amended by Chapter 379) (stating that any unauthorized person
that travels on any portion of a district toll bridge not intended for public use is guilty of a misdemeanor); see also
SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 4, at I (May 15, 1997) (stating that the punishment for the
unauthorized trespass on any district bridge is ajail term of up to six months, a fine of up to $1,000, or both).
12. See Maitland Zane, Actor Remains Defiant at Bridge Protest Hearing; Woody Harrelson Calls for
Charges to be Dropped, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 1997, at A15 (quoting actor Woody Harrelson saying that he would
without question stage the protest again); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing how the Golden
Gate Bridge has been used by demonstrators over the years).
13. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (stating that Golden Gate Bridge officials have asked the
California Legislature to increase the penalties associated with bridge trespassing).
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in a county jail and/or a fine of up to $10,000.'4 Moreover, if a person convicted of
bridge trespass is granted probation, he or she is required to perform between 40
and 160 hours of community service in certain specified programs. t5 Although
bridge trespassing remains a misdemeanor under Chapter 379,16 proponents believe
that the stricter penalties will provide a more effective deterrent than prior law,
while maintaining the public's right to free expression. t7 However, opponents of
Chapter 379 argue that the effect of Chapter 379 is to restrain the First Amendment
right of protesters.'"
Ill. CHAPTER 379 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Chapter 379 has been criticized as placing limitations on the First Amendment
right of protesters. 9 Opponents of Chapter 379 argue that Chapter 379 "is designed
to curb protesters and restrain First Amendment activities." 20 Moreover, protesters
serve a beneficial part in bringing about change in America and their efforts should
not be curtailed by legislation enacted to limit their rights.2'
Both the United States and the California Constitutions guarantee the right of
freedom of expression 2 however, this freedom is not without restriction. 2 In City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,24 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that prohibits any adult theater from locating
within 1,000 feet of a residential zone, church, park or school.a2 The Court ex-
plained that the ordinance was merely a time, place, and manner regulation because
14. See CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 27174.2(a) (amended by Chapter 379) (specifying that the penalty for
a violation of this section be imprisonment in a county jail for up to one year or a fine of up to $10,000, or both).
15. See id. § 27174.2(c) (amended by Chapter 379) (requiring any person convicted of an unauthorized
trespass on any district bridge to perform at least 40 hours, but no more than 160 hours, of community service in
a homeless shelter, drug abuse programs, or hospice as a condition of probation).
16. See id. § 27174.2(a) (amended by Chapter 379) (stating that any unauthorized person who uses any part
of a district toll bridge not intended for public use is guilty of a misdemeanor).
17. See ASSEMDLYFLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 4. at 3 (July 1, 1997) (explaining that Chapter 379
"protects the rights of the public for free expression while it penalizes those who subject others to unreasonable risk,
harm, and financial losses").
18. Stein, supra note 9, at A26.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. (stating that while protesters may pose an inconvenience to some, there is more to be lost than
gained in imprisoning those engaged in civil disobedience).
22. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I (stating "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech");
see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (West 1997) (declaring "every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge
liberty of speech or press").
23. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing the restrictions that the Court may place on
the freedom of expression).
24. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
25. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (holding that an ordinance that
bans adult theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, church, park, or school is constitutionally
valid).
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it did not place an outright ban on adult movie theaters.26 The Court concluded that
time, place, or manner regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech
based on its content are presumed to violate the First Amendment.27 However, the
Court declared that a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation will survive
constitutional scrutiny if the regulation serves a substantial government interest and
leaves ample alternative channels of communication available for the regulated
speech.
2 8
A content-based restriction focuses on the message associated with the speech,
allowing certain messages to be heard but barring others.2 ' These restrictions can
be based on either subject matter or viewpoint.30 A content-based restriction
receives strict scrutiny from the courts and will only be validated if it furthers a
"compelling" state interest and is designed to further that interest in a narrow
manner.
3 1
In contrast, a content-neutral regulation does not distinguish speech based on
subject matter or viewpoint.32 In order for a regulation to be deemed content-
neutral, it must be justified without mention of the speech being regulated.3 3 It is
enforced uniformly without regard to the content of the speech that is being
suppressed and is concerned only with the time, place, or manner of the speech.34
A content-neutral regulation on speech is valid if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
"significant" government interest and leaves adequate alternative channels of
communication. 5
Chapter 379 may properly be classified as a content-neutral regulation because
it is applied uniformly without regard to the content of speech incidentally restricted
26. See id. at46 (stating that an ordinance that does not place an outright ban on adult movie theaters, but
only provides limitations on their location should be considered a time, place, or manner regulation).
27. See id. at 46-47 (noting that a regulation enacted with the purpose of restraining the content of certain
speech is presumed to violate the First Amendment).
28. See id. at 47 (declaring the validity of time, place and manner regulations that are not based on the
content of the regulated material, so long they are designed to further a substantial government interest and leaves
ample alternative channels of communication open for the regulated speech).
29. Barbara Gaal, Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned
Property, 35 STAN. L. REv. 121,124 (1982).
30. Id. at 125.
31. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,276 (1981).
32. See Casenote, The Illusion of Residential Privacy: The Doctrine of Time, Place, Manner and Regulation
Revisited Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988), 12 HAMItNE L. REv. 447,459 (1989) (describing a content-
neutral restriction on speech as one that makes no distinction on the basis of message, ideas, or subject matter, and
does not discriminate in its application and is not arbitrarily enforced).
33. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
34. Gaal, supra note 29, at 125.
35. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (stating that
courts will approve a regulation on speech if the restriction is not based upon the content of the speech, furthers a
siguificant government interest, and leaves ample alternative channels of communication available through the
enforcement of the regulation).
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by its enforcement.3 6 Chapter 379 requires all persons to refrain from trespassing
on portions of district toll bridges not intended for public use, not just demon-
strators.37 Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, Chapter 379 must be shown to
be narrowly tailored to further a significant government interests and leave ample
alternative channels of communication.38
Proponents of Chapter 379 believe that Chapter 379 serves a significant
government interest by protecting the public from dangers associated with bridge
trespassing. 39 Bridge trespassers threaten the safety of motorists, bicyclists, pedes-
trians, and themselves ° For example, bridge demonstrators frequently cause traffic
delays by blocking bridge access during their demonstrations. 1 In Cox v. State of
Louisiana,42 the United States Supreme Court stated that traffic control on public
streets is a governmental responsibility necessary to ensure order.43 Furthermore,
the Court noted that demonstrators do not have the right to ignore traffic regulations
and stage protests that cause traffic jams.4 Thus, the control of traffic is a signi-
ficant government interest for the purpose of assessing a content-neutral time, place
or manner regulation. 5
Moreover, proponents of Chapter 379 argue that it leaves ample alternative
channels for communicating ideas.4 6 Proponents explain that Chapter 379 merely
prohibits unauthorized people from trespassing on any portion of a district toll
bridge not intended for public use.47 Chapter 379 does not make it unlawful to use
a toll bridge in a demonstration, it merely requires the protestors refrain from tres-
passing on certain parts of a bridge that are not open to the public.48 Demonstrators
36. See Gaal, supra note 29, at 125 (describing acontent-neutral regulation as one applied uniformly without
regard to the speech that is being suppressed); see also CAL. STS. &HIGH. CODE§ 27174.2(a) (amended by Chapter
379) (stating that "every person" who climbs on any portion of a district toll bridge not intended for public use is
guilty of a misdemeanor).
37. See CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 27174.2 (amended by Chapter 379) (requiring all persons to refrain from
trespassing on portions of district toll bridges not intended for public use).
38. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (requiring a content-neutral, time, place, or manner regulation
on speech to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication to survive constitutional scrutiny).
39. see AssEMBLYFLOOR, COmMImrEEANALYsisOFSB4, at 2 (July 1, 1997) (stating thatbridgetrespassers
endanger the public and cause significant delays to motorists).
40. Id.
41. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing how protestors have frequently caused traffic jams
by protesting on the Golden Gate Bridge).
42. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
43. Id. at 554.
44. Id. at 554-55.
45. See id. at 554 (stating that an individual's free speech right does not trump traffic regulations designed
to ensure public convenience).
46. See ASSEIBLY FLOOR, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 4, at 3 (July 1, 1997) (stating that Chapter 379
protects the public's right to free expression, but penalizes those that subject others to unreasonable risks).
47. See CAL. SiS. & HIGH. CODE § 27174.2(a) (amended by Chapter 379) (stating that any unauthorized
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are free to picket on the sidewalks of any bridge or use any other part of the bridge
that is not restricted to authorized personnel. Thus, Chapter 379 leaves ample alter-
native avenues for communication of information for the purposes of assessing a
content-neutral, time, place or manner regulation on speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Legislature approved Chapter 379 at the requests of Golden Gate
Bridge officials as an attempt to reduce frustrations and concerns over the use of the
Bridge as a demonstration site.49 Chapter 379 should survive constitutional scrutiny
because it is a content-neutral, time, place, or manner restriction that is narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and leaves ample alternative
channels for communication of information.
Furthermore, by increasing the penalties for bridge trespassing, Chapter 379
will act as an effective deterrent. By hitting would-be trespassers where it really
hurts-in the pocket book-protestors will more likely find an alternative demon-
stration site and stay off district toll bridges.
49. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 4, at 2 (July 1, 1997) (stating that the use of the
Bridge as a demonstration site threatens to public safety and causes substantial traffic delays).
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Penal Code § 12022.53 (new).
AB 4 (Bordonaro); 1997 STAT. Ch. 503
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Three Strikes provision sent an unequivocal message to the
habitual offenders of society.' Chapter 503 seeks to send a similar message to
criminals: use a firearm while committing a felony, and you're going to jail for a
very long time.2 Chapter 503 requires an additional sentencing enhancement for
individuals who personally use, discharge or cause great bodily injury to another
through the use of a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a
specified felony
Chapter 503 will likely face constitutional challenges based on alleged
violations of cruel and unusual punishment, jury trial rights, and double jeopardy.4
However, courts will likely reject these constitutional challenges.5 In a society
where criminals increasingly use firearms in the perpetration of felonies, the courts
are likely to recognize that Chapter 503 represents a rational deterrent and re-
tributive response toward violent crime.6
H. COMPARISON BETWEEN PREVIOUS LAW AND CHAPTER 503
Prior to the adoption of Chapter 503, California law specified that an individual
who was armed7 with a firearm, in the commission of a felony, was punished by an
1. Michael Bryan Reynolds, '1-20-Life'Another Step Toward Cutting Crime, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 6,1996,
at B5.
2. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (commenting on Chapter 503's deterrent and retributive
benefits).
3. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing the sentencing enhancements of Chapter 503).
4. See discussion infra Part IV (observing the constitutional challenges that Chapter 503 may face).
5. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that Chapter 503 will withstand constitutional attack).
6. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (arguing the societal benefits of Chapter 503).
7. See People v. Bland, 10 Cal. 4th 991, 1002,898 P.2d 391,398,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77,84 (1995) (declaring
that a purposeful or effective nexus or link must exist between the firearm and the offense for an individual to be
"armed with a firearm in the commission" of a crime); People v. Smith, 9 Cal. App. 4th 196,204, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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additional year onto their sentence,' or if the firearm was an assault weapon, the
enhancement would be an additional three years.9 Prior law further required that one
who used1" a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony would
be punished by an additional three, four, or ten years." However, if the felony was
645,649 (1992) (stating that defendant is armed forpurposes of sentencing enhancement statute if he is in physical
possession of the weapon or if he may easily reach the weapon); People v. Mendival, 2 Cal. App. 4th 562, 574, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d 566, 574 (1992) (discussing that an individual is "armed" if the individual knowingly has the firearm
available for either offensive or defensive use); People v. Wandick, 227 Cal. App. 3d 918, 928, 278 Cal. Rptr. 274,
281 (1991) (deciding that an individual whose weapon was "available" satisfies meaning of "armed"); People v.
Reaves, 42 Cal. App. 3d 852, 856-57, 117 Cal. Rptr. 163, 166 (1974) (determining that if the weapon is simply
carried or is available for use in either an offensive or defensive capacity, then the individual is "armed"); see also
Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 999, 898 P.2d at 396,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82 (holding that for the purposes of California Penal
Cede § 12022(a), a defendant who could resort to a firearm to further crime fulfills requirement of being "armed
with a firearm in the commission... of a felony" for purposes of sentencing enhancement); People v. Nelums, 31
Cal. 3d 355, 360, 644 P.2d 201, 204, 182 Cal. Rptr. 515, 518 (1982) (noting that a firearm does not need to be
lorded for an individual to be armed, if weapon was designed to shoot and supports reasonable appearance of Its
ability to fire); see generally Mendival, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 574,3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574 (declaring that for the purpose
of sentencing enhancement statute, two people may be "personally armed" with a single firearm).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997); cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227b (WCst
Supp. 1997) (determining that an individual who carries or has in his possession a firearm during the commission
of specified felony is guilty of a felony mandating imprisonment for two years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-490 (Law
Co-op Supp. 1996) (providing that an additional sentence of five years is imposed for one who possesses a firearm
orvisibly displays what appears to be a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a violent crime).
9. CAL. PENALCODE § 12022(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997); cf GA. CODEANN. § 16-11-160 (1996) (declaring
that an individual who possesses or uses a machine gun, sawed-off rifle, sawed-off shotgun, or firearm equipped
with a silencer during the commission or attempted commission of specified felonies shall be sentenced for 10
additional years); IND.CODEANN. § 35-50-2-13 (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing that an individual who is convicted
of dealing a controlled substance may be sentenced up to five additional years if individual used or possessed a
firearm, an additional 10 years if the firearm was a sawed-off shotgun or an additional 20 years if the firearm was
a machine gun or firearm equipped with a silencer); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.610 (1995) (requiring an enhanced
sentence of 10 years if a machine gun, short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or firearm equipped with a
silencer is used or threatened to be used during the commission of a felony).
10. See People v. Masbruch, 13 Cal. 4th 1001, 1006, 920 P.2d 705, 708,55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 760,763 (1996)
(holding that a firearm is to be deemed as "used" if it served as an aid in the completion of the essential elements
of the crime, even if only displayed at outset of criminal activity); People v. Granado, 49 Cal. App. 4th 317,324-25,
56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636, 641 (1996) (explaining that no "use" occurred if weapons-related conduct was incidental and
unrelated to offense); People v. Camacho, 19 Cal. App. 4th 1737, 1747, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286, 291 (1993)
(recognizing that use of firearm does not require the actual production of harm, it only requires conduct which
produces fear of harm or force by the means or display of the firearm); People v. Steele, 235 Cal. App. 3d 788, 791,
286 Cal. Rptr. 887, 889 (1991) (deciding that a firearm does not have to be loaded at time of crime to be in "use"
for purposes of sentencing enhancement provision); see also Londale H., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1464, 1467,7 Cal. Rptr.
2d 501, 503 (1992) (stating that the legislative intent of the statute is best served by broadly construing the term
"use"); People v. Bush, 50 Cal. App. 3d 168, 176-77, 123 Cal. Rptr. 576, 581 (1975) (providing that the word
"uses" is not synonymous with the word "armed" in affording additional punishment for felony conviction); see
generally Masbruch, 13 Cal. 4th at 1007, 920 P.2d at 709, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764 (stating that whether a defendant
"used" a firearm is a question of fact for the trier of fact); Mendival, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 575, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574
(deciding that whether firearm is available for the use of an individual is a jury question).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997); cf ARtK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-120(a) (Michie
Supp. 1995) (requiring that one who employs a firearm in the commission or escape of a felony may be subject to
an additional 15 years onto their sentence); IDAHO CODE § 19-2520 (1997) (providing an additional 15 years onto
maximum sentence for an individual who is convicted of display, use, threat or attempted use of a firearm or other
deadly weapon in the commission or attempted commission of specified felonies); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-11
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carjacking or attempted carijacking, the added punishment was four, five, or ten
years.
12
Chapter 503, in addition to current law, imposes an augmented ten-year
sentence for a person who, in the commission of a specified felony,13 personally
uses a firearm. 14 Chapter 503 also requires a twenty-year sentence enhancement for
an individual who intentionally and personally discharges a firearm during the com-
mission of a specified felony.'5 Chapter 503 also directs an additional twenty-five-
years to life sentence enhancement for one who in the commission of a specified
felony proximately causes great bodily injury16 through the intentional and personal
discharge of a firearm to any person other than an accomplice. 17 Chapter 503's
enhancements do not apply to the lawful use or discharge of a firearm by a public
officer 8 or to a person in lawful self-defense, lawful self-defense of another, or law-
ful defense of property. 9
III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND FISCAL EFFECT OF CHAPTER 503
Most felonies that are committed are done through the use of a firearm.
20
Consequently, the number of injuries and fatalities associated with firearms are
(Michie Supp. 1996) (declaring that one who uses a firearm in the commission of a felony resulting in death or
serious bodily injury, kidnaping or a Class B felony may be sentenced to an additional five years); MD. ANN. CODE
art 27, § 281A (Supp. 1996) (declaring that an individual who uses, wears, carries, or transports a firearm in
connection with the felony of drug trafficking is subject to an additional sentence ranging from five to 20 years);
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.610 (1995) (requiring a five year minimum sentence for one who uses or threatens to use a
firearm during the commission of a felony).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
13, See id. § 12022.53(a) (enacted by Chapter 503) (specifying that Chapter 503's sentencing enhancement
applies to the following felonies: murder, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, carjacking, assault with intent to commit
a specified felony, assault with a firearm on a peace officer or firefighter, rape, rape or penetration by a foreign
object in concert, sodomy, lewd act on a child, oral copulation, penetration by a foreign object, assault by a life
prisoner, assault by a prisoner, holding a hostage by a prisoner, any felony punishable by death or imprisonment
for life or any attempt to commit one of the above crimes other than an assault).
14. Id. § 12022.53(b) (enacted by Chapter 503); see id. (stating that the firearm does not need to be in
working condition or loaded for this sentencing enhancement to apply).
15. Id. § 12022.53(c) (enacted by Chapter 503).
16. See id. § 12022.7(e) (West Supp. 1997) (defining "great bodily injury" to mean "a significant or
substantial physical injury"); see also People v. Armstrong, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1066, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839, 841
(1992) (explaining that "great bodily injury" is bodily injury that is substantial or significant, not trivial or
moderate); People v. Wilson, 218 Cal. App. 2d 564, 566, 32 Cal. Rptr. 406, 408 (1963) (stating that the question
of great bodily injury is determined by trier of fact); People v. Bradley, 71 Cal. App. 2d 114, 120, 162 P.2d 38, 41
(1945) (indicating that in consideration of elements that constitute "great bodily harm," a jury may consider the
character of the means used, the manner and the purpose of instrument used, and may consider other
circumstances).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(d) (enacted by Chapter 503).
18. Id. § 12022.53(/) (enacted by Chapter 503).
19. Id.; see Reynolds, supra note 1, at B5 (asserting that the initiative will not backfire against citizens who
use guns in self-defense).
20. See Stephen J. Leibovic, Handguns Threaten Public Health, RICHMoND TIMES DISPATCH (Richmond,
Va.), Oct. 9, 1996, at A12 (stating that handguns are the most commonly used weapon in violent crimes).
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much higher than those not involving the use of firearms. 2' The intent in promul-
gating Chapter 503 is to provide a deterrent toward the use of handguns in the
commission of felonies,' and to provide a retributive response for those who do use
one.2 However, opponents contend that Chapter 503 will not serve as an effective
crime deterrent.2
The enactment of Chapter 503 will result in additional fiscal expenditures
25
because the criminal justice system must pay for the increased costs of incarceration
and construction of new prisons.26 Critics of Chapter 503 argue that this money
21. See James P. Sweeney, Assembly Set to Reject Handgun Ban, COPLEY NEws SERV., June 4, 1997
(stating that more than 20,000 people are killed each year with handguns and that nearly 5.000 are in California);
see also Leibovic, supra note 20, at A12 (arguing that in 1995 more than $4 billion was spent on medical related
costs for firearm-related injuries); Ren Yanshi, A Look at the U.S. Human Rights Record, XINIIUA NEWS AGENCY
(Beijing), Mar. 4, 1997 (citing that one million crimes occur each year involving firearms, more than 20,000 people
are shot and killed, and an additional 110,000 were injured by firearms in 1994).
22. ASSamLYCOM rrEEoNPUBLICSAFETY, COMMrrEEANALYSiSOFAB4, at 2-3 (Apr. 15, 1997); see
Masbruch, 13 Cal. 4th at 1006, 920 P.2d at 709, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764 (asserting that the purpose behind
Dangerous Weapons' Control Law section governing firearm sentencing enhancements is to deter the use of
firearms in the perpetration of violent crimes); Bland, 10 Cal. 4th at 1001, 898 P.2d at 398,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84
(declaring that the legislative intent behind firearm sentencing enhancement is to deter criminals engaged in felonies
from creating risk of death or injury); People v. Jackson, 32 Cal. App. 4th 411, 422, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 220
(1995) (stating that the goal behind firearm sentencing enhancement statutes is to deter those from creating the
potential for death or bodily injury from the presence of a firearm in the commission of a crime); Reynolds, supra
note 1, at B5 (observing that states that have passed rigid anti-crime law have experienced a greater decrease in
respective crime rates); James P. Sweeney, Initiative Takes Aim at Outlaws with Guns, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Oct. 18, 1995, at Al (indicating that clear language of enhancements will serve to deter criminals).
23. See ASSEMiBLY COMMirrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 4, at 2 (Apr. 15, 1997)
(quoting the author who stated, "For far too long, criminals have been using guns to prey on their victims. AB 4
will keep these parasites where they belong.., in jail.... [W]e are sending... [a] clear message: If you use a gun
to commit a crime, you're going to jail, and you're staying there."); see also Christopher Tasy, 'Severe Measures, '
FRESNO BEE, Mar. 3, 1996, at B6 (arguing that sentencing enhancement sarves to keep criminals away from the
populace more so than it serves as a deterrent).
24. See Pete Kuiper, Various Methods, Besides Initiatives, Work Against Crime, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 10, 1996,
at B7 (arguing that threat of longer sentences will not deter the criminal 'nothing more to lose' mentality); Rory
Little. Costly '10-20-Life' Initiative Won t Cut Crime, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 26, 1996, at B7 (indicating that no
evidence exists showing that longer sentences will decrease crime because criminals don't know or care what tho
law says); Patience Milrod, '10-20-Life 'lsn't a Sensible Method for Cutting Crime, FRESNO BEE. Feb. 16, 1996,
at B7 (indicating that no evidence supports the deterrent power of enhancements).
25. ASSEMBLYCOMMrTTEEONAPPROPRIATIONS, COMNi'i"EEANALYSISO AB4, at I (May 14, 1997).
26. See id. (estimating that the annual cost of increased incarceration to be about $17 million and
construction costs to be $45 million within 10 years, topping $150 million for incarceration and $225 million for
construction within 20years and resulting in more than $220 million in annual costs for incarceration and more than
$500 million in construction costs in 30 years); see also Dan Bernstein, Wilson Signs Bill Adding 7unefor Gun
Crimes, Warns Gangs, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 26, 1997, at A3 (noting that Chapter 503 will result in harsher
sentences for about 500 defendants next year); Milrod, supra note 24, at B7 (predicting that additional millions of
dollars will need to be spent in costs for cotinty criminal justice agencies). But see Cindi Hamilton, 'Basic
Principles,' FRESNO BEE, Feb. 28, 1996, at B4 (explaining that the cost of keeping criminals in prison is much less
than the cost of crime); Mike Reynolds, Readers Can Join 10-20-Life Movement, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 17, 1996, at
B5 (inferring that crime reduction will heighten real estate values, business profits, schools, parks and the tax base).
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would be better spent on more effective methods of crime prevention" and on other
social programs.2
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Cruel, Unusual and Disproportionate Punishment
The Federal and California Constitutions prohibit the use of cruel and/or
unusual punishment,29 or punishment that is grossly disproportional to the crime
committed. Chapter 503's sentencing enhancements are clearly more severe than
under prior law.3' For example, an individual who commits an assault and inflicts
great bodily injury through the discharge of a firearm would receive a sentence of
twenty-five years to life under Chapter 503, while one who commits the same
offense with a machete would receive a maximum sentence of seven years under
prior law.32 Additionally, prior law permitted the court to strike enhancement
allegations,33 Chapter 503 does not grant the court this discretion. The dispro-
portionality of Chapter 503's sentencing enhancements thus may be subject to con-
stitutional attack.3 5 However, defendants face a considerable burden in challenging
27. See Milrod, supra note 24, at B7 (arguing that a far more effective and less expensive method toward
reducing crime would be to reconstitute our mental health system). But see Matthew Trbovich, 'The Real
Questions,' FRESNO BEE, Feb. 23, 1996, at B6 (arguing that incarceration better serves the function of crime
deterrence than reconstituting our mental health system).
28. See Kuiper, supra note 24, at B7 (asserting that a punitive approach diverts funds from programs that
benefit victims); Milrod, supra note 24, at B7 (arguing that increased cost of sentencing enhancements will result
in sacrifices to public health, education and quality of life). But see Reynolds, supra note 1, at B5 (reporting that
social programs inadequately deter crime).
29. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VHII (providing that, "cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted");
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (declaring that, "cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted... '').
30. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (explaining that the punishment may not be
unconstitutionally disproportionate to the circumstances of the conduct of the defendant); Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d
639, 653, 537 P.2d 384, 394, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 562 (1975) (requiring that an offender's culpability in the
circumstances of a case may not be disproportionate to the sentence).
31. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CoMMrrIEE ANALYSIS OF AB 4, at 4 (Apr. 15, 1997)
(declaring that the court has no discretion with Chapter 503 sentencing enhancements); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022.53(h) (enacted by Chapter 503) (requiring that, "the court shall not strike an allegation under this section
or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section"); id. § 12022.53(g) (enacted by Chapter 503)
(stating that probation or sentencing suspension is not permitted for an enhanced sentence under Chapter 503).
32. ASSEMBLYCOMMITrEEONPUBLICSAFETY, COMMITrEEANALYSISOFAB4, at3-4 (Apr. 15, 1997); see
Bill Ainsworth, Wilson Signs Bill Putting Gun Criminals Away Longer, COPLEY NEWS SERV., SepL 26, 1997
(stating that under Chapter 503, "a criminal who brandishes a gun but doesn't use it in a crime would get a far
lengthier prison stay than a convict who seriously injures a victim with a knife or other weapon").
33. People v. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 529-530, 917 P.2d 628, 647-648, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 808-809
(1996).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(i) (enacted by Chapter 503).
35. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 4, at 2 (May. 14, 1997)
(arguing that "[c]hoice of weapon seems a dubious basis for such disparate punishment").
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a punishment as cruel or unusual36 because of the deference that courts give to the
Legislature in determining the definition of crime and scope of punishment.37 Thus,
because of the potential societal benefits38 in an age where criminals frequently use
firearms, the deference to afford Chapter 503 is especially strong. 39 Furthermore,
Chapter 503's punishment requirements are very similar to the previously adopted
three strikes provision,' and these laws have not yet been found to violate the
Eighth Amendment.4" For instance, in People v. Cepeda,42 the court held that an
aggregate eight year sentence under three strikes is not cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the individual circumstances of the crime and held that the crime is not
grossly proportionate to the punishment so as to shock the conscience.4 3 Therefore,
the courts should determine that Chapter 503's sentencing enhancements do not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
B. Jury Trial Rights
The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial.44
Previously, courts have held that the trier of fact should determine factual questions
relevant to sentencing enhancements.45 Yet today, the vast majority of decisions
36. See People v. Weddle, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1196, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 718 (1991) (noting that
successful challenges based on proportionality are extremely rare); Peoplev. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 174,534 P.2d
1001, 1006, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1975) (requiring that a penalty must appear clearly, positively, and
unmistakably unconstitutional to be questioned).
37. See Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d at 174, 534 P.2d at 1006, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (noting that in upholding the
doctrine of separation of powers, the courts will not "lightly encroach" in matters reserved for the Legislature);
Dennis PA., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 453, 450 P.2d296, 301, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1969) (declaring that the validity of statutes
will not be questioned "unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears").
38. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing potential societal benefits of sentencing
enhancements).
39. See People v. Thompson, 24 Cal. App. 4th 299, 304-305,29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847, 850 (1994) (noting that
the Legislature is given some leeway and ability to experiment in determining scope of punishment especially when
the Legislature has determined that the "crime is particularly dangerous to human life," and "the penalty ... is
calculated to advance a critically important social policy for the protection of the public at large").
40. See ASSEmLY COMMrrrEEON PUBLIC SAFErY, COMMrrrEmANALYstS OF AB 4, at 2-3 (Apr. 15, 1997)
(noting the similarity between Chapter 503's sentencing enhancements and three strikes' most severe provision).
41. See People v. cartwright, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1123, 1134-37, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 356-58 (1995)
(declaring that increasing severity of defendant's sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the current offense
when viewed in light of his individual circumstances and criminal history and therefore does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
42. 49 Cal. App. 4th 1235,57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 246 (1996).
43. Id. at 1240,57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249.
44. See U.S. CoNST. amend. VI (providing that, "in all criminal procedures, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury"); see also CAL. CONS'. art. I, § 16 (requiring that, "trial by jury
is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all").
45. See People v. Hemandez, 46 Cal. 3d 194, 206, 757 P.2d 1013, 1020, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857 (1988)
(stating that sentencing enhancement could not be applied unless it had been "pled and proven before the trier of
fact"), superseded on other grounds by CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 207, 208 (West 1996); People v. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d
826, 835, 694 P.2d 736, 741, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628 (1985) (mandating that enhanced ternm for subsequent felony
could not be imposed absent proof of each fact required for enhancement), overruled on other grounds by People
536
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have determined that no constitutional guarantee or precedent exists for a jury to
determine the application of sentencing enhancements.46 Therefore, following the
weight of decisions in this matter, the courts should conclude that Chapter 503 does
not violate any constitutional rights concerning a trial by jury.
C. Double Jeopardy
It may be argued that Chapter 503 violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of both
the United States and California Constitutions. 47 The prohibition against double
jeopardy protects individuals from being charged with the consecutive violation of
the same law or violation of laws that are so related that the prohibited conduct by
one statute is necessarily included within prohibited conduct by the other 8 Chapter
503's sentencing enhancements may be likened to punishing a defendant twice for
the same offense, because Chapter 503 requires punishment once for the original
crime and additionally for the felony with the use of a handgun.49 Yet, the sen-
tencing enhancements of Chapter 503 do not represent a separate crime or offense
for which a defendant is being tried.50 Rather, they represent additional punishments
for offenses for which the defendant has already been convicted.5 1 Further, Chapter
v. Harrell, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1439, 255 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1989); People v. Najera, 8 Cal. 3d 504, 509-10, 503 P.2d
1353, 1357, 105 Cal. Rptr..345,349 (1972) (requiring ajury determination as to whether defendant used a firearm
to provide for sentencing enhancement); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.530) (enacted by Chapter 503)
(providing that the necessary facts relevant to sentencing enhancement must either be admitted by defendant or
found true by the trier of fact).
46. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,93 (1986) (providing that no constitutional guarantee exists
for jury sentencing); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee a jury determination of the appropriate punishment an individual receives); People v. Wiley, 9 Cal. 4th
580,588, 889 P.2d 541,546,38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347,352 (1995) (arguing that no federal or California constitutional
requirement grants a defendant a right to ajury trial for sentencing enhancements). Cf Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S.
638,64041 (1989) (opining that, "the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the
imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury").
47. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (prohibiting that "any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb"); CAL. CONST. art. I. § 15 (providing that "persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for
the same offense"); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988) (stating that, "an act or omission which is made
punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars
a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other").
48. Dennis B., 18 Cal. 3d 687,691,557 P.2d 514,517, 135 Cal. Rptr. 82,85 (1976).
49. See People v. Harbolt, 56 Cal. App. 4th 294,298, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397,400 (1997) (noting that in a three
strikes offense, the prosecution is barred from relitigating circumstances of previous crime so defendant's double
jeopardy rights are not violated).
50. See People v. Kelley, 52 Cal. App. 4th 568, 576,60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653,658 (1997) (holding that double
jeopardy rights are violated if each offense contains an element the other does not).
51. See People v. Waite, 146 Cal. App. 3d 585, 593, 194 Cal. Rptr. 245, 250 (1983) (stating that an
enhancement is neither an independent crime or offense); Bush, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 176, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 581
(determining that enhancement of punishment for individual convicted of crime does not separately define separate
crime); People v. Provencher, 33 Cal. App. 3d 546, 551, 108 Cal. Rptr. 792, 795 (1973) (indicating that sentence
enhancement does not amount to double punishment); People v. Henry, 14 Cal. App. 3d 89,92,91 Cal. Rptr. 841,
84243 (1970) (explaining that imposition of five-year sentencing enhancement in addition to punishment for armed
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503 requires that only one additional term of imprisonment be imposed for each
crime a person commits.5 2 Therefore, any challenges to the Constitution's double
jeopardy clause would likely be defeated.
V. CONCLUSION
The strict sentencing provisions of Chapter 503 are intended to send a clear
message to criminals regarding the use of firearms in the commission of specific
felonies:53 (1) Personal use of a firearm will result in a sentence enhancement often
additional years;4 (2) personal and intentional discharge of a firearm during the
commission of a felony brings an enhancement of twenty years;55 and (3) personal
and intentional discharge of a firearm that causes great bodily injury will result in
an enhancement of twenty-five years to life.56
Despite Chapter 503 being the most severe law regarding sentencing enhance-
ments in California,57 it does not violate the constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment because of its similarity to the Three Strikes law, and
the societal concerns that Chapter 503 addresses.5 8 Additionally, because the con-
stitution does not guarantee a jury trial in applying sentencing enhancements, no
consequent violation should be found.59 Finally, these enhancements are not
classified as separate offenses, but merely as sentence augmentation for existing
offenses. 60 Thus, Chapter 503 would not result in double jeopardy infringements.
Therefore, Chapter 503's sentencing enhancements should withstand any con-
stitutional challenges because of the societal urgency in combating firearm related
felonies.6t
robbery does not constitute double punishment or double jeopardy).
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(f) (enacted by Chapter 503).
53. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (observing the societal response and benefits from Chapter
503's implementation).
54. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (noting the severity of Chapter 503's sentencing
requirements).
58. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (arguing that Chapter 503 does not violate constitutional
prohibitions against cruel or unusual punishment).
59. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional jury trial implications in light
of Chapter 503's passage).
60. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (distinguishing between criminal offenses and sentencing
enhancements).
61. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (observing the societal necessity in fighting firearm
related felonies)
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Food and Agricultural Code § 5343.5 (new); Penal Code §§ 11106, 12001,
12026.2, 12072, 12076, 12077, 12082 (amended).
AB 991 (Shelley); 1997 STAT. Ch. 462
I. INTRODUCTION
The biblical prophet Isaiah envisioned a future in which swords were beaten
into plows and nations no longer waged war.' Conversely, the ancient Chinese
military theorist Sun-tzu thought of armed warfare as essential to the existence of
humankind.2 For centuries, these competing schools of thought have been engaged
in philosophical and intellectual combat over the function of weapons in society.
In early America, our ancestors bore arms as a means of survival in a new and
dangerous world. Frequent attacks by wild animals and savage peoples, coupled
with fledgling bodies of authority from which to draw protection, made arming
oneself a requisite to existence. 4 It was only natural that our nation's founders
included "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" in the Bill of Rights.5 But
they did so with a caveat of sorts.6 Written in a time where the fear of a dominant
central government was offset only by the fear of the union crumbling in its
infancy,7 the Second Amendment links the right to bear arms with the objective of
maintaining a "well regulated Militia" in order to secure "a free State."' And so the
debate goes: Does the Second Amendment grant the personal right to bear arms to
1. Isaiah 2:4 (King James).
2. SuN-Tzu, TIE ARr OF WAR 167 (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., Barnes & Noble Books 1994).
3. See Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control Legislation, 58 MONT.
L. REV. 79, 96 (1997) (explaining the dangers of eighteenth century life); see also JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS 139 (Harvard University Press 1994) (referring to "the perils of frontier life").
4. Dowd, supra note 3, at 96; see MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 139 (remarking that the earliest American
settlers "enact[ed] measures for their individual and mutual protection").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
6. See William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Bear Arms. 43 DUKE LJ.
1236, 1236 (1994) (discussing the confusion caused by the Second Amendment's wording).
7. See MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 152-54 (noting the conflicting opinions of the nation's leaders around
the time of the Constitutional Convention with regard to the state and federal roles in controlling a standing army
and militias).
8. Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1236.
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each and every American, 9 or does it merely impose a restriction on the federal
government's power to prevent the forming and arming of state militias? 0
Today, the debate over gun control includes terms such as "background checks"
and "waiting periods."'1 In California, all gun purchasers are required to submit to
a background check which involves a 10-day waiting period.12 Similarly, the Brady
Act of 1993 created the requirement for background checks and waiting periods on
a federal level, sparking national debate.' 3 A recent Supreme Court decision,
however, declared unconstitutional the portion of the Act which required state
officials to carry out federal law in conducting these checks.' 4 In the opinion, the
Supreme Court managed to avoid taking sides in the debate over the Second
Amendment by basing its decision on other provisions of the Constitution. 5 But
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, may have tilted the hand of the high
Court when he suggested that the determination of the right to bear arms may need
to be settled soon.
t 6
9. See generally id (suggesting that the Second Amendment will develop into a personal right once case
law begins to fall into place); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The SecondAmendment: Toward an Afro.
American 1st Reconsideration, 80 GEO. LJ. 309 (1991) (examining the historical correlation between the right to
bear arms and the plight of the African-American in this country and supporting the individual rights theory);
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989) (arguing that the framers
intended the right to bear arms to be personal).
10. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 177 (1939) (establishing that the Second Amendment only
applies to firearms reasonably related to preserving a well-regulated militia in determining that ownership of LI
sawed-off shotgun was not protected by the Constitution); Presser v. Illinois. 116 U.S. 252,264-65 (1886) (holding
that the Second Amendment did not limit the power of the states); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553
(1875) (holding that the Second Amendment "has no other effect than to restrict the rowers of the national
government" in reversing the convictions of Ku Klux Klan members convicted of depriving African-American
citizens of their right to bear arms); see also Dowd, supra note 3, at 83-86 (suggesting that the first clause of the
Second Amendment, referring to the need for a well-regulated militia, limits the second clause, the right to bear
arms); see generally Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993) (arguing that the Second
Amendment does not grant a personal right); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991) (supporting the collective right theory).
11. See, e.g., National Press Club Newsmaker Luncheon Debate Between Rep. Charles Sehumer (D-NY)
and Wayne LaPierre, National Rifle Association, (C-SPAN television broadcast and National Public Radio radio
broadcast, July 17, 1997) (debating the merits of gun control laws).
12. CAL PENALCODE § 12072(c)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
13. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); see generally Marc Christopher Cozzolino, Note, Gun
Control: The Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 245 (1992) (examining the debate
surrounding the Brady Bill).
14. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365.2379 (1997).
15. See id. at 2379 (deciding that even though the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, it did not, via the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorize Congress to direct the actions of
state officials).
16. See id. at 2386 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the debate over the meaning of the Second
Amendment has been fervent among legal commentators and suggesting that the high court may wish "to determine
whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms 'has been justly considered, as the
palladium of the liberties of a republic' (quoting 3 J. STORY. COMMENTARIES § 1890, p. 746 (1833)).
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Now, as the 60th anniversary of the last Supreme Court ruling on the Second
Amendment approaches, 7 we potentially find ourselves on the cusp of a new
defining era in the evolution of the United States Constitution. 8 California's
Chapter 462 may hang in the balance.
Chapter 462 amends a relatively new California law which requires registration
with the Department of Justice of all sales of firearms purchased in the state.19
Maintenance of such a record of gun owners is designed to help law enforcement
personnel investigate crimes and prosecute criminals.20 There are some, however,
who believe that registration today can lead to confiscation tomorrow.2" The
National Rifle Association warns its members that registration laws could
ultimately result in law-abiding NRA members losing their firearms, if subsequent
laws are passed that ban the possession of previously legal weapons and permit the
state to use its registration list to enforce the new law.22 Similarly, the National
Association of Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers has issued propaganda through
the Internet stating that a 1960's New York City law requiring citizens to register
long guns resulted in a government list of gun owners which was used by city
officials in 1991 to confiscate weapons that had become banned.23
The Supreme Court has declared some registration requirements uncon-
stitutional including, a federal law that required an individual to send a reply card
to the Post Office prior to receiving communist propaganda24 and a state law that
required voters either to pay a poll tax or to register at least six months prior to any
election in which they intended to participate.2 The court reasoned that such laws
17. See generally United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (holding that the Second Amendment only
applies to firearms reasonably related to preserving a well-regulated militia).
18. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1238-41 (comparing the state of the First Amendment in the early
twentieth century to that of the Second Amendment today, there having been little case law regarding the First
Amendment until Chief Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis began shaping it in the 1920's).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11106 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
20. Id.
21. See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Symposium, Keeping Guns Out of the "Wrong" Hands: The
Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 93 n.2 (1995) (quoting the NRA
Member Guide as stating "[any type of... registration scheme.., ultimately could result in the prohibition and/or
confiscation of legally owned firearms"); see also American Firearms Network, Problems with Gun Registration
and Licensing (visited July 22, 1997) <http://www.amfire.com/afistatistics/factsheet.html> (suggesting that a New
York City gun registration law did eventually lead to confiscation).
22. Jacobs, supra note 21, at 93 n.2.
23. American Firearms Network, supra note 21.
24. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (establishing that a federal law requiring an
addressee to apply in writing to receive mail presumed to be communist propaganda, restrained freedom of speech
and was unconstitutional).
25. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 538-42 (1965) (holding that a Virginia law requiring voters
to file, six months prior to an election, a notarized or witnessed certificate attesting that they had lived continuously
in the state from the time of their original voter registration and did not intend to depart prior to the upcoming
election, created the same disenfranchising effect that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment sought to abolish).
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would deter some individuals from exercising their constitutional rights and
potentially deprive others of participation in our democracy entirely.
2 6
Should the high Court decide that the Second Amendment does indeed grant a
personal right to bear arms,' the next logical question would be: Is it an abridge-
ment of that personal right for the State of California to require its citizens to
register gun ownership?
H. How CHAPTER 462 AFFECTS CALIFORNIA LAW
Prior to the passage of Chapter 462, California law required state licensed gun
dealers to submit all applications for the purchase of firearms to the Department of
Justice in order to ensure that the applicant was not a member of a class prohibited
from owning guns, such as convicted felons or the mentally incompetent.28 The
statute further provided that applicants wait at least ten days before taking pos-
session of their firearms.29 In conducting these background checks, the Attorney
General was authorized to maintain a record of those gun owners who purchased
weapons capable of being concealed upon the person.30
Chapter 462 keeps this language intact and fills an apparent void in these laws
by requiring the registration of firearms such as pistols, revolvers or other con-
cealable weapons purchased outside of California and brought into the state.3 This
is intended to cover persons moving into the state who possess handguns purchased
in other states as well as licensed collectors who acquire curio or relic handguns
outside of California.32
Today, there are approximately 30-35 million handgun owners in the United
States, 33 comprising approximately 13% of the population.34 During a twelve month
period from July, 1995 to June, 1996, there were about 440,000 driver's licenses
issued to new California residents. 5 If 13% of these newcomers owned just one
handgun each, then over 57,000 unregistered concealable firearms may have
crossed the state line during that period. While many gun owners do choose to
26. Harnan, 380 U.S. at 538-42; Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307.
27. See Printz 117 S. Ct. at 2386 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Supreme Court may wish
"to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms 'has been justly
consid.-red, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic."' (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1890, p. 746
(1833)).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
29. Id. § 12072(c)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
30. Id. § 11106(West 1996&Supp. 1997).
31. Id. § 12072 (amended by Chapter 462).
32. See ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrTEEANALYSIS of AB 991, at 2 (Apr. 22, 1997)
(commenting that persons who move to California with handguns are not subject to registration rcquirements while
California residents who purchase handguns in-state are).
33. American Firearms Network, supra note 21.
34. See U.S. BIREAUOFCENsUS, U.S.CENS s OFPoPuiLATO: 1920-1990, vol. I (reporting that as of April
1, 1990 the U.S. resident population was 248,709,873).
35. ASSiBLYCOMMrrrEEoN PUBLICSAF-rY, COMMrrrEEANALYSIS of AB 991, at 4 (Apr. 22, 1997).
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voluntarily register their guns when they become California residents,3 6 Chapter 462
ensures that all new residents will be required to do so within 60 days of moving
into the state, or else be subject to a criminal misdemeanor.
III. THE PERSONAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs
The Second Amendment's stipulation that the right to bear arms may be con-
tingent upon a need for a well regulated militia 7 combines with the Supreme
Court's history of relative silence on the subject38 to keep the debate over the right
to bear arms lively amongst Americanjurists.39 The growing body of support for the
notion that the Second Amendment grants an individual liberty to every American
citizen, rather than a collective right of the people, has its roots deeply entrenched
in a wide ground of reasoning. Some commentators suggest that our English
heritage, rich in gun owning tradition, provides the basis for this personal right.4 t
Others rely on the Amendment's placement in the Bill of Rights, neatly tucked
between other individual liberties-the freedom of speech42 and the right to
privacy43 -along with the amendment's Legislative history' as proof that the
authors intended this right to be personal.45 Still others argue that the right to bear
arms is protected not only from federal infringement, but also from state intrusion
via the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby affording it the same status as other per-
sonal liberties.46
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. 1I.
38. Only three United States Supreme Court decisions have directly ruled on the meaning of the Second
Amendment. See supra note 10 (stating the Court's holding in each).
39. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2386 n.2; see also supra notes 9 & 10 (citing several commentators arguing
for various interpretations of the Second Amendment).
40. See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 6 (suggesting that the Second Amendment will develop into a
personal right); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 9 (supporting the individual rights theory); Levinson, supra note
9 (arguing that the framers intended the right to bear arms to be personal).
41. See Dowd, supra note 3, at 96 (referring to the English common law right to keep arms for self-defense);
see also MALCOLM, supra note 3, at 138 (including among the "fundamental principles of English jurisprudence
... the right of Protestants to keep and use weapons"). See generally David B. Kopel, It Isn't About Duck Hunting:
The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 1333 (1995) (reviewing MALCOLM, supra note 3, and
analyzing the British origins of gun ownership).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Third Amendment, granting the right to be free from quartered soldiers,
has been scarcely relevant in the enormous body of law written since its inception.
44. See Levinson, supra note 9, at 640 (explaining that the debates surrounding the Second Amendment's
passage contained references to self-protection).
45. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1239-41 (suggesting that a Second Amendment jurisprudence
resembling that of the First Amendment is ripe for development).
46. See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4
GEO. MASONU. L. REv. 1 (1981) (arguing that the Second Amendment is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
from state interference).
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Of course, the thought that the Second Amendment grants no such personal
liberty has a wide following as well.47 On the only occasions where the Supreme
Court has chosen to speak on the subject,4 it held that the Second Amendment
merely restricted the federal government. It created no individual right to keep and
bear arms49 and it did not prohibit the states from passing gun control laws.50 Thus,
this following has some not-yet-overturned-but-relatively-ancient "law of the land"
in its corner.
But suppose for a moment that Justice Thomas has in fact issued an invitation
on behalf of the Court to hear such a case,5' is it possible that the high Court would
end the debate over the Second Amendment, or start a series of new debates?
IV. REGISTRATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
For the purpose of this legislative note, let us suppose that the Supreme Court
has just handed down a monumental decision declaring that the right to keep and
bear arms is an individual liberty, to be enjoyed by all Americans, and not merely
a check on Congress or a collective right of the citizenry. Where would that leave
Chapter 462 and the law it amends which require California residents to register this
newfound personal right with the State Department of Justice?5
2
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated that virtually any requirement of
individuals to register with the government prior to exercising a constitutional right
infringes on that right and is therefore unconstitutional.53 The high Court has gone
47. See generally Bogus, supra note 10 (arguing that the Second Amendment does not grant a personal
right).
48. See cases cited supra note 10.
49. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553 (explaining that the Second Amendment "has no other effect than to
restrict the powers of the national government").
50. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 265 (stating that the Second Amendment "is a limitation only upon the power
of Congress ... and not upon that of the States'),
51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (suggesting the Supreme Court may want to take up the issue).
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11106 (amended by Chapter 462).
53. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (establishing that a federal law requiring an addressee to apply in writing
to receive mail presumed to be communist propaganda restrained freedom of speech and was unconstitutional);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,532 (1945) (declaring that a statute requiring labor organizers to register with the
state prior to soliciting membership imposed a previous restraint on an individual's rights of free speech and frce
assembly); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 116 S.
Ct. 2374,2391 (1996) (explaining that an FC.C. regulation requiring cable television subscribers to submit written
notice priorto viewing indecent programming would deter viewing and restrain First Amendment rights); Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,48-49 (1968) (holding that the federal law requiring persons to record earnings from
illegal gambling activities with the federal government for occupational tax purposes created the "real and
appreciable... hazard of self-incrimination" that made it unconstitutional); Harman, 380 U.S. at 538-42 (holding
that a Virginia law requiring voters to file, six months prior to an election, a notarized or witnessed certificate
attesting that they had lived continuously in the state from the time of their original voter registration and did not
intend to depart prior to the upcoming election created the same disenfranchising effect that the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment sought to abolish). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 630 (1973) (upholding a state voter
registration statute on the ground that it furthered the legitimate state objective of ensuring fair elections); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349 (1972) (same).
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so far as to determine that a person's right to be free from self-incrimination 54 was
so great that it operated as a complete defense to a federal law requiring citizens to
report income earned from illegal gambling to the federal government.55 The Court
held that a registration requirement which created a"real and appreciable... hazard
of self-incrimination" undermined the liberties guaranteed in the Fifth Amend-
ment.
56
At times though, the Court has qualified its holdings. On more than one
occasion, the high Court stated that restrictions on individual rights may be justified
where public safety so demanded. 7 In another case, the Supreme Court held that a
law requiring voters to register at least 30 days before an election was constitutional
because, in order to ensure fair elections, the state needed a time period in which
it could compile an accurate voter record. 8 The Court said that the right to vote did
not entitle a citizen to demand a ballot on election day.5 9
Where might the right to keep and bear arms6° fit into this line of reasoning?
Surely, the misuse, abuse, or mere irresponsible exercise of the right to keep and
bear arms presents a far graver threat to society than does the misuse of most other
constitutional rights such as free speech or the right to vote. But, does the potential
for such danger justify California's need to maintain a record of law-abiding citi-
zens who have chosen to exercise their Second Amendment rights with proper
care?6
54. U.S. CONST. amend V.
55. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49 (holding that the federal law requiring persons to record earnings from
illegal gambling activities with the federal government for occupational tax purposes created the "real and
appreciable... hazard of self-incrimination" that made it unconstitutional).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530 (stating that a "clear and present danger" threatening the safety of
the general public may give rise to restrictions on personal liberties, but only in the gravest of circumstances); see
also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,524 (1960) (explaining that only a compelling state interest may withstand
the constitutional scrutiny of the significant abridgement of an individual's personal rights).
58. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 349 (providing that the interests in preventing voter fraud were such that a
registration cut-off date prior to an election was appropriate in order for officials to prepare voter records, so long
as the period reflected a reasonable amount of time to conduct such business).-
59. Id.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11106 (amended by Chapter 462) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
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V. THE BACKGROUND CHECK AND PUBLIC SAFETY
When it comes to public safety, the needs of the many often outweigh the needs
of the few.62 An individual's wish that his or her constitutional rights be free from
state intrusion will usually yield to the demands of society as a whole, particularly
where public safety is threatened.63 Unfettered gun ownership has proven to present
just such a threat, where it is not uncommon for persons to commit crimes shortly
after purchasing a firearm.64
The public need to prevent guns from reaching the wrong hands has led to such
things as background checks and waiting periods. Investigating an individual's con-
fidential history prior to permitting gun ownership would seem to constitute not
only an invasion of that person's privacy,65 but also an unnecessary impediment on
a personal liberty.6 In addition, requiring a would-be gun owner to file an appli-
cation with the Department of Justice before taking possession of his or her fire-
arm 67 seems tantamount to requiring the addressee of communist political pro-
62. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530 (stating that a restriction on an individual's personal rights may bejustificd
where public safety is threatened by a "clear and present danger"); see also Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 (explaining that
only a compelling state interest may withstand the constitutional scrutiny of the significant abridgement of an
individual's personal rights); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992,996, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1984)
(holding that an individual's right of privacy must sometimes give way to "a state's fundamental right to enact laws
which promote public health, welfare and safety").
63. Id.
64. See Ken Herman, Florida Concealed Weapons Law: It's a Draw, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at Al
(describing a man who had an altercation about an hour after purchasing a gun); Mike Kelly, Gun Law Loophole,
THE RECORD, June 14, 1994, at B1 (explaining how a person previously institutionalized as a paranoid
schizophrenic was able to purchase a gun in Arizona where he only needed a driver's license and a second form
of photo I.D.); Harrison Man Goes on Trial, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Feb. 19, 1994, at A9 (detailing the actions
of a man who shot a 16 year old girl hours after purchasing a firearm); Man Kills Wife, SelflWith Just-Purchased
Gun, U.P.L, Nov. 26, 1991 (reporting that the gun used in a homicide/suicide had been purchased less than an hour
before); Katie Long, Mother Skirted 15-day Law to Buy Gun, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Jan. 11, 1991, at G1 (noting
that a woman had killed her mentally ill son and then herselfjust three days after purchasing a handgun); State Sets
Three New Executions, U.P.., June 19,1987 (recounting the crimes of a death-row inmate where he shot and killed
a police officerjust hours after purchasing the gun).
65. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (explaining that the right of privacy includes the right to
avoid the disclosure of personal matters); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (characterizing the "right to be let alone" as "the right most valued by civilized men"); Cozzolino,
supra note 13, at 265-66 (asserting that a background check before a handgun purchase may infringe upon the
purchaser's right of privacy, specifically the Fifth Amendment aspect of privacy, the right to be free from self-
incrimination). But see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 597 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(reasoning that the responsibility ofthe press to report matters ofpublic concern outweighed appellee's right to keep
information surrounding the rape of his daughter private); Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at
276 (holding that an individual's right of privacy must sometimes give way to "a state's fundamental right to enact
laws which promote public health, welfare and safety"); People v. Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 181, 146 Cal. Rptr
411,417 (1978) (establishing that a state's interest in preserving public health, safety and welfare supercedes an
individual's right of privacy).
66. As previously indicated in Part IV., for the purposes of this Legislative Note, assume that the Second
Amendm.-nt grants a personal right to bear arms to individual citizens, as opposed to a collective "right of tho
people." U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
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paganda to submit a written request before receiving his or her mail.68 In Lamont
v. Postmaster General,69 the Supreme Court held that the "official act" of returning
a reply card, as a prerequisite to receiving communist mail, amounted to an uncon-
stitutional abridgement of the addressee's First Amendment right.
However, with gun-purchaser background checks, such an obstacle to the
exercise of a constitutional right serves a greater societal good. It enables the
government to prevent known classes of individuals, such as convicted felons, drug
abusers and the mentally handicapped, from arming themselves and posing a
potential danger to the public.' Unlike the scenario in Lamont, where the reply card
was a mere formality operating only as a means of detaining communist mail,72 the
background check actually stops guns from entering the wrong hands. a
VI. THE WArrING PERIOD AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Requiring a gun purchaser to wait ten days before receiving his or her firearm
74
serves a dual purpose in the preservation of public welfare. First, a period of ten
days is ample time for a gun dealer to send a purchaser's application to the Depart-
ment of Justice and for a thorough check into the purchaser's background to be
conducted. 5 Second, by mandating a cooling off time of sorts, the law may avert
some potentially grievous circumstances.
The Supreme Court has determined that individuals do not have a constitutional
guarantee that the demand for a ballot on election day will produce one. 6 Rather it
declared that the societal interest in preserving the sanctity of elections warranted
the minor hindrance of registering some time in advance.77 Similarly, society has
an interest in preventing individuals, acting on emotions such as anger, revenge or
68. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302 (explaining the portion of the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary
Act which required all mail fitting the description of "communist political propaganda" be detained and the
addressee notified, and such mail remain detained until the addressee requested delivery in writing).
69. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
70. Id. at 305.
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
72. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302.
73. CAL. PENALCODE § 12072 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); see John D. McClain, Gun Checks are Working,
Study Says Organization Lauds Brady Law's Effects, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 21, 1997, at A2 (reporting
that background checks reduce interstate gun trafficking); Naomi Paiss, Brady Background Checks Cause Dramatic
Decrease in Gunrunning, New Study Shows, U.S. NEwswmE, Sept. 19, 1997 (stating that "[s]tates that began
conducting background checks on handgun purchases when the Brady Act was implemented in 1994 are as much
as 86 percent less likely to be sources of guns used in crimes in other states than they were prior to [the Brady
Act]"); Jerry Zremski, Study Says Brady Law Reduced Guns Entering State, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 21,1997, at B5
(citing Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms statistics that background checks pursuant to the Brady Act
prevented 173,000 handgun purchases between 1994 and 1996).
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
75. Id.
76. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 349; Marston, 410 U.S. at 680.
77. Id.
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fear, from obtaining firearms while in an irrational or enraged state of mind. Such
a societal benefit warrants the minor delay a California citizen experiences in
exercising his or her right to bear arms.
VII. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LIST
The Department of Justice is authorized to maintain a record of California
citizens who purchase concealable firearms.78 Chapter 462 further authorizes the
Department of Justice to add to the record the names of persons moving into the
state with similar weapons. 79 This raises the issue: Does a state have a legitimate
public safety concern, so serious and imminent as to warrant the compilation of a
list of law-abiding citizens who have chosen to exercise their personal right to bear
arms by owning handguns? The question remains largely unanswered in other areas
of law.
In Lamont, the plaintiff challenged, the placement of his name on a government
list of persons receiving communist mail.80 But before the case reached the high
Court, Congress amended the law, removing the provision authorizing the govern-
ment list.8 Even though the Supreme Court was not asked to decide that issue, it
recognized the "almost certain... deterrent effect" that a law which stigmatized the
receipt of communist literature could have on individuals.82 The author of the
majority decision, Justice Douglas, implied that the government's mere con-
demnation of such literature created a fear tantamount to being placed on a list of
traitors.8
3
Similarly, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v
Federal Communication Commission,84 the Supreme Court was asked to rule on a
federal law which required cable operators to block "patently offensive" sex chan-
nels, unblocking them only upon written request by the subscriber.85 The Court
recognized that the written request requirement created a fear in viewers that they
would be placed on a subscriber list86 despite the fact that the law contained no
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11106 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
79. Id (amended by Chapter 462).
80. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 304 (discussing that plaintiff amended his complaint to include the
constitutional challenge).
81. See id at 305 (explaining that the federal law in question was amended before trial and the Postmaster
General was no longer authorized to maintain a list of communist propaganda recipients).
82. l at 307.
83. See id. (commenting that some persons wishing to receive communist mail may not do so out of fear
for their jobs or that the federal government would label them traitors).
84. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
85. DenverArea Telecomm Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2380; id. at 2394.
86. Id. at2391.
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 29
provision authorizing such a list.8 7 The Court viewed this fear as a legitimate
restriction on the would-be viewer's First Amendment right.88
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that an individual's exercise and
enjoyment of a constitutional right may be somewhat suffocated by the collection
of names by the government or some other entity, it has never ruled directly on
whether the maintenance of such lists is constitutional.8 9 It is natural to assume that
if California purported that its list of handgun owners operated to prevent a "clear
and present danger" from threatening public safety,9° or quelled a legitimate public
concern, 1 or carried out some administrative function,92 then the law would most
likely survive judicial scrutiny, provided California could establish the necessity of
such an interest. However, the law permitting the Department of Justice to maintain
a list of handgun owners was passed "[i]n order to assist in the investigation of
crime, the arrest and prosecution of criminals, and the recovery of lost, stolen, or
found property."93 Is the state's need for this type of aid to law enforcement of such
paramount importance that it supersedes an individual's right to handgun owner-
ship, free of any deterrence or apprehension?
Typically, only the most serious public interests will outweigh a person's right
to enjoy constitutional liberties.94 Where background checks and waiting periods
seem to pass the public safety test by averting a potential serious and imminent
threat,95 a government list of handgun owners appears to fall short. The Attorney
General's record of gun owners does not keep firearms out of the wrong hands,"
and it doesn't prescribe a temporary antidote to irrational behavior.97 Rather, it turns
law-abiding handgun owners into possible murder suspects or the subjects of
criminal investigation.98 Moreover, Chapter 462 requires California's newest
residents to take their places in the police line-up.99
87. Id. at 2392,2430.
88. Id. at2391.
89. Id.; see Lamont, 381 U.S. at 303-05 (explaining that the constitutional question surrounding the
government's maintenance of a list was not decided because, prior to oral argument, the statute was amended,
deleting that provision).
90. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530 (stating that a restriction on an individual's personal rights may be justified
where public safety is threatened by a "clear and present danger").
91. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 597 (Brennan, J., concurring) (reasoning that the responsibility
of the press to report matters of public concern outweighed appellee's right to keep information surrounding the
rape of his daughter private).
92. See Marston, 410 U.S. at 680 (granting deference to Arizona's legislative decision to cut off voter
registration at 50 days prior to an election in order to meet the state goal of compiling an accurate voter record).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11106 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
94. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530.
95. See supra Part V (examining the constitutionality of background checks).
96. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) (explaining that convicted felons, drug
abusers and the mentally incompetent are prohibited from possessing firearms).
97. See supra Part VI (examining the constitutionality of waiting periods).
98. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11106 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) (stating that the purpose of the Attorney
General's record of handgun owners is criminal investigation, arrest and prosecution).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072 (amended by Chapter 462).
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It is likely that some prospective gun purchasers will be dissuaded by this
procedure, in much the same way the Supreme Court in Lamont predicted persons
would be deterred by the communist mail law.'° On the other hand, the federal law
in Lamont was not purported to be an aid to law enforcement (i.e. the tracking down
of communist spies). Moreover, the high Court was protecting a right declared to
be unfettered10 and uninhibited.1t 7 Here, the need for the swift and speedy appre-
hension of criminals provides a mitigating public safety concern."t 3 The longer a
criminal remains at-large, the greater the chance of further criminal activity.t01 More
importantly, the right to keep and bear arms is not likely to attain the level of
relative limitlessness that we have come to associate with its freedom of speech
counterpart. 0 s Thus, the state's interest in public safety is likely to outweigh
whatever deterrent effect a government list of handgun owners may create.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is entirely plausible that the Supreme Court will soon end the long-standing
debate over exactly what rights are granted by the Second Amendment. 6 Should
the high Court resolve the issue on the side of personal liberty,"0 7 then the right to
bear arms may experience some alterations, and begin resembling its Bill of Rights
brethren.0 8 Considering the potential dangers associated with gun ownership," 9 the
courts are unlikely to release the Second Amendment from its shackles completely.
Nonetheless, a personal right to bear arms will certainly impact many current
gun control laws. Chapter 462 and the law it amends are likely candidates for
judicial challenge. Government lists of handgun owners can serve as obstacles to
an individual exercising his or her right to bear arms. Such lists can intimidate the
prospective gun purchaser concerned about reputation or privacy. They can place
the gun owner in fear of being wrongly accused of a crime or having his or her
100. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307.
101. Id. at 305.
102. See id. at 307 (citing New York 7mes v. Sullivan as establishing that the First Amendment contemplatcs
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate and discussion").
103. See Cozzolino, supra note 13, at 245 n.3 (citing BUREAU OFJUsTICE STATISTiCS, U.S. DErT. OF JUSICE,
Handgun Crime Victims: A Special Report (July 8, 1990). which reported that almost half of the nation's murder
victims were killed with a handgun, and that an additional 15,000 people were wounded each year by handguns).
10. Id.
105. See supra note 64 (illustrating the dangers ofunrestricted gun ownership).
106. See Printz, 117 S. CL. at 2386 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the debate over the meaning of
the Second Amendment has been fervent among legal commentators and suggesting that the high court may wish
"to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms 'has been justly
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic' (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1890, p. 746
(1833)').
107. Il
108. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I-X (setting forth the Bill of Rights).
109. See source cited supra note 103.
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weapons confiscated. However, the purpose these lists serve, to expedite the arrest
and prosecution of criminals, would seem to tip the scales in favor of public safety.
The conclusion of one debate is likely to be the beginning of many new ones
as the Second Amendment transforms. California law may play a significant role
in its shaping.
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Penal Code § 1203.085 (amended).
AB 133 (Scott): 1997 Stat. Ch. 160
1. INTRODUCTION
The California "Three Strikes" law, largely acclaimed and highly criticized, at
times appears to be in a state of disrepair.' For example, prior to 1996, some repeat
felons were averting incarceration through probation sentences2 even when they
were already on probation at the time of their second felony conviction. This
problem arose largely because of the poor drafting of the "Three Strikes" law.' Last
year, lawmakers plugged this hole by passing Chapter 719' which eliminated
probation sentencing (thus, mandating incarceration) where the offender was
already on probation for a "non-strike" felony at the time of the new offense and
committed a "serious or violent" felony.'
1. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return To Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
395, 410-14 (1997) (discussing how public fervor fueled by the murders of two young girls forced the "Three
Strikes" legislation and initiative upon California lawmakers relatively unamended and filled with drafting errors);
see also id. at 397-99, nn.14, 19 (citing Bill Jones, Three Strikes and You're Out, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 243
(1995) and Phil Wyman & John G. Schmidt, Jr., Three Strikes You're Out (It's About Tune), 26 U. VEST L.A. L.
REV. 249 (1995), as ardently advocating in favor of "Three Strikes," and William M. Thornbury, What is the
Meaning of Three Strikes and You Are Out Legislation?, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 303, 303-04 (1995). and Jeff
Brown, Why California's "Three Strikes Law" is Terrible Legislation, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 269 (1995). fl,3
presenting unfavorable opinions of the "Three Strikes" law).
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1202 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "probation" as a sentence imposed for
the "commission of [a] crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into the community under the
supervision of a probation officer in lieu of incarceration").
3. See SENATE COtmfrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMI'rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 893, at 3 (May 14,
1996) (indicating that it is not uncommon for some offenders to be serving two or three probation sentences at the
same time).
4. SeeASSEMBLYCoMMrFrEEONPUBLICSAFETY, CoMMrTTEEANALYSISoFAB 133,at3 (Feb.25, 1997)
(explaining that prior to the passage of Chapter 719, the silence of"Three Strikes" with regard to probationers who
committed a "strike" resulted in somejudges granting additional probation sentences to these repeat offenders). See
generally Vitiello, supra note I (discussing the many flaws created by hasty drafting of "Three Strikes").
5. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 719, sec. I. at 3214-17 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (including in the definition of violent
felonies: murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, rape, sodomy by force, oral copulation by force, lewd acts on
a child, any felony inflicting great bodily harm, robbery of an inhabited dwelling, arson, attempted murder,
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In 1997, legislators needed to address a new hole in "Three Strikes"created by
Chapter 7 19.7 Chapter 719 required prison time for probation violators committing
serious or violent offenses but left the possibility of probation open to parole
violators perpetrating the same crimes.8 Thus, probationers who committed "strike"
level offenses received mandatory jail sentences, while parolees who carried out the
same crimes could be sentenced to probation. Since both probation and parole serve
as an offender's conditional last chance to avoid prison, 9 California lawmakers
decided to treat them the same for "Three Strikes" sentencing purposes by enacting
Chapter 160.10 Chapter 160 makes a strike for a parolee equivalent to that of a
probationer-each will carry a mandatory prison sentence. 1
Proponents of Chapter 160 argue that it makes sense for these two offenders to
suffer similar fates for similar offenses, since both are criminal repeaters." On the
other hand, opponents believe that such rigid sentencing laws deprive judges of
their discretionary function.'3 They argue that the judiciary performs an important
role in weighing special or mitigating circumstances prior to issuing sentences.
14
Further, opponents fear that inflexible sentencing guidelines will lead to over-
crowded prisons. 5 To some, Chapter 160 fills a void. To others, it unnecessarily
constrains the judiciary.
kidnaping and carjacking, among others ); see also id. § 1192.7(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (including in the
definition of serious felonies: murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, rape, sodomy by force, oral copulation
by force, lewd or lascivious acts on a child, any felony punishable by the death penalty, any felony inflicting great
bodily harm, any felony in which the defendant used a firearm or other dangerous or deadly weapon, attempted
murder, assault with intent to commit rape or robbery, assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, assault by
a life prisoner on a nominate, assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate, explosives, burglary of an inhabited
dwelling, robbery, kidnaping, carjacking and selling or furnishing a minor with one of a number of controlled
substances, among others).
7. See ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 133, at 1-2 (Feb. 25,
1997) (observing that Chapter 719 amended the probation statute without amending the parole statute, creating an
imbalance in the law).
8. Id. See infra Part II. (explaining the differences between probation and parole).
9. See SENATE COMMrrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 893, at 4 (May 14,
1996) (expressing that felony probation should serve as an ultimatum to the offender).
10. See ASsEMBLYCOMMrTrEEONPUBLICSAFErY, CoMMITTEEANALYSISOFAB 133, at I (Feb.25, 1997)
(stating that Chapter 719 created an "anomaly" in the law).
11. Id at 1-2.
12. SENATE CoMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY. CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 133, at 7 (May 20, 1997).
13. ASSEMBLY CoMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 133, at 4 (Feb. 25, 1997).
14. Id.
15. Id.; SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 893, at 8 (May 14,
1996).
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11. PAROLE V. PROBATION
In California, parole is part of the defendant's determinate sentence. 16 When a
person is sentenced to prison, a parole term is automatically attached to the prison
term,17 and parole begins once the inmate is released from prison. 8 Under most
circumstances, the period of parole is not more than three to five years.'9 During
that time, the parolee is required to report to a parole officer and to abide by the
rules of parole, usually established by the Board of Prison Terms. 20 Any violation
of these rules may lead to a revocation of parole and the parolee may be required
to complete his or her prison term.21
Probation is itself a sentence and, depending on the circumstances surrounding
the offense and the history and criminal record of the individual, may serve as a
substitute for a prison term.22 Like parolees, persons on probation are required to
report to a probation officer and to abide by the rules of their probation, usually
prescribed by the sentencing judge or probation officer. 2 Similarly, a violation of
these rules could lead to automatic incarceration. 24 However, unlike parole,
probation is a sentence available only at the discretion of the judge, on a case-by-
case basis.'
III. EXISTING LAW AND CHAPTER 160
Following the enactment of Chapter 719 in 1996, judges were stripped of the
discretion to determine whether extenuating or mitigating circumstances warranted
probation in cases where the defendant committed a serious or violent crime while
serving a probation sentence. 6 But Chapter 719 failed to address similar conduct
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (a)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (stating that "[a] sentence... shall
include a period of parole"); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 133, at 2
(Feb. 25, 1997).
17. Id.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(a)(1) (,Vest 1982 & Supp. 1997).
19. See ASSEMBLYCOMMrrrEEON PUBLC SAFETY, COMMITTEEANALYSIS OFAB 133, at 2 (Feb. 25,1997)
(explaining that parole may be extended beyond the statutory limit where parolees escape from custody and become
fugitives).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(b)(6) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
21. Id. § 3000(b)(7) (stating that the Board of Prison Terms is "It]he sole authority to issue warrants for the
return to actual custody of any state prisoner released on parole").
22. Id. § 1203(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (describing persons ineligible for probation sentences).
23. ld. § 1202.8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
24. Id. § 1203.1(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
25. Id. § 1203(b)(3); SENATE COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 893,
at 6 (May 14, 1996).
26. Chapter 719 eliminated the possibility of a probation sentence where the offender committed a "serious
or violen!" felony while on probation for a "non-strike" felony at the time of the new offense. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203(k) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
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by parolees. 27 Thus, judges retained a degree of autonomy in weighing the specific
circumstances surrounding a particular case where a parolee committed a repeat
offense.
Prior to Chapter 160, the California Penal Code prohibited a sentence of
probation, hence eliminating judicial discretion in sentencing, under two circum-
stances: (1) Where an individual was convicted of a violent offense while on parole
for any felony; or (2) where an individual was convicted of any felony while on
parole for a violent felony.28 The law was silent as to serious felonies. Chapter 160
added serious felonies to the list of offenses for which incarceration is mandatory.29
IV. LIMmNG JUDICIAL DISCRETION
The primary concern of those opposed to Chapter 160 is that, without ajudge
weighing all of the circumstances surrounding each individual case, justice will be
administered blindly.30 Many feel that the judge's role in sentencing is crucial,
particularly where circumstances may warrant the avoidance of a prison term.31
Indeed, the strict application of "Three Strikes" has produced plenty of anecdotal
evidence to support this notion.
In one case, a Riverside homeless man received a sentence of 29 years to life
when he was convicted of shoplifting cologne samples, a razor kit and a flashlight
from K-Mart.32 His other strikes consisted of two robberies in the 1970's and a
residential burglary in 1987.33 In another case, a 27-year old man received his
"third" strike when he stole a slice of pepperoni pizza. 4 Before the notorious pizza
caper, the man had been convicted of robbery, attempted robbery, unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle and possession of a controlled substance.35 These prior offenses
elevated the misdemeanor to a felony pursuant to "Three Strikes" and the man was
sentenced to 25 years to life.36 An Alameda man who was previously convicted of
27. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEEON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 133, at 1-2 (Feb. 25, 1997).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.085 (West 1982).
29. Id. § 1203.085 (amended by Chapter 160).
30. See ASSEMBLYCOMMITrEEON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEEANALYSIS OFAB 133, at 4 (Feb. 25,1997)
(suggesting that opponents of AB 133 believe that the independent trier of fact is in the best position to determine
whether a particular defendant deserves probation rather than a prison term).
31. See id. at 4-5 (listing the American Civil Liberties Union, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and
the California Public Defenders Association as opponents making the argument against limitingjudicial discretion).
32. See Steven Pressman & Jennifer Kaae, Three Strikes: The Law Was Intended to Send a Clear Message
to Repeat Criminals. But No One Agrees What the Message Is., CAL. LAW., Oct. 1996, at 32, 38 (discussing the
disparate results of "Three Strikes" sentencing throughout the state, and portraying the effect it had on four
individuals).
33. Id.; see CAL. PENALCODE § 1170.12(a)(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (stating that "[t]he length of time
between the prior felony conviction and the current felony conviction shall not affect the imposition of the
sentence").
34. Vitiello, supra note 1, at 396 n.8.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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robbery and armed robbery received a sentence of 35 years to life for his unarmed
robbery of a Wendy's restaurant. 37 Another man was sentenced to 25 years to life
for stealing a drill from a garage following two convictions for residential burg-
laries, one of which predated the Reagan Administration.38 Finally, a San Diego
man is currently serving his sentence of 115 years to life for possession of .06
grams of heroin.39 His first two strikes were dealt simultaneously in one 1985
charge.40 They consisted of two residential burglary counts.
The opposition to "Three Strikes" may use such cases to illustrate the dangers
of relinquishing judicial discretion, but there are those who believe that this is
exactly how justice ought to be carried OUt.42 Many "Three Strikes" supporters are
average Americans who are troubled by the prospect of criminals returning to the
streets after serving light sentences only to strike again. 43 They view judicial dis-
cretion in sentencing as something that is just not working.44 Others simply believe
that individual judges are cursed with many of the same biases and prejudices as
others in society.45 In their view, removing the power to sentence from the hands of
one individual (the judge) and placing it in the hands of many (the legislature)
creates a more balanced approach to punishment.46
Despite this apparent judicial hand-tying, the power to dismiss a prior strike
offense remains a discretionary weapon in the trial judge's arsenal.47 "Three
Strikes" explicitly permits the prosecuting attorney to move to dismiss a defen-
dant's prior felony convictions "in the furtherance of justice. 48 In People v.
Superior Court (Romero),49 the Supreme Court of California held that a court may
37. Pressman & Kaae, supra note 32, at 38; see CAL. PENALCODE § 1170.12(e)(2)(A) (West 1982 & Supp,
1997) (detailing the methods courts must use to determine the minimum term of a third strike sentence, the
maximum always being life imprisonment).
38. Vitielo, supra note I at 396, n.8; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a)(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997)
(stating that length of time between offenses is not determinative).
39. See Pressman & Kaae, supra note 32, at 38.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Vitiello, supra note 1, at 430-31 n.206 (quoting California Attorney General Dan Lungren as stating
that the goal of the state is to follow through on promises of tough punishment).
43. See Meredith MeClain, Note, Three Strikes and You're Out: The Solution to the Repeat Offender
Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 120 n.1 12 (1996) (citing Edwin E. Meese Il, Three Strikes Laws Punish
and Protect, INSIGHT, May 1994, at 20, to support the proposition that citizens generally don't trust discretionary
sentencing laws).
44. 1L
45. See Lois G. Forer, Justice by the Numbers: Mandatory Sentencing Drove Me From the Bench, WASH.
MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 12 (conceding that mandatory sentencing guidelin:!s were originally created to prevent
racist or crusader judges from doling out punishment unfairly).
46. IdL
47. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497,508,917 P.2d 628, 632,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789,
793 (1996) (construing § 1385(a) of the California Penal Code as permitting the court to dismiss a defendant's prior
criminal convictions for the purposes of sentencing).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
49. 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
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dismiss prior felony allegations "in the interest of justice" without requiring a
prosecutorial motion, if the "Three Strikes" penalty would be too harsh.50 The
Romero court reasoned that requiring ajudge to gain the prosecutor's approval prior
to taking such action independently would seriously undermine the judicial system
and the separation of powers doctrine.5' Thus, the court held that such power
granted to the prosecuting attorney by statute must be implicitly granted to the
judiciary as well.52
"Three Strikes" authorizes the striking of a strike "in the furtherance of
justice,' '53 and Romero established that such power is vested in the judiciary.m This
may not give judges a license to exercise unfettered discretion, but neither does it
bind them to the strict application of 'Three Strikes" where conditions mitigate the
need for harsh punishment. In fact, in Romero, the trial court judge dismissed two
of the defendant's three prior convictions-first degree burglary of an inhabited
dwelling and attempted burglary of an inhabited dwelling-both "serious"
felonies,55 thus eliminating a third strike situation.56 For his crime of possession of
a controlled substance, the defendant received a six-year sentence57 rather than the
twenty-five years to life he would have received under "Three Strikes."58
The law upon which the Romero court relied does not, however, permit prior
violent offenses to be dismissed.59 Otherwise, the judiciary is free to act indepen-
dently when considering circumstances that would make mandatory sentences for
minor third strike crimes unfair. Judges may dismiss any prior, non-violent felony
conviction in the name of justice.'
However, if justice demands that a person convicted of a felony while serving
parole for a serious offense be sentenced to probation, it is not likely that a court
could fully exercise this "Romero discretion." The law permits a court to strike a
50. Id. at 508,917 P.2d at 632,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
51. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 512, 917 P.2d at 635, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796 (explaining that the judiciary
must remain independent in order to be effective, and that while the legislature retains certain authority exclusive
of the judiciary, it may not empower the executive (i.e. the prosecutor) with leverage over the judiciary).
52. Id.
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); see Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 508, 917 P.2d
at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
54. Id. at 512,917 P.2d at 635,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796.
55. See CAL.PENALCODE § 1192.7(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (including these felonies in the definition
of serious crimes).
56. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507,917 P.2d at 632,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
57. See id. (explaining that the court issued a six-year sentence to the defendant, representing the upper term
for possession of a controlled substance plus a one-year enhancement for each prior, non-serious felony conviction
pursuant to California Penal Code § 667.5(b)).
58. Id. at 506,917 P.2d at 631,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
59. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1385 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting judges from striking prior California
Penal Code § 667 convictions).
60. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (stating that a prosecuting attorney
may move to dismiss a defendant's prior felony convictions "in furtherance ofjustice"); id. § 1385 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1997) (permitting judges to strike prior serious felony convictions for purposes of sentencing).
1998 / Criminal Procedure
prior offense.61 It says nothing about the court dismissing the felony for which an
offender is still serving time. Technically, parolees have not completed their
sentence. 62 And Chapter 160 prohibits the granting of probation to such offenders.63
Where mitigating circumstances exist, a judge, although unable to grant probation
to the parolee, may use the power to strike prior felonies to ensure that the punish-
ment fits the crime.' In these situations, laws created by the Legislature and signed
by the Governor serve to buffer judicial discretion in order to promote consistent
public policy throughout the state.
V. OVERCROWDED PRISONS
Regardless of what message harsh sentencing laws may send,65 or how fair or
unfair these laws may seem,66 some critics point to a lack of prison space as the
chief drawback to administering such a parochial sentencing structure.67 Many
"Three Strikes" sentences keep criminals in prison long past their prime offending
years. 68 This creates a two-fold problem: (1) No longer a threat to society, these
criminals occupy valuable prison space that could be used for more likely
recidivists, often released early from less strict sentences due to overcrowding;6 9
and (2) the annual costs associated with housing prisoners is driven up as aging
inmates require more frequent and more expensive medical attention.70
California's prison population rose from 22,500 in 1979 to 138,000 in 1996. 7'
The Department of Corrections reported that prisons were at 181% of "design"
61. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507,917 P.2d at 632,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1 170.12(d)(2)
(West 1982 & Supp. 1997); id. § 1385 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
62. CAL. PENALCODE § 3000(a)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (indicating that parole is part of a sentence);
ASSENBLY CO?,mIrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 133, at 2 (Feb. 25, 1997).
63. CAL. PENALCODE § 1203.085 (amended by Chapter 160); see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text
(explaining that Chapter 160 filled a gap in California sentencing law by placing parolees on even ground with
probationers).
64. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 508, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793 (discussing a prior case in
which it was determined that ajudge may use discretion to dismiss a defendant's prior felony convictions "in the
interest of justice").
65. See Vitiello, supra note 1. at 431 n.206 (citing authorities in support of toughersentencing laws that send
a tough message to criminals).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 32-41 (discussing individual cases where the punishment seemed
to significantly outweigh the crime).
67. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMIrrE- ANALYSIS OI AB 133, at 4 (Feb. 25, 1997);
Vitiello, supra note 1, at 443.
68. Vitiello, supra note 1, at 443.
69. l
70. See McClain, supra note 43, at 120 n. 1 5 (citing statistics that indicate the cost of housing prisoners over
the age of 65 could be as high as $ 100,000 per year).
71. SENATECOMMrrIEEONCRMNALPROCEDURECOMMITTEEANALySiSOIAB 893, at 8 (May 14, 1996).
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capacity in 1996.72 By mandating prison terms for parolees convicted of subsequent
offenses, Chapter 160 will add to this growing problem.73
The judiciary may use its discretion however, by considering extenuating
circumstances, to ensure that the least dangerous parolees receive the shortest prison
terms, limiting the potential for elderly inmates driving up prison costs.74 The
number of recidivists that will be displaced from prisons by parole violators under
Chapter 160 is almost impossible to ascertain, but the most dangerous offenders are
not likely to be among the early releases.75 Moreover, every parole violator is, in
essence, a recidivis 76 anyway. By eliminating the possibility of probation for these
repeat offenders, Chapter 160 will continue to congest the California state prisons
while carrying out consistent public policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chapter 160 fills a gap in the "Three Strikes" law by requiring a prison sentence
for parole violators committing serious offenses, whereas probation was previously
available.77 Moreover, it places parole violators in the same class as probation vio-
lators,78 for whom prison terms are mandatory for the commission of serious
felonies.79 In so doing, Chapter 160 may hinder judicial discretion to a certain
extent and will continue to shuttle criminals to already prisons, however it also
helps to clarify the message lawmakers have been trying to send since the passage
of "Three Strikes"--California is going to be tough on repeat offenders.
72. Id.
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.085 (amended by Chapter 160) (creating mandatory incarceration where
probation was previously available).
74. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 508, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793 (discussing a prior case in
which it was determined that a judge may use discretion to dismiss a defendant's prior felony convictions "in the
interest of justice"); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (stating that a
prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss a defendant's prior felony convictions "in furtherance of justice"); see
also supra Part IV (discussing the amount of discretion judges are left with following the enactment of Chapter
160).
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
76. See BLACK'sLAwDicTioNARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "recidivistas a repeat criminal offender).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.085 (amended by Chapter 160).
78. Compare id. § 1203(k) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (eliminating the possibility of probation for persons
already serving probation for a felony at the time of the commission of a new violent or serious felony), with id.
§ 1203.085 (amended by Chapter 160) (eliminating the possibility of probation for persons on parole for a felony
at the time of the commission of a new violent or serious felony, or persons on parole for a violent or serious felony
at the time of the commission of a new felony).
79. Id. § 1203(k) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
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Providing Stalking Victims With Emergency Protective
Orders: "All the Signs Were There"
Kimberly Jean Wedding
Code Sections Affected
Family Code § 6274 (new); Penal Code § 646.91 (new).
AB 350 (Firestone); 1997 STAT. Ch. 169
I. INTRODUCTION
In retrospect, Kim Springer explains that it all began on July 4, 1992, when she
and co-worker Mark Hilbun went on an office outing to the county fair-grounds.1
The next day, Hilbun began making phone calls professing his love for Kim and
leaving presents for her at her door.2 Kim rejected his advances, but he continued
to pursue her, resulting in Hilbun's termination from the post office and his arrest
for harassment.
Subsequently, Kim decided not to pursue the harassment case after Hilbun
promised to leave Kim alone and get help for his manic depression.4 Even after his
arrest, Hilbun continued harassing Kim, with her breaking point being a letter that
was sent to her by Hilbun, in which he threatened: "I love you. I'm going to kill us
both and take us both to hell."' Kim immediately sought the help of law enforce-
1. Rene Lynch, Postal Worker Details Harassment By Hilbun; Grand Jury: Woman Describes Fixation,
Bizarre Behavior By Co-WorkerAccused of Killing His Mother and Best Friend, L.A. TMES, Apr. 30. 1994, at AI
(providing a summary of grand jury transcripts of Kim Springer's testimony regarding Mark Hilbun).
2. Id.
3. See id. (stating that Springer "spumed his advances" after Hilbun telephoned her after the July 4th outing
in 1992); see also id. (providing a chronology of harassment by Hilbun testified by Springer at a grand jury
investigation); Frank Messina & Eric Lichtblau, Ex-Mail Carrier Kills 2 in O.C.; Attack Follows Similar Incident
in Michigan, L.A. TIMES, May 7. 1993, at Al (stating that Hilbun had followed and harassed Kim while she
delivered the mail on her postal route); Lynch, supra note 1, at Al (stating that Kim had notified postal officials
about Hilbun's harassment and that this behavior led to his firing); see also Messina, supra, at AI(reporting that
Hilbun had been fired in December because he had stalked a female co-worker).
4. See Eric Bailey, State's Landmark Stalking Law Could Have Put Hilbun Behind Bars; Legislation: The
Woman He Attacked Chose Not To File Complaint Earlier Sie Asked Police For Help Wednesday But Didn't Have
the $182 Court Filing Fee, L.A. TmEs, May 7, 1993, at AI8 (stating that Hilbun's case was dismissed when Kim
was informed that Hilbun was undergoing treatment for his manic depressive illness); Messina, supra note 3, at
Al(reporting that in return for Kim dropping the charges against Hilbun for harassment, Hilbun had agreed to leave
Kim alone and cease his harassment of her).
5. Bailey, supra note 4, at A l8.
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ment, who suggested that Kim get a restraining order.6 However, after filling out the
paperwork for the protective order, Kim realized that she did not have the money
to pay the $182 filing fee.' She decided to wait and file the papers on payday, only
five days away.8 But payday came too late, because on that day, Hilbun entered the
post office and began shooting randomly.9 Hilbun's rampage killed one co-worker
and injured another at the end of the rampage.'0 Kim was left physically unharmed,
but emotionally distraught, after hiding beneath her mail case during the shooting."
Hilbun was later convicted for the murder of two people and the attempted murder
of seven others. 2
Co-workers of Kim now wonder whether law enforcement could have
prevented Hilbun's attack. 3 Kim's boyfriend argues that "all the signs were there"
and that the incident should never have occurred. 4
Perhaps most troubling is that while law enforcement had recognized the
seriousness of the situation by suggesting that Kim obtain a restraining order, she
6. See Dan Weikel & Maria Cone, Postal Workers Wonder If Attack Could Have Been Prevented, L.A.
TIMES, May 8, 1993, at A26 (noting that Kim had called the Orange County Sheriff's Department to report that she
was being harassed by Hilbun and that a deputy had suggested that Kim obtain a restraining order and that she
contact her local police department).
7. See Bailey, supra note 4, at AIS (stating that Kim's boyfriend told reporters that she delayed the filing
of the restraining order "because she did not have the necessary $182 filing fee").
8. See Miles Corwin, When the Law Can't Protect; Despite Recent Advances, the Legal System Still Has
Trouble Apprehending Stalkers. As the Dana Point Case Shows, Officials Are Often Forced To Wait Too Long
Before They Can Take Action. L.A. TIMES. May 8, 1993, at Al (reporting that Kim had decided to obtain a
restraining order, but had waited to file the order until she could afford the filing fee).
9. See Michael Granberry, Terrorized Post Office Worker Sues Her Union; Courts: Kim Springer Claims
Officers Suppressed 'Damaging Information' About the Man Accused of Stalking Her and Shooting Two of Her
Co-Workers, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at B1 (providing a summary of Hilbun's attack on co-workers on May 6.
1993).
10. Id.
11. See id. (reporting that Kim had "desperately hid under her mail case in fear of her life, causing her to
suffer serious emotional and psychological injuries"); see also Michael Granberry, A Lifetime Sentence; Post Office
Rampage Survivor Fears She'll Never Be Free of Anguish, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at BI (stating that Kim
"feels a deep rooted survivor's guilt... for all the people who died or who suffered injury" because of the "twisted
passion" Hilbun had for her).
12. See Anna Cekola, Ex-Postal Worker Is Convicted Of Murder; Trial: Jurors Now Must Decide if He Was
Sane When He Killed His Mother and a Friend and Tried To Slay Seven Others in Orange County L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1996, at A3 (stating that Hilbun was convicted of murder and attempted murder); see also Anna Cekola,
Plea Bargain To Give Ex-Postal Worker Life Tenn Without Parole In 2 Slayings, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at
Al 8 (reporting that Hilbun was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after being convicted of murdering
two people); Eric Lichtblau & Eric Young, Suspect In Slayings Remains At Large; Rampage: Dana Point
Deliveries Are Suspended and Guards Are Stationed At Post Office In Wake of the Killings- Officers Are Stymied
In Search for O.C. Man, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1993, at Al (reporting that Hilbun had stabbed to death his mother
and her dog prior to the rampage at the post office and afterwards had shot and robbed numerous other people).
13. See Weikel, supra note 6, at A26 (discussing the questions that Kim Springer's co-workers are asking
regarding whether or not law enforcement was at fault for not taking more precautions against Hilbun, who was
known by the police to have extreme psychiatric problems).
14. Id.
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did not have money to pay the filing fee for the order. 5 Although no one will ever
know whether a restraining order would have prevented the entire situation, most
law enforcement agencies require a stalking victim to obtain a restraining order
before they become involved in stalking case.
1 6
Recognizing the need for law enforcement to be able to provide emergency
protection to stalking victims, the Legislature enacted Chapter 169. This law allows
a peace officer to issue an ex parte emergency protective order (EPO) to a person
whom the peace officer reasonably believes is being stalked.1 7 If this procedure had
been available to Kim Springer when she first contacted law enforcement regarding
Hilbun's behavior, law enforcement would likely have been able to issue her an
EPO and perhaps, deter Hilbun's rampage.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Stalking Legislation and Legal Protections Available to Victims Prior to
Chapter 169
In 1990, following the high-profile murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer,
California was the first state in the nation to enact anti-stalking legislation."8 A
person commits the crime of stalking when he or she "willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows or harasses another person and makes a credible threat with the
intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of
his or her immediate family.' 9 The purpose of such legislation is to deter the crime
of stalking before it escalates into violence, thus protecting potential victims before
they are attacked.2"
Stalking victims may seek protection from their stalkers by securing temporary
restraining orders from the courts.' However, in order to secure a permanent
restraining order, ajudge must conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence
15. See Bailey, supra note 4, at Al8 (stating that Kim's boyfriend had told reporters that she had delayed
the filing of the restraining order "because she did not have the necessary $182 filing fee).
16. See Denise Marie Siino, Stalking Their Prey; A Criminal's Obsession Is a Victim's Nightmare.
Prosecution, Though Hard. Is Possible When Law Enforcement Gets Cooperation, O.C. Experts Say, L.A. TIME,
Nov. 12, 1996, at E1 (providing an interview with Westminster Police Detective Mike Prctor, who stated that he
urges stalking victims to obtain restraining orders because "when the stalker violates the order, it gives police more
evidence in the case they are building").
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.91(a) (enacted by Chapter 169).
18. 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 1527, sec. 1, at 7143 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9); see Nanette Diacovo,
Notes and Comments: California'sAnti-Stalking Statute: Deterrent or False Sense of Security?, 24 SW. U. L. REV.
389,390 (1995) (explaining that after the murder of Rebecca Schaeffer and the media attention that followed, the
California Legislature passed an anti-stalking bill in less than five weeks).
19. CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1996).
20. Diacovo, supra note 18, at 390.
21. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 527(a) (West Supp. 1997) (authorizing the courts to issue a temporary
restraining to prohibit harassment which rem.ains in effect for fifteen days).
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of unlawful harassment.Y Although permanent restraining orders remain in effect
for only three years, the victim may petition for renewal, which requires another
hearing.'
In 1993, California created domestic violence EPOs, which may be issued to
victims of domestic violence and child abductions.24 Domestic violence EPOs are
issued when: (1) a judicial officer believes that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that an immediate and present danger of domestic violence exists or that a
child is in immediate and present danger of abuse or abduction; and (2) that the
EPO is necessary to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of the abuse or
abduction.2' California law requires service of the EPO by the law enforcement
officer who requested the EPO and mandates that it expire within a specific time
period.26
B. Chapter 169
Assembly member Brooks Firestone believes that "stalking has become one of
the more serious and often violent crimes committed in the State of California."27
Accordingly, Firestone introduced legislation modeled after existing EPO pro-
cedures used in domestic violence cases to make EPOs available to stalking
victims. 2 Specifically, Chapter 169 allows ajudicial officer to issue an EPO when
a peace officer states reasonable grounds to believe that a person is in immediate
and present danger of stalking and that the order is necessary to prevent the
occurrence or reoccurrence of stalking activity.29
The EPO created by Chapter 169 for stalking cases has the same expiration
periods as domestic violence EPOs and also requires service by the law enforce-
ment officer requesting the EPO upon the restrained person.30 Furthermore, Chapter
169 provides that violations of the EPO by the restrained person allows the
prosecution of the stalker under criminal contempt or stalking laws.3
22. Id. § 527.6(d) (West Supp. 1997).
23. Id.
24. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 219, sec. 154, at 1385 (West) (enacting CAL. FAMILY CODE § 6250) (allowing
a judicial officer to issue an EPO where a law enforcement officer asserts reasonable grounds to believe that a
person is in immediate and present danger of domestic violence or that a child is in immediate and present danger
of abuse or abduction).
25. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6251 (West Supp. 1997) (declaring the required findings for the issuance of an EPO).
26. See id. § 6271 (West 1994) (requiring service by the law enforcement officer who requested the EPO);
id. § 6256 (West 1994) (providing expiration periods for an EPO on the seventh calendar day, or at the close of
business on the fifth court day, following the day of its issuance).
27. ASSEMBLY CoMMI'rEEoNJUDIcIARY. COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 350, at 2 (Apr. 16,1997).
28. Id.
29. CAL. PENALCODE § 646.91(a) (enacted by Chapter 169); id. § 646.91(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 169).
30. Id. § 646.91(f) (enacted by Chapter 169) (providing expiration periods of at the close ofjudicial business
on the fifth court day following the day of its issuance or the seventh calendar following the day of its issuance);
id. § 646.91(g)(1) (enacted by Chapter 169) (requiring service by the requesting law enforcement officer).
31. Id. § 646.91(n) (enacted by Chapter 169).
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m. IMPORTANCE OF CHAPTER 169
Following the passage of domestic violence EPO legislation, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office discovered that the orders were found to "de-
escalate potentially violent situations."32 The EPOs require immediate separation
of the abuser and victim, and provide victims with protection while awaiting the
issuance of a permanent restraining order. Chapter 169 strives to de-escalate
potentially violent stalking activity in the same way.
33
While it is worth noting that the Legislature in 1993 amended the restraining
order statute and no longer required stalking victims to pay filing fees,34 there was
no provision for issuance of EPOs until now. Kim Springer's situation perfectly
demonstrates the need for EPOs. Although the filing fee could have been waived,
Kim still would have been left without protection from the time that she notified the
police until the time that she was able to fill out the paperwork for the order and
receive a court date. This process can normally take at least 24 hours.35 If an EPO
had been issued to Kim when she reported to the police that Hilbun had threatened
to kill her, she would have been entitled to protection during the time in which she
was securing a permanent restraining order.
Increased occurrences of workplace violence supply additional support for
EPOs and their availability to stalking victims and companies.3 6 Although stalking
victims try to avoid their stalkers by moving or changing their phone numbers, the
stalker will always be able to find their victim at work,37 just as Mark Hilbun found
Kim at work at the post office. Workplace harassment often consists of barrages of
phone calls, waiting outside the office for the victim, interfering with clients, and
making false statements about the victim to his or her supervisors."
32. ASSEMBLYCOMMITfEEONJUDICIARY, COMMITrEEANALYSIS OFAB 350, at 2 (Apr. 16, 1997).
33. Id.
34. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 383, sec. I, at 2408 (West) (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527); see
Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Signs Get-Tough Bills Aimed At Stalking; Legislation: One Measure Widens
Definition of the Crime-Others Stiffen Criminal and Civil Penalties, L.A. TIMES. Sept. 30, 1993, at A28 (reporting
that legislation which eliminated a $182 filing fee for restraining orders was inspired by the case of Kim Springer
and her inability to get funds for a restraining order).
35. See Carla Rivera & Bill Billiter, Men Obsessed Can Turn Love Into a Tragedy; Domestic Violence:
Deaths, Injury andAnguish Have Been the Fruits of Soured Relationships In Orange Coutmy Recently, and Experts
Caution bmen To Look For Warning Signs. L.A. TnMEs. Oct. 29, 1989. at B I (advising women that they "should
allow one full day ... to take care of everything" because the process they must follow to secure a restraining order
is long and complicated).
36. Id.
37. See Stuart Silverstein, Stalked By Violence On the Job; Domestic Abuse Is Spilling Over Into the
Workplace-Victim's Job Performance Can Suffer and They May Risk Being Fired-At Worst, the Outcome Can
Be Deadly For Them and For Co-Workers, L.A. TIMES. Aug. 8, 1994, at Al (quoting a stalking victim who stated
that "a stalker knows ... if they can't catch you at home, they can catch you at work").
38. See id. (discussing the types of harassment that stalking and domestic violence victims encounter while
at worki.
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Workplace violence has caused much concern for company security directors,
with 94% of them ranking "domestic violence as a 'high' security problem at their
companies."39 Moreover, homicide is the leading cause of death for women at
work.40 Thus, workplace violence experts have stated that it is "imperative that the
Legislature... provide victims with some measure of relief for the helplessness
they experience at the hands of the stalker."'4 Chapter 169 aims to provide this
relief to victims by allowing the issuance of an EPO when a police officer recog-
nizes that the victim is in immediate danger and has been stalked in accordance to
the stalking statute.42
IV. PRACTICALITY OF CHAPTER 169
It is important for stalking victims who receive EPOs not to have a false sense
of security that they will be safe from their stalker.43 An EPO is not a "bullet-proof
vest, and it is not a cop in your front yard."' Furthermore, EPOs may trigger a
violent reaction in the stalker once they are received. 45 Many stalking victims have
been murdered days within days of the assailant receiving the EPO.4 Therefore,
violence experts argue that the effectiveness of an EPO will often depend on how
seriously the stalker will take the order.47 Accordingly, the order may provide the
victim no protection against certain stalkers.48
39. Michael G. Wagner, More Stalkers Taking Violence To the Workplace, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 4,
1994, at A3.
40. See id. (reporting figures from the U.S. Department of Labor that stated that "homicide was the most
common cause of death at work for women, claiming nearly four out of 10 of the 481 women killed on the job").
41. ASSEMBLYCOMMTrrEEONJUDICIARYCOMMITrEEANALYSISOFAB 350, at 2 (Apr. 16, 1997).
42. See id. at 1 (discussing the provisions of AB 350).
43. See Bob Hohler, Court's Shield Can DrawA Bullet, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1992, at Metro:l (reporting
that the availability of restraining orders and the willingness of courts to issue them "may be lulling some women
... into a false sense of security at the most dangerous times of their lives").
44. Bryanna Latoof, Domestic-Violence Cases On the Rise, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May, 21, 1990, at
Pasco:l (quoting a domestic violence counselor, who tells domestic violence victims the realities of a restraining
order and its limitations).
45. See Hohler, supra note 43, at Metro:1 (reporting that there had been murders committed by men who
had received a restraining order only days before and that many abusers become violent after being told that they
are barred from making any type of communication with the victim, who is often a wife or girlfriend); see also
Carolyn Nielsen, Restraining Orders Can Make Difference; Although Often Derided As "Too-Little-Too-Late, "
A Study Finds ThatMostAllegedBatterers Believe They Will Face Consequences, PRESS ENTERPRISE, Feb. 2, 1997,
at A4 (quoting a prosecutor for the district attorney office, who stated that "there are a sizeable number of cases
where there was a shooting while there was a restraining order in place").
46. Id.
47. See Nielsen, supra note 45, at A4 (discussing how the perception of the batterer and his or her decision
to abide by the restraining order will often determine the order's effectiveness).
48. Id.
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Women's groups worry about the perception that the orders "are not worth the
paper they are written on"49 and they argue that often times the orders do help."
Most importantly, the issuance of EPOs and restraining orders allow the police to
construct a "paper trail" necessary to prove a pattern of conduct needed for stalking
prosecutions."1
Experts argue that EPOs can be more effective in reducing instances of stalker
violence by improving police training. 2 If police training classes were to include
methods on how to recognize potentially violent stalking situations, they would
likely be more willing to issue EPOs.5 Such intervention should reduce the
likelihood of future violence involving the victim and her stalker.54
IV. CONCLUSION
Chapter 169 allows law enforcement to issue EPOs in cases where 'all the
signs' of stalking are there. Although the order itself will not be shield against the
stalker and any potential violent situations, it does help the police and the district
attorney prove a pattern of conduct, which will make a successful prosecution under
the stalking statutes more likely.
49. See Hohler, supra note 43. at Metro: I (quoting a coordinator for a battered women's group in Boston,
who argues that we don't hear about the many orders that actually do work for the victims).
50. See id (discussing that women's groups are still recommending that victims file for restraining orders
because is some instances, the abusers or stalkers will cease their behavior).
51. See Nielsen, supra note 45, at A4 (noting that experts believe that restraining orders can help prosecutors
prove abuse by establishing a "paper trail").
52. Id (stating that police officers "need training to learn how to identify those situations" in which an EPO
will be effective).
53. Id. (discussing the benefits of improved police training).
54. Id
566
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Penal Code § 1275 (amended).
AB 728 (Bowler); 1997 STAT. Ch. 34
I. INTRODUCTION
In May, 1992, approximately 63% of accused state felons were released prior
to their cases being heard.' Of those released, approximately a third were either re-
arrested for a new offense, has a bench warrant issued for their arrest for failing to
appear as scheduled, or committed some other violation that resulted in the
revocation of their pretrial release.2 Moreover, 8% of all accused felons released
prior to the disposition of their cases were still fugitives after one year.3 These
figures demonstrate a serious problem that occurs when felons are released on bail
prior to the disposition of their case.
According to research conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, there is a
correlation between the amount of bail required for release and the likelihood that
a defendant will remain detained until the disposition of his or her case.4 When a
defendant is charged with a violent felony and his or her bail is set at $20,000 or
more, 82% of such defendants remained in detention until the disposition of their
case.5 When bail is set below $20,000, the percentage of defendants charged with
a violent felony detained until disposition of their case drops dramatically. 6 Thus,
one conclusion that can be made is that bail should be set high to successfully
1. Brian A. Reaves & Jacob Perez, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants, 1992, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
BULL., Nov. 1994, at 1; see id. at 3 (noting the three types of pretrial release programs, which are: "nonfinancial"
release, where the accused is released without posting bail; "financial" release, which requires the defendant to post
the full bail amount prior to release; and "emergency" release, where the defendant has no financial or nonfinancial
conditions placed on release, but who was ordered released because of jail overcrowding).
2. Id. at 1.
3. See id. (stating that 8% of defendants with state felony charges filed against them failed to appear as
scheduled and remained fugitives after one year).
4. See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (showing the correlation between higher bail and the
likelihood that a defendant will remain in custody until the disposition of his or her case).
5. See Reaves, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that when bail was set at $20,000 or greater, only 18% of
defendants charged with a violent offense were released prior to the disposition of their case).
6. See id. (noting that when bail was set between $10,000 and $19,999, 62% of felons were detained until
their case was resolved, between $2,500 to $9,999, 48%, and under $2,500, 34%).
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detain serious felons until the disposition of their case. This will facilitate the
probability that the defendant will be present at all required court appearances and
refrain from committing new offenses.7
Chapter 34 was designed to make it more difficult for a defendant charged with
a serious felony to be released on bail lower than that established by the applicable
bail schedule.8 Specifically, Chapter 34 requires a showing of "unusual circum-
stances" before a person charged with a serious felony may have his or her bail
reduced below the amount established by the bail schedule.9 Chapter 34 specifies
that a defendant cannot establish unusual circumstances by showing that he has
made all prior court appearances and has not committed any new offenses.' 0
Proponents of Chapter 34 believe that the public has the right to expect a defen-
dant's compliance with orders to appear for their cases and to expect a defendant
to refrain from committing more offenses while released on bail." Proponents argue
that defendants should not be rewarded for such minimal conduct.'
2
Opponents of Chapter 34 believe that many defendants charged with serious
felonies can be released without bail with little risk that they will fail to appear.
Moreover, opponents of Chapter 34 argue that the requirements set forth in Chapter
34 will increase the overcrowding of local jails and add to the workload of the
courts.,4
7. See In Re Ruef, 7 Cal. App. 750,752,96 P. 24,25 (1905) (stating that bail should not be used to punish
the defendant, but only to insure his attendance to all court proceedings which he is required to attend).
8. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSTS OF AB 728, at 1-2 (June 19, 1997) (stating the purpose of
AB 728 is to "make it more difficult for a person charged with a serious felony to receive bail lower than
established by the schedule").
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (amended by Chapter 34) (requiring the court to find the presence of
unusual circumstances before the bail of a person charged with a serious felony may be reduced below the
established bail schedule amount).
10. See id. (stating that "unusual circumstances" does not include the fact that a defendant has made all prior
court appearances and has not committed any new offenses).
11. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 728, at 2 (June 19, 1997) (noting that a defendant
should be expected to comply with court orders pertaining to his or her case and refrain from committing new
offenses while released on bail).
12. See id. (noting that defendants should not be rewarded with lower bail because they have shown minimal
good conduct required by society).
13. See id. (claiming that many defendants charged with serious felonies may be released without bail with
little or no risk of failing to appear).
14. See id. (arguing that requiring a showing of unusual circumstances for bail to ba reduced for the broad
class of defendants effected by Chapter 34 will increase the problem of jail overcrowding and will add to the
workload of overburdened courts).
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II. LEGAL HISTORY
A felony is any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in a state prison. 5
A subset of felonies are those that are deemed "serious felonies."' 6 Murder,
voluntary manslaughter, rape, kidnaping and robbery are among the felonies that
are considered "serious.' 7 Chapter 34 requires a showing of unusual circumstances
before a defendant charged with a serious felony may have his or her bail reduced
below the amount established by the applicable bail schedule.'8
Bail is a device used by the courts to ensure the appearance of the defendant at
all required court dates.' 9 Bail should not be used as a tool to punish a defendant
during the period before his or her conviction.20 Prior to the enactment of Chapter
34, ajudge or magistrate enjoyed discretion in reducing bail of a defendant charged
with a serious felony.2' In lowering the amount of bail, the judge was only required
to consider the public's protection, the seriousness of the offense charged, the
defendant's prior criminal record, and the likelihood the defendant would make all
required court appearances.22 After these required considerations, thejudge was free
to set bail at any amount he or she deemed appropriate.23
Proponents of Chapter 34 believe that a court's ability to lower bail for
defendants charged with a serious felony should have greater restrictions because
of the likelihood that such defendants will fail to appear.24 Thus, Chapter 34
requires a showing of unusual circumstances before any defendant charged with a
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West 1996) (describing a felony as any crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in a state prison, and noting that all other crimes are either misdemeanors or infractions).
16. See id. § 1192.7(c) (West 1996) (defining a "serious felony" by means of an all inclusive list of felonies
that are considered "serious").
17. Id.
18. See id. § 1275(e) (amended by Chapter 34) (requiring a court to find unusual circumstances in order to
reduce the amount of bail below the bail schedule if the defendant is charged with a serious felony).
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying test (stating that the primary purpose of bail is to force the
defendant's attendance at all required court appearances).
20. See In Re Ruef, 7 Cal. App. 750,752, 96 P.24, 25 (1905) (stating "bail should not be extracted for the
purpose of punishing a person charged with a crime").
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269c (West Supp. 1998) (declaring that a magistrate is authorized to set bail
at any amount that he or she considers sufficient to assure the defendant's appearance).
22. See id. § 1275(a) (amended by Chapter 34) (stating that in setting the amount of bail for any offense,
thejudge will base his or her decision on considerations of public protection, the seriousness of the offense charged,
the defendant's previous criminal record, and the likelihood of the defendant making all required court appearances,
with the public safety being the primary concern).
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that ajudge or magistrate has the authority
to set bail at any amount he or she deems sufficient to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial).
24. See supra note 3 and accompanying test (stating that 25% of accused state felons that were released on
bail had bench warrants issued against them for failing to appear); see also SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 728, at 2 (June 19, 1997) (arguing that the bail of a person charged with a serious felony should not be
reduced unless the existence of unusual circumstances can be proven).
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serious felony may have his bail reduced below the amount established by the
applicable bail schedule.2
III. THE EFFECT OF CHAPTER 34 ON LOCAL JAILS
Jails are locally operated detention facilities that hold defendants both before
and after adjudication.2 Jails usually house inmates sentenced to a year or less, but
are also responsible for holding defendants awaiting trial and convicted felons
awaiting room in prisons.27 As of June 18, 1996, the Nation's jails housed over
500,000 offenders.28 This number represents a 2.3% increase from midyear 1995.29
However, the jail population growth rate was down from the previous year's rate
of 4.2 %.30 The Nation's 1995 jail population growth rate was the lowest it had been
in the previous ten years, which had an annual average growth rate of 6.6%.31
However, Chapter 34 may have the effect of reversing this downward trend and
causing unprecedented jail overcrowding.32
Jail capacity was also down from the previous year, rating at 92%.33 Rated
capacity represents the maximum number of inmates that rating officials have
allocated to a particular jail.34 In 1995, 93% of the Nation's jail capacity was
occupied.35 However, many California county jails were above their rated
capacity.36 In fact, Orange County had the highest percentage of rated capacity in
the Nation at 139%, followed by San Diego County at 119%.31 Opponents of
Chapter 34 argue that requiring the existence of unusual circumstances to reduce
25. CAL PENAL CODE § 1275(e) (amended by Chapter 34).
26. See Darrel K. Gilliard & Allen J. Beck, Ph.D., Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear, 1996, BUREAU OF
JUST. STgT. Bum., Jan. 1997, at 5 (defining jails as locally operated detention facilities that house defendants before
and after adjudication).
27. See id. (noting that in addition to housing inmates sentenced to a year or less, jails also house numerous
other categories of people, including defendants waiting to be arraigned, parole and probation violators, inmates
awaiting transfer to State or Federal prison, mentally ill persons awaiting transfer to health facilities, and juveniles
awaiting transfer to juvenile authorities).
28. See id. (stating that at midyear, 1996, the jails held approximately 518,492 offenders).
29. See id. (noting that the number of offenders housed in jails grew 2.3% from midyear 1995 to midyear
1996).
30. See id. (stating that from midyear 1994 to midyear 1995 the Nation's jail growth rate increased 4.2%).
31. See id. (noting that the jail population growth rate is approximately a third of the annual average from
1985 to 1996).
32. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSiS OF AB 728, at 2 (June 19, 1997) (stating that opponents of
Chapter 24 believe that it will have adverse effects on the California's jails by causing overcrowding).
33. See Gillard, supra note 28, at 7 (stating that as of June 30, 1996, 92% of rated jail capacity was
occupied).
34. kid
35. See id. tbl. 8 (noting that since 1989 the percent of rated capacity occupied by inmates has continued
to decline).
36. See id. thl. 9 (noting that Orange County, San Diego County, and Sacramento County were all abov
their rated capacity).
37. Id.
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the bail of a defendant charged with a serious felony will only add to the already
seriously overcrowded jails in California.38
TV. CONCLUSION
Chapter 34 attempts to make it more difficult for defendants charged with a
serious felony to get their bail reduced from the amount required by the applicable
bail schedule.3 9 Chapter 34 will add to the current problem of jail overcrowding
because defendants charged with serious felonies are more likely to remain in
custody until trial if unusual circumstances must be proven before their bail is
reduced.4 Thus, the advantage of keeping defendants charged with a serious felony
off the streets until their case is adjudicated comes at the price of forcing local
governments to build additional facilities in order to alleviate California's already
overcrowded jails.
38. See SENATEFLOOR, COMMIT=EEANALYSIS OFAB 728, at 2 (June 19, 1997) (stating that Chapter 34 will
increase the overcrowding of California jails).
39. See id. at 1-2 (declaring the purpose of Chapter 34 is to increase the difficulty in reducing bail for
defendants charged with a serious felony).
40. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (describing the effect that having bail set at a higher level
has on the likelihood that a defendant charged with a serious felony will remain in custody until the disposition of
his or her case).

